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INTRODUCTION TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MEXICAN LAW: POLITICS OF MODERN NATIONALISM
EDWARD C. EPSTEIN*
Mexico's recently enacted legislation on investment and technol-
ogy' represents another step in that country's continued development
of modern nationalism. Though these laws announce some new prac-
tices in the regulation of foreign property and investment, they build
directly on earlier government policy and action. The result desired
from this evolving policy is an increase in the ability of the govern-
ment to control the future appearance of Mexico as a nation.
This paper will examine the two new laws in terms of their impli-
cations as to the state of present day Mexican nationalism. The term
"nationalism," here, means the common emotional commitment of
a large number of individuals to the symbols of an historical-cultural-
geographical abstraction called "the nation."2 In Mexico, of particu-
lar relevance are the nationalistic feelings of the dominant political
elite. Their attitudes have been strongly influenced by foreign con-
tact, whether through invasion, foreign investment, or tourism. Mexi-
can nationalism clearly reflects the nation's geographical proximity
to the United States. Many nationalists have long wanted to reduce
their dependence on capital and technology imported from across the
border to the north.
The present analysis falls into three parts. The first looks at the
historical evolution of government policy toward foreign investors
from the 1910 Revolution to the present. The second part is an over-
* ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLrICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH.
1. The complete titles of these two new laws are: Ley para promover la inversion
mexicana y regular la inversion extranjera (The Law to Promote Mexican Investment
and to Regulate Foreign Investment) [hereinafter referred to as Investment Law]; Ley
sobre el registro de la transferencia de tecnologia y el uso y explotacion de patentes y
marcas (Law on the Registry of Technological Transfer and the Use and Exploitation
of Patents and Trademarks) [hereinafter referred to as Technology Law].
2. See generally K. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION (1953).
2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
view of the contents of the two new laws, stressing those aspects
which could potentially be the cause of friction between foreigners
and the Mexican government. The final part focuses on President
Luis Echeverria's efforts to cope with the pressures for drastic change
which have been building up in Mexico in recent years. Through his
utilization of the issue of nationalism, Echeverria hopes to shift the
predominance of power in the government from the Right to the
Center of the political spectrum.
NATIONALISM: THE RECENT PAST
Today's nationalism reflects the past conflict between foreign
investors and the Mexican government. Sharp clashes between the
two have influenced both parties; each side was forced to re-evaluate
its past actions in terms of the outcome of those conflicts and in light
of a changing relationship of bargaining power.
Before the Constitution of 1917, investors clearly had the upper
hand. Their governments frequently intervened in Mexican politics
on their behalf to obtain and preserve the conditions most propitious
for the maximization of profits with minimal restriction on opera-
tions. Many investors were not particularly hesitant to exploit the
political and economic weaknesses of the Mexican government of the
day. Guided by classical liberal arguments about free trade and no-
tions of racial prejudice, they believed they had the right to invest
anywhere abroad. At first, Mexican officials grudingly accepted the
domination and political intervention on the part of the foreign inves-
tors. They did so because of a sense of political helplessness coupled
with naive positivist assumptions that automatic progress would re-
sult from foreign investment.
A growing level of frustration tended to coincide with the ex-
panding Mexican economy. At the same time, an increasing attitude
of confidence was produced by the new economic growth which pro-
vided the Mexican government with the resolve to challenge the for-
merly unquestioned dominance of the foreigners. Government actions
to restrict the activities of the investors caught the latter by surprise,
resulting in sharp conflicts between the two.
Further interaction between investors and the government was
dependent on the outcome of the initial conflict. Where the govern-
ment was able to impose restrictions on the investors, the latter grad-
ually reconciled themselves to accepting the legitimacy of the govern-
ment's right to set rules for future investment. As a result, the inves-
tors attempted merely to keep the changes to a minimum by applying
the only pressure available to them-threats to withdraw or withhold
funds from Mexican investment. An atmosphere of mutual bargain-
ing developed as the growing strength and confidence of the Mexican
government asserted itself against the power of the foreign investors.
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The evolution of this nationalism was not a uniform progression.3
Early governments were unable to make more than symbolic protests
against the domination of Mexican resources by foreigners. Although
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution reasserted the State's traditional
monopoly of subsoil ownership rights,4 in the face of U.S. threats of
military invasion and the withholding of diplomatic recognition,
nothing was done to repossess mining and petroleum properties ille-
gally deeded to foreign companies during the Diaz period. 5 Similarly,
other provisions of the same Article existed only on paper, such as the
right to expropriate private property with compensation and the right
to forbid foreign land holdings in border and littoral areas. The acts
of intervention of U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson in 1913 and
the sending of American naval and land forces into Mexico as in the
1914 Vera Cruz landing or the 1916-17 Pershing expedition remained
a vivid memory of the power of the United States.7 Thus, not until
the government of Lazaro Cardenas in 1938 was there any serious
interference with the economic activities of foreign businessmen.
The assertion of a strong nationalist position by the Cardenas
government toward foreign-owned petroleum forced outside investors
to re-examine their assumptions about the Mexican government's
ability to limit foreign property rights. Faced with a direct challenge
to his government by the oil companies which refused to recognize
Mexican labor law, Cardenas reacted by expropriating their proper-
ties. The Mexican position in the open conflict which resulted was
strengthened by the likely prospect of World War II. In its desire to
avoid a repeat of the World War I situation of bad relations, the
United States hesitated to exert the type of pressure which would
have normally been expected.' An arrangement for compensation was
agreed upon during the government of Manuel Avila Camacho, Car-
denas' successor. The successful expropriation of petroleum finally
established that foreign investors, indeed, were to be subject to Mexi-
can law.
By the mid-1950's, Mexico had created a modus vivendi with
foreign investors. Disputes over financial compensation due foreign-
3. Particular presidents were specially responsible for winning Mexico more con-
trol over its resources, while others like Miguel Aleman and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz were
either uninterested or temporarily reversed the process.
4. See THE CONSTrrUIONS OF THE AMERICAS 505-13 (R. Fitzgibbon ed. 1948).
5. G. MAUR, NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 78 (1966). For a more detailed picture
of this period see R.F. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM IN
MEXICO, 1916-1932 (1972).
6. CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 4, at 505-13.
7. J. FAGG, LATIN AMERICA: A GENERAL HISTORY 536, 538 (1969); SMITH, supra note
5, at 43-70.
8. SMITH, supra note 5, at 96.
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ers from the 1910-1917 revolutionary period had long since been set-
tled. Foreign capital was now flowing back into Mexico at a rate
unprecedented in Mexican history. These new investors were not
frightened by the government regulations reserving certain aspects of
the Mexican economy to Mexicans only.' When problems arose dur-
ing this time concerning the operation of the foreign-dominated
power industry, negotiations finalized in 1960 provided for the Mexi-
can purchase of the industry, a settlement quite acceptable to the
foreign owners.10 The purchase of U.S. owned copper and sulfur prop-
erties and of majority ownership of the telephone system in 19721,
only marked a continuation of the now well established Mexican
government policy that basic industries such as petroleum, minerals,
communications and steel ought to be owned by Mexican nationals
and not foreigners.
The 1973 foreign investment law really says very little which was
new in terms of Mexican government policy. For example, in 1963,
an official Mexican publication aimed at foreign investors stated:
Foreign private investment is well received when it does not displace
Mexican capital, when it associates on a minority basis with local inves-
tors, devotes itself to increasing the country's productivity, and does not
attempt to obtain privileges or preference.12
Though not radically new, the 1973 law serves a purpose; it is written
to be specific and enforceable. The Echeverria government in 1972
clearly felt that the somewhat vague, voluntaristic approach of its
predecessors needed some tightening-up in order that abuses such as
the increasing number of purchases of established Mexican enter-
prises by foreigners be stemmed.
The nationalist fears in Mexico in the early 1970's of a foreign
take-over of the most profitable sectors of Mexican industry received
widespread publicity. One article claimed that in 1970 foreign invest-
ment in manufacturing controlled 84 percent of the tobacco industry,
78 percent of chemicals, 68 percent of metal products, 54 percent of
non-metallic mineral products, 60.5 percent of diverse manufacturing
products, and 33 percent of paper and paper products. 3 Article 8 of
the investment law which gives preference to Mexican investors in
9. See BANCO NATIONAL DE COMERcIo EXTERIOR, MEXICO 181-182, (1966); M.
WIONCZEK, INVERSION Y TECNOLOGIA EXTRANTERA EN AMERICA LATINA 145-146 (1971);
M. B=TETA, Mexican Government Policy Towards Foreign Investors, in FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 265-272 (M. Bernstein ed. 1966).
10. See generally M. WIONCZEK, Electric Power: The Uneasy Partnership, in
PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN MEXICO 19 (R. Vernon ed. 1964).
11. Siempre, Dec. 6, 1972, at 13.
12. BANCO NATIONAL DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR, MEXICO 288 (1963).
13. E. Mujica, Por fin: la ley esperada, Siempre, Jan. 10, 1973, at 30, quoting
figures from a study by economist C. Bazdresch.
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company purchases is clearly aimed at limiting, if not preventing, the
continued de-nationalization of Mexican industry.
The new laws deal with another problem area facing the Echev-
erria government-the continued deficit in Mexico's balance of pay-
ments. Some writers suggested that the process of import-
substitution industrialization upon which so many hopes were resting
was actually increasing pressure on the balance of payments by re-
quiring a steady stream of imported parts and technology from
abroad, all of which had to be paid for with "hard" currency. The
anticipated exports to the world market have been very slow in com-
ing. Between 1956 and 1966, as foreign investment continued to
increase in Mexico, the extent of sales abroad of United States in-
dustrial subsidies operating in Mexico rose from one and one-half
percent of total sales to only thirteen percent, most of which were in
auto exports.' 5 Nor has the export of manufactured products from
new plants installed just inside the Mexican border in the late 1960's
had much effect on the balance of payments, since most exports are
merely assembled in Mexico using parts directly imported from the
United States.
The 1972 technology law was aimed at reducing the balance of
payments pressure by controlling the imports of costly technology,
much of which may not really make a major contribution to Mexican
know-how. According to one 1969 study of U.S. subsidiaries operating
in Mexico, almost half the respondents admitted that export prohibi-
tions had been imposed upon them by their home offices.' Article 7,
Fraction 7 of the new law bans this practice of forbidding industries
operating in Mexico from exporting abroad. The heavy spending of
Mexican industry on imported technology has contributed to Mex-
ico's growing foreign debt and in many cases has done nothing to
facilitate the exports needed to pay the costs. 7
Taken together, the technology and the investment laws fit well
into the pattern just described of an emerging Mexican nationalism.
The laws are the logical continuation of a series of government poli-
cies intended to give Mexican officials more control over their econ-
omy. To determine their potential impact, it is necessary to study
14. WIONCZEK, supra note 9, at 31-33.
15. Id. at 153. Non-auto exports in 1966 were only three percent of total sales of
U.S. subsidiaries in Mexico.
16. The study referred to by the National Chamber Foundation of Washington,
D.C. is cited in WIONCZEK, supra note 9, at 163.
17. For a study of Mexico and other Latin American countries' serious foreign
debt problem see M. WIONCZEK, El endeudamiento publico externo y los cambios
sectorales en la inversion privada extranjera de America Latina, in LA DEPENDENCLA
POLMCo-EcoNOMICA DE AMERICA LATrNA 111-145 (H. Jaguaribe ed. 1971).
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them in greater detail.
THE LEGISLATION OF 1972-73
In late 1972, the two laws were sent to the Mexican Congress by
President Echeverria. Both bills were passed and signed into law
without major modification of the presidential drafts. 8 The contents
of each will be described separately.
The law on technology establishes a National Registry for the
Transference of Technology within the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce. 9 All contracts or agreements concerning the transference
and use of technology, patents and trademarks must be filed with the
Registry within 60 days in order to be legally binding.20 Typically
such contracts involve either foreigners or foreign owned businesses,
since most of Mexico's technology is imported from abroad and a
large part of its trademarks and patents are foreign owned.
While the registration requirements are not particularly contro-
versial, the extensive contract limitations presented by Article 7 of
the law might appear more subject to debate. Article 7 lists fourteen
instances under which contract approval will normally be denied.'
18. Hispanoamericano, Feb. 26, 1973, at 8; Siempre, Dec. 6, 1972, at 13; Siempre,
Jan. 10, 1973, at 6.
19. Technology Law, supra note 1, art. 1.
20. Id., arts. 2,4,6.
21. Id., art. 7. These fourteen instances include:
1. When the object is the transference of technology freely available in
the country... ;
2. When the price has no relation to [the value of] the technology
acquired or constitutes an unjustifiable and excessive burden on the na-
tional economy;
3. When clauses are included which permit the purveyor to regulate or
intervene in, directly or indirectly, the business of the technology's ac-
quirer;
4. When the obligation is established to cede for little or nothing to the
purveyor of the technology the patents, trademarks, innovations, or im-
provements that are obtained by the acquirer;
5. When limits are imposed on research or technical development (of
the technology) by the acquirer;
6. When the obligation is established to acquire equipment, tools, parts,
or raw material exclusively from one specified source;
7. When the export of the goods or services produced by the acquirer are
prohibited in a manner contrary to the interest of the country;
8. When the use of complementary technology is prohibited;
9. When the obligation is established to sell exclusively to the purveyor
of the technology the goods produced by the acquirer;
10. When the acquirer is obliged permanently to use personnel indi-
cated by the purveyor of the technology;
11. When the volume of production is limited or prices for sale or resale
are imposed on national production or on the exports of the acquirer;
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Since many of the practices mentioned in the fourteen points have
commonly been incorporated in contracts for the acquisition of for-
eign technology, the new law serves as formal notice that the Mexican
government finds such practices harmful to its goal of rapid in-
dustrial development. The harshness of the new law is considerably
diluted, however, by an important escape clause. Under a number of
the fourteen points, exceptions can be made where the technology to
be acquired is "of particular interest to the country. ' ' 2 In other words,
the distasteful aspects of some contracts will be ignored when the
technology to be gained outweighs the disadvantages of retaining
such contracts. The law, therefore, is nationalistic, but flexible.
The second piece of legislation, the investment law, seeks to
restrict foreign ownership and control over the Mexican economy by
formalizing certain established government policies which have re-
served parts of the economy for state control while leaving other parts
to wholly Mexican-owned private enterprises.2 3 Moreover, in those
areas where foreign investment is allowed, the percentage of foreign
capital invested is to be limited. For mining concessions, foreign capi-
tal investment may not exceed forty-nine percent of any single busi-
ness. Henceforth, no mining concessions may be transferred directly
to foreigners. 24 For firms dealing with the secondary products of the
petrochemical industry and those engaged in the manufacture of au-
tomobile parts, capital investment by foreigners is limited to forty
percent. Where no specific limit is indicated in the law or by execu-
tive regulatory dispositions, an upper limit of forty-nine percent is to
be understood. Although the law is not clear, these restrictions seem-
ingly apply only to new investments and to businesses presently in
Mexican possession.
Similar to the law on technology, the investment law has appro-
priate escape clauses in order to provide for regulatory flexibility.
Where foreign investment is "advantageous for the Mexican econ-
omy," the normal limit of forty-nine percent may be altered.2
One of the special problem areas the investment law is designed
12. When the acquirer is obliged to sign exclusive sales or representation
contracts with the purveyor of the technology within national territory;
13. When the contracts are for an excessive period. In no case can the
time period exceed ten years for the acquirer; or
14. When knowledge of the resolution of legal judgments originating out
of the interpretation or fulfillment of the said acts, agreements, or con-
tracts (must be) submitted to foreign courts.
22. Id., art. 8. Such exception will be made for points 2,3,6 and 8-12.
23. Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 4.
24. Id., art. 5, fraction a.
25. Id., art. 5.
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to control concerns the situation in which Mexican companies are
induced to sell out to foreign investors. In recent years, an ever in-
creasing share of foreign money in Mexico has gone toward the pur-
chase of existing local firms, rather than the establishment of new
ones. In a survey of the subsidiaries of the largest U.S. companies
established in Mexico from 1958 to 1967, it was discovered that 61
percent were acquired from prior Mexican owners, whereas only 39
percent were newly organized.2 1 The Mexican government now hopes
to control this practice in the future by requiring special authoriza-
tion whenever foreigners acquire more than 25 percent of the capital
or more than 49 percent of the fixed assets of the particular Mexican
company.
27
The above provisions of the investment law are to be supervised
by a National Commission for Foreign Investments, comprised of the
heads of seven key government ministries. 28 This commission is to be
aided in its decisions on granting exemptions under the law by seven-
teen guidelines. These include consideration of the effects of foreign
investment on the Mexican balance of payments and Mexico's ability
to export, the effect on employment and salaries, the use of Mexican-
made parts and Mexican technology.
2 9
To ensure that the provisions of the investment law are enforced,
all shares in Mexican enterprises held by foreigners must be con-
verted into registered shares (titulos nominativos) whereas pre-
viously, no such registration was necessary. 0 Furthermore, all foreign
investments must be registered with the National Registry for For-
eign Investments, a dependency of the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce, under the authority of the Executive Secretary of the National
Commission for Foreign Investments.31 Failure to register denies the
non-complying company the right to pay dividends.2 Fines up to
100,000 pesos may be levied against violating company officers and
directors who may be held personally liable.3 Further, any individual
who permits foreigners to enjoy the rights of investment reserved to
Mexican citizens will be subject to fines of up to 50,000 pesos and a
26. J. VAUPEL & J. CURHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 300-301
(1969). The percentages are a radical increase from the 1948-1957 period when the
percentages for acquired and new subsidiaries were thirty-nine and sixty-one respec-
tively, exactly the reverse of the decade to come.
27. Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 8.
28. Id., art. 11.
29. For the complete set of guidelines see id., art. 13.
30. Id., art. 25.
31. Id., arts. 23,24.
32. Id., art. 27.
33. Id., arts. 28, 29.
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prison sentence of up to nine years. 34 This last provision is designed
to eliminate the so-called prestanombres (strawmen), Mexican citi-
zens who have lent their names to foreigners so that the latter could
invest in and control areas of the Mexican economy otherwise forbid-
den to foreign citizens.
In short, the laws represent a formal legal response to the steadily
increasing call for the control of imported funds and technology by
Mexican nationalists. While they may be seen as a response by the
government to economic pressures, political pressures may really be
much more important as the next section will show.
ECHEVERRIA AND THE MEXICAN POLITICAL CRISIS
In recent years, Mexican politics has been characterized by its
apparent stability. A series of presidents have each peacefully served
out their term. This surface calm was shattered, however, in October
1968, by the Tlatelolco massacre, and again in June 1971 by the
Falcons incident (Las Halcones). 35 Each of these events caused a
major crisis in the Mexican government.
Tlatelolco and the Falcons incident were symptomatic of how the
administrations of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70) and Luis Echever-
ria responded to increasing social tensions. An analysis of these two
incidents will aid in understanding the reasons for the passage of the
new legislation of 1972-73.
During the presidency of Diaz Ordaz, political power in Mexico
had shifted to the Right. Echeverria, on the other hand, has sought
to shift more toward the Center. It appears that Echeverria has
sought to accomplish this shift partially through the new legislation
previously discussed. By re-emphasizing nationalism, he hopes to
attract the political support of those of the left of the regime whose
aid will be needed to oust the well-entrenched conservative forces left
over from his predecessor's government.
Most authors agree that Mexican politics has been dominated in
recent years by strong presidents who have presided over coalitions
of usually subordinate personality and interest groups. 31 Significant
crises are likely to occur only when important groups, either within
or outside the governing elite, directly challenge government policies.
34. Id., art. 31.
35. For descriptions of these events see C. FUENTES, TIEMPO MEXICANO 147-172
(1971); K. JOHNSON, MEXICAN DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL VIEW 148-164 (1971); M. TmRADO,
EL 10 DE JUN1O Y LA IZQUIERDA RADICAL 16-39, 118-128, 178-181 (1971).
36. See F. BRANDENBURG, THE MAKING OF MODERN MEXICO 2-7 (1964); P. GONZALES
CASANOVA, LA DEMOCRACIA EN MEXICO 26-31 (1967); R. HANSEN, LA POLITICA DEL DESAR-
ROLLO MEXICANO 170-171 (1971); JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 59-76; R. SCOTT, MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITION 259 (1959).
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The incidents of 1968 and 1971 were confrontations of this sort. To
explain these events and the attempts to deal with them, it is neces-
sary to first look at the division of power within Mexico in the late
1960's and early 1970's.
Brandenburg suggests that this division of power consists of




3) Revolutionary [or governmental] Left
4) Revolutionary [or governmental] Center
5) Revolutionary [or governmental] Right
6) Traditional Conservatives
7) Reactionary Conservatives
Of these seven, only the members of the so-called "Revolutionary
Publics" (groups 3-5) have exercised power in Mexico since the end
of the violent stage of the Revolution in 1917. These three are the key
groups which may or may not have support from the actors on one of
the extremes. Brandenburg believes that the Center has usually been
best represented in the presidency, but that on specific occasions,
power has swung to one of the other "Revolutionary" groups. Presi-
dent Cardenas (1934-40) has been the only representative of the Rev-
olutionary Left, while Presidents Aleman (1946-52) and Diaz Ordaz
have represented the Revolutionary Right.
3 8
The governments of the Revolutionary Center and Right have
generally agreed on government policies favoring big agriculture over
the peasant (ejido) sector, urban over rural interests and, in general,
the more affluent over the less affluent.39 As a result, the distribution
of income in Mexico has become steadily more inequitable. While
these inequities have been protested by radical students and dissi-
dent trade union leaders, for the most part, the protests have either
been ignored or repressed by government officials. One such repres-
sion was the Tlatelolco massacre.
This particular incident arose from a situation of increasing stu-
dent militancy confronted by brutal government armed repression.
The government of President Diaz Ordaz was closely identified with
the Revolutionary Right and its allies among many major business-
37. BRANDENBURG, supra note 36, at 119.
38. Id. at 131-140.
39. I.M. de Navarrete, Income Distribution in Mexico, in MExIco's RECENT Eco-
NOMic GROWTH: THE MEXICAN VIEW 133-172 (T. Davis ed. 1967). A major critique of
the situation of the Mexican peasantry is presented in Stavenhagen, Social Aspects of
Agrarian Structure in Mexico, in AGRARIAN PROBLEMS AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS IN
LATIN AMERICA 225-270 (R. Stavenhagen ed. 1970).
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men operating in Mexico. The street demonstrations organized by the
students in Mexico City just prior to the 1968 Olympic Games repre-
sented to the Right (especially the Monterrey Group of industrial-
ists)40 an intolerable challenge. The government responded with an
armed attack on the students."
After Tlatelolco, the criticism of the political system, which had
begun in 1965 by Carlos Madrazo and others,4" reached major propor-
tions. The so-called "Mexican miracle" of sustained economic growth
was widely condemned on the Left as hollow and superficial. The
gross national product had indeed increased steadily, but critics be-
lieved that the beneficiaries were those who least needed to benefit.
This rising tide of criticism from various groups both within and
outside of the "Revolutionary Publics '43 was to have a major impact
on Diaz Orda-'s successor, Luis Echeverria.
Once in office, Echeverria was faced with a choice between fur-
ther repression or a new democratization." His so-called "democratic
opening" was a response in favor of the latter." Instead of Diaz
Ordaz's almost exclusive concern with new investments and G.N.P.
growth per se, Echeverria began speaking of the need to redistribute
income as a means of promoting both social justice and a larger
domestic market.4 6 He was highly critical of foreign investors who
sought only profit repatriation, while ignoring the need for a constant
reinvestment of profits and increase in Mexican exports.47
The critical speeches of the new President aroused a great deal
of anxiety among Mexican conservatives and their foreign allies who
saw their position in Mexico in danger. They were even more upset
by the President's intervention at the end of May 1971 in a university
dispute in Monterrey, a major center of conservative political and
economic control, which resulted in the ouster of both the university
rector and the governor who had appointed and supported him
against the students."
The response of the conservatives was to instigate an attack by
40. For a discussion of the "Monterrey Group" see JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 76.
41. Id. at 159-161; Latin America, Oct. 11, 1968, at 325-326.
42. JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 45-47.
43. See E. PADILLA ARAGON, MEXICO: DESARROLLO CON POBREZA (1969); F.
CARMONA, EL MILAGRO MEXlCANO (1970); M. MORENO SANCHEZ, CRISIS POLITICA DE
MExIco (1970); R. STAVENHAGEN, NEOLATIFUNDISIMO Y EXPLOTACION (1968).
44. FUENTES, supra note 35, at 162.
45. See Latin America, Jan. 29, 1971, at 34,36.
46. BANCO NATIONAL DE COMERCiO EXTERIOR, MEXICO: LA POLITICA ECONOMICA DEL
NUEVO GOBIERNO 16-18 (1971).
47. Id. at 190-191.
48. Latin America, June 11, 1971, at 189-190.
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bands of armed thugs called Falcons on a group of student demon-
strators in Mexico City, while police officials stood by passively. The
reaction of the Left to the Falcons' attack was as strong as that after
Tlatelolco in 1968. Clearly, the President was faced with the need to
take strong measures against those responsible if he was to preserve
his new-found support on the Left. Such action, on the other hand,
might threaten the political structure, because any attempt to punish
the powerful economic personages of the Right could provoke wide-
spread political struggle.
Echeverria acted cautiously. After demonstrating that he had
the strong backing of the Mexican military, which stationed tanks at
strategic locations in the Federal District, he forced the resignations
of the Regent of Mexico City and the Chief of Police. Echeverria's
next move was to defuse the immediate crisis by calling for what was
sure to be a protracted investigation of the whole affair.49 This inter-
val could be used by the President to rally support for himself and
to strengthen his political base.
The new laws of 1972 and 1973 ought to be seen as part of this
attempt to Echeverria to strengthen his political base. The issue of
nationalism is highly suited to appeal to those to the left of the
President, while it puts the Right on the defensive. Mexican investors
and industrialists, with their foreign allies, will find it difficult to
attack the President openly without leaving themselves vulnerable to
charges of putting foreign interests ahead of those of their own nation.
The political offensive by Echeverria and his supporters to pass
the new legislation began in October 1972, just prior to the Seventh
National Assembly of the government party, the PRI. In a speech
delivered at the Fundo de Cultura Economica on October 18, the day
before the Assembly opening, the President himself spoke of the great
pressure on Mexican companies to sell out to foreigners.50 At the
Assembly, Lic. Jesus Reyes Heroles, the new president of the PRI
Executive Committee, called for a law to permit the government to
regulate foreign and private investment. 5' The Program for Action,
produced by the Assembly as a PRI policy statement, repeated the
call for such a law.52 The theme switched on October 30, when Lic.
Rodolfo Echeverria Ruiz, another high PRI official, condemned the
importation of obsolete technology from abroad which inflated Mexi-
can production costs.53 Four days later, the President sent the tech-
49. Id. at 193-194, 196, 205-207.
50. Siempre, Dec. 6, 1972, at 13.
51. Hispanoamericano, Oct. 30, 1972, at 14.
52. Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 10.
53. Hispanoamericano, Oct. 30, 1972, at 14.
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nology bill to Congress where it received rapid approval by the PRI
majorities in both houses. About the same time, the notable sympa-
thetic magazine Siempre, itself a voice of the Revolutionary Left,
contained a number of articles and editorials urging the passage of
the technology bill and what was to be the investment bill.
5 4
The passage of the new laws at that time was a direct result of
the governmental crisis in Mexico, first apparent at Tlatelolco and
intensified by the Falcons incident. While the crisis may have been
disturbing to those who had imagined Mexico as a land of political
stability, it also had its positive side. It gained for the beleaguered
government the support of a number of prominent figures on the Left
(such as Carlos Fuentes who had been highly critical of Echeverria's
predecessor, Diaz Ordaz) and, indeed, support of much of the Mexi-
can political rystem. 5
The laws, themselves, offer the opportunity for the Mexican gov-
ernment to continue to extend its control over various parts of the
national economy in its professed desire to promote development
with social justice. Such control seems both logical and necessary as
Mexican nationalism evolves.
With their various escape clauses, the laws will require the neces-
sary government resolve if they are to attain their desired ends. Be-
cause the forces opposed to the implementation of the laws are still
strong in parts of the government bureaucracy, such implementation
cannot be assumed as a matter of fact. As one writer has suggested
in speaking of Latin America as a whole:
[It] is well known that in Latin America . . .many problems related to
foreign investment are resolved in a casuistic and administrative way,
outside of existing law, and in agreement with the "power of persuasion"
of the large transnational investors.m
Those political analysts who are optimists will see the laws of
1972-73 as a sign that the Echeverria Presidency really is serious
about its desire to change the priorities of Mexican development. On
the other hand, the cynics will probably view the new legislation as
little more than an exercise in the "symbolic uses of politics." 57 We,
the observers, must wait to see.
54. H. Castilla, Aparecen Cartas Marcadas, al Cambian Las Reglas del Juego,
Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 24; Editorial, Una Ley que Regula la Inversion Extranjera,
Siempre, Oct. 18, 1972, at 16-17; Mujica, En la Battalla Para Ajustar la Tecnologia
Extranjera, Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 28-29; Mujica, Por Fin: La Ley Esperada,
Siempre, Jan. 10, 1973, at 30-31; Martinez de la Vega, Cambien Ciertas Reglas Pero
No El Juego, Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 26-27.
55. See FUENTES, supra note 35 at 162-172; also Fuentes, El Extremismo de
Algunos Jovenes Descencantados, in TmAno, supra note 35, at 118-122.
56. WIONCZEK, supra note 9, at 97.
57. See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
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MEXICAN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS By
FOREIGNERS
ZACK V. CHAYET* AND LEONARD v.B. SUTTON**
The desire of foreigners to reside in, or to own real property, in
Mexico goes back, at least, to Cortez' voyage from Cuba to Mexico
in 1519.' The first invaders and settlers sought primarily the abun-
dant mineral wealth, agricultural lands, converts and slaves, while in
contrast, the first twentieth century visitors sought primarily petro-
leum and business and manufacturing opportunities. As these later
opportunities disappeared or diminished due to restrictive laws and
regulations, a new breed, mostly from the United States, came as
friends usually seeking the sunny climes, the lovely broad beaches
and the wonderful world of water sports. The net effect of these latter
day "invaders" on Mexico's economy has been tremendously benefi-
cial.
Each period of Mexico's past has had a part in shaping its nu-
merous Constitutions2 and various laws, resulting in today's unique
type of federal democracy. The large estates and ancient land grants
(latifundios), from the Mexican social viewpoint, had to be broken up
to provide a means of livelihood for the unlanded, poor rural workers.
The petroleum resources had to be nationalized to prevent foreign
exploitation to the detriment of the Republic, and gradually, some
parts of the business and commercial fields of activity were prohib-
ited to, or restricted for, foreigners in order to assure Mexicans a fair
opportunity to develop their own sources of production and wealth.
Undoubtedly, the pressures of the human waves that have
sought to exploit, or to enjoy, Mexico have resulted in such self-
protective clauses as Article 27 of the Constitution adopted in 1917,
which provides, in part:
Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national
territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the
right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting
private property.
* Instructor of International Business Transactions, University of Denver, College
of Law; Legal Advisor to the Mexican Consulate and Consul A.H. of Honduras;
member of the Mexican Bar Association, Inter-American Bar Association and Interna-
tional Bar Association.
** Practicing attorney in Denver, Colorado and Washington, D.C.; former Chief
Justice, Colorado Supreme Court; former Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission of the United States; member of Council Inter-American Bar Association and
the Academia Mexicana de Derecho Internacional.
1. J. DELOREDO & SOTELO, HISTORIA DE MEXICO 279 (1955).
2. L. SUTTON, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: MEXICO (1973).
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Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public use
and subject to payment of indemnity.
• . . In the Nation is vested the direct ownership of all natural resources
of the continental shelf and the submarine shelf of the islands; . . . all
minerals . . . . [and] petroleum . . .
In the Nation is likewise vested the ownership of . . . [all waters
territorial and inland] . . . waters extracted from mines . . . Under-
ground waters may be brought to the surface by artificial works and
utilized by the surface owner . . . [subject to certain restrictions] . . .
Legal capacity to acquire ownership of lands and waters of the Nation
shall be governed by the following provisions:
(I) Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies
have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurte-
nances, or to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or of waters.
The State may grant such rights to foreigners, provided they agree before
the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider themselves as nationals in
respect to such property and bind themselves not to invoke the protection
of their government in matters relating thereto; under penalty in case of
non-compliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the property ac-
quired to the Nation. [This is known as the Calvo Clause].' Under no
circumstances may foreigners acquire direct ownership of lands or waters
within a zone of one hundred kilometers along the frontiers and of fifty
kilometers along the shores of the country. [emphasis added]'
In Mexico, all real property, unless restricted in some manner,
may be acquired by "qualified" persons by purchase, gift, inheri-
tance, exchange and adverse possession.5 Generally, realty held and
claimed in good faith adversely for five years, or even in bad faith for
ten years, can result in the ouster of the legal title holder' under the
applicable Statute of Limitations. Due to the many facets of the
subject under consideration, this article will consider only selective
categories of realty interests concerning foreigners in Mexico which
seem to be of the greatest current interest.
I. COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS SITES
Land for commercial and business uses may be acquired by qual-
ified foreigners (as defined under "IV Home Sites in General," infra),
except in the prohibited zones, to the extent necessary for their opera-
3. Named after Carlos Calvo (1830-1890) of Argentina, the validity of the clause
was upheld by the United States Claims Commission in North American Dredging
Company (United States v. Mexico), Opinions of the Commissioners 21 (Ct. Cl. 1926).
For a discussion of this case, see M. KATZ & K. BREWSTER, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
AND RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 144 (1960). For a discussion of the Calvo Clause
see Eder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAWYER 611 (1970).
4. CONSTriTION OF MEXICO, conveniently found in StrrroN, supra note 2, at 8-15
(hereinafter cited as CONSTtrUTION).
5. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, A STATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF MEXICO IN
MATTERS AFFECTING BUSINESS (4th ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as OAS).
6. Id. at 243.
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tions, provided they first procure the consent of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores). In Mexico, con-
sent by a prospective seller to an alien buyer is meaningless without
governmental approval, which is obtained only after the completion
of a suitable petition, governmental investigation and consent by the
foreign buyer to the Calvo Clause. As a widely used provision in many
Latin American countries in dealings with foreigners, the Calvo
Clause should not be a matter of great concern because Mexican law
protects fully any national, or qualified foreigner, who lawfully pos-
sesses. real property in Mexico.7 Although Mexican law states that
agriculture and livestock raising are commercial enterprises, foreign-
ers are not "qualified" persons to acquire farms and ranch lands.,
H. FARM AND RANCH LANDS
Under Mexican law, rural property is divided into three classes:
the ejidos (communal), small properties and medium-sized proper-
ties;' and the Constitution provides for the adoption of local laws and
regulations to govern where larger tracts are necessary.10 Items 10 to
15 of Article 27, as expanded by the Agrarian Code of December 31,
1948, indicate how individuals or groups may obtain lands, either as
restitution or by grant.
Due to its history and its agrarian "revolutions," Mexico adopted
laws to cope with its need to break up the large estates and to try to
assure the small farmer the opportunity to make a living on his own
land. Ejidos, devised as a form of communal ownership, are a grant
of farm land to a group in an area with a prohibition on sale or
transfer by the farmer-owners to protect them against exploitation
and dissipation. Only the Federal Government has the power to
change the status of such lands by permitting higher or different use,
but has seldomly done so, and then, only upon determination that
such is beneficial for the owners. In such cases, the communal owners
are provided with other suitable lands and, when possible, with job
opportunities arising out of the new development of their old lands.
An Organization of American States publication sets forth the
small property requirements of Item 15 of Article 27 as follows:
a. Small agricultural properties will be considered as those which do not
exceed 100 hectares (247 acres) of first class irrigated land or their equiva-
lent in other lands under cultivation;
b. For purposes of equivalence, one hectare of irrigated land will be
computed as two of unirrigated (temporal) land, four of summer pasture
7. CONsTrrmON, supra note 4, art. 33.
8. OAS, supra note 5, at 168-171.
9. Id. at 168.
10. CONsTrrurON, supra note 4, art. 33, § 15.
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(agostadero) land of good quality, and eight of hilly or pasture land in
arid sections;
c. Small agricultural lands also include areas which do not exceed 200
hectares of unirrigated crop lands or summer pasture susceptible of culti-
vation; 150 hectares when the lands are utilized for the cultivation of
cotton, if they receive irrigation from rivers or by pumping; and 300
hectares when used for the cultivation of bananas, sugar cane, coffee,
henequen, rubber, coconuts, grapes, olives, cinchona, vanilla, cacao or
fruit trees;
d. Small stockraising properties are regarded as those which do not
exceed an area necessary to maintain up to 500 head of large livestock
(cattle) or the equivalent in small livestock (such as sheep), within the
terms of the law, in accordance with the forage capacity of the lands;
e. Whenever owing to irrigation, drainage or any other works under-
taken by the owners or possessors of a small holding for which a certificate
of exemption has been issued, the quality of their lands has been im-
proved for cultivation or stockraising, such property may not be subject
to agrarian appropriation even when, by virtue of the improvement
obtained, the maximum indicated herein is exceeded, provided they meet
the requirements fixed by law."
Pursuant to Item 12 of Article 27, the maximum area of rural
holdings and the subdivision of excessive holdings are regulated, re-
spective to jurisdition, by the Federal Congress or the state legisla-
tures. Thus, the maximum area of land owned by one natural, or
juridical, person is fixed by each state, territory and the Federal
District. These medium property holdings, as well as the small hold-
ings, are subject to acquisition by foreigners, since:
. . . in accordance with Article 54 of the Agrarian Code the requirement
of being a native-born Mexican applies only to recipients of land grants,
that is, to the acquisition of ejidos."1
Of course, here again, permission must be obtained by foreigners
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lease or purchase such lands.
Im. EMBASSIES
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, by amendment adopted
November 9, 1940, provides specifically that:
The State, in accordance with its reciprocity, may in the discretion of the
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs authorize foreign states to acquire, at the
permanent sites of the Federal Powers, private ownership of real property
necessary for the direct services of their embassies or legations.
No known difficulty has been encountered, since 1940, in regard to
Embassies. However, the prohibitions and restrictions on private
ownership evidently prevail regarding the acquisition of sites for
homes for diplomatic and consular personnel and, possibly, even for
consulates, whether located in the Federal District, or elsewhere in
11. OAS, supra note 5, at 169.
12. Id. at 20.
VOL. 4:15
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
the Republic. Presumably in the border and coastal prohibited zones,
title still cannot be acquired outright for such purposes, even today.
Apparently, the trust format (Fideicomiso) described herein, in sec-
tion V, is now applicable in such cases.
IV. HOME SImEs-INTERIOR LOCATIONS
As to interior sites, amendments to the Population Law of De-
cember 30, 1960, require qualified foreigners to obtain prior govern-
mental permission to acquire any real property, or rights thereto.
Later regulations clarified these requirements, forbidding the owner-
ship of shares in speculative realty companies, and also limited the
acquisition of acquiring property as follows:
a. Nonimmigrants who enter as tourists, transmigrants or visitors (visi-
tantes) may not acquire real property or rights (unless prior specific per-
mission is obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except such
permission is not necessary for residential leases for the term of their
authorized stay).
b. Nonimmigrants who enter as political refugees or students may do
so only in exceptional cases.
c. Immigrants or temporary residents may acquire their dwellings and
also other real property or rights provided this is not contrary to their
imigration status.
d. Permanent residents may acquire real property and rights as long as
their status is not restricted in this sense.
e. When a foreigner acquires property rights involuntarily, the Secretar-
iat may grant permission to formalize the operation.
f. Foreigners may dispose of their properties without permission of the
Secretariat. 3
Thus, it is important to remember that a mere tourist, as such,
cannot acquire real estate, even in the interior of Mexico, except
residential leases. Additionally, one must qualify as a resident or
immigrant to be eligible to purchase land or buildings in the interior.
The actual mechanics of a purchase by a qualified buyer requires
the execution of a Purchase and Sale Agreement, as in the United
States, with a clause therein providing that it shall not be effective
until, and unless, consent to the purchase by the foreigner is obtained
in a specified time from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Written
application is made for such permission which, barring unforeseen
problems, issues within a reasonable time. The Ministry has wide
discretion in granting the application. The value of the property
seems to be immaterial in this regard, and the validity of the title is
between the parties. This proceeding is presided over by a Notary
Public, who is a Mexican lawyer-public official with quasi-judicial
authority to see that the evidence of title and status of liens, if any,
is as represented. Once all is proper and approved, the Agreement is
13. Id.
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registered in the Notary Public's "protocol," and he then issues evi-
dence of title. It should be noted that in Mexico there is no title
insurance, and that abstracts of title, as such, do not exist. Title
searches have to be made by inquiry at the office of the Public Prop-
erty Register (Registro Publico de la Propiedad) in the jurisdiction
where the land is located. Satisfaction of liens and unpaid taxes is
evidenced by a Certificate of Freedom from Encumbrances (Certifi-
cado de Libertad de Gravamenes).
Under the new 1973 law on foreign investments, 4 all real prop-
erty of foreigners in Mexico must now be registered with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Failure to do so can result in such penalties, as
having the ownership declared null and void, fines in case of a fla-
grant violation, removal of public officials who have authorized any
such acts and prison sentences for the Prestanombres (Mexican nom-
inees who take title in their names as a "front").
V. HOME SITES-PROHIBITED AREA
Prior to 1971, many foreigners, through the use of
Prestanombres, Mexican corporations with bearer shares or tier
corporations, acquired realty in the prohibited zones in Mexico. One
can presume that the English common law maxim, that one cannot
do by indirection what one cannot do directly, could have been ap-
plied by the courts which, upon a proper challenge by the Govern-
ment, would have pierced the corporate veil and denied title validity
to the reputed owners of many hotels and other properties dotting the
coasts of Mexico. Rather, President Luis Echeverria, by Presidential
Decree on April 30, 1971,15 validated titles for definite periods by
authorizing the creation of land Trusts for limited periods of time in
order to clear up the old "arrangements" and to encourage new devel-
opments by foreigners benefitting the Mexican Economy through new
foreign investment, technology and know-how. The net effect gives
foreign persons and foreign capital the legal right to use and derive
benefits from such "prohibited" lands, without the need of
subterfuges, through the use of the "Fideicomiso" (land Trust).
A "Fideicomiso," is a legal structure patterned after the concept
of the English common law trust, although not having all the charac-
teristics of one, as used in the United States. The term "Trust" is
used herein, therefore, only as a translated word for "Fideicomiso."
The substance of the Decree of 1971 was later adopted and ap-
proved by the Mexican Congress as a law on March 9, 1973 and
14. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment,
Diario Oficial, March 9, 1973.
15. For the full text of the Decree see Diario Oficial, April 30, 1971.
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became fully effective on May 8, 1973.16 The gist of the law is that
authorized banks in Mexico, on proper application by a foreigner
(who need not now be a resident or immigrant) may direct a qualified
Trustee to purchase and hold title to real property in the prohibited
zones for him for up to thirty years. This, as usual, is subject to the
granting of a permit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new
foreign beneficiary, then, has the right to use, rent or sublease his
trust property, subject only to the restriction that the sublease term
cannot be for more than ten years. Under the present law, by the end
of the thirty year period, unless the trust beneficiary desires to let his
trust expire, he may sell or dispose of his trust property to a then
"qualified buyer" with the foreigner receiving the net proceeds.
Under present interpretation by the Mexican Government, a "quali-
fied buyer" must be a Mexican national. At this time, there is specu-
lation that by the end of thirty years the Mexican Government may
amend the law to permit a renewal of the trust agreement for up to
another thirty years, but no foreigner should buy with that in mind."
For multi-family developments and industrial or commercial
enterprises requiring more than one owner, a single Master Trust
format is allowed. Usually the buyer would create a Mexican corpora-
tion for such purposes. In such cases, once the seller and buyer have
agreed on a price, the buyer negotiates a Master Trust Agreement
with a qualified bank with the purchaser as the beneficial interest
owner. The Trustee bank, then, prepares the application for the trust
permit to the Ministry of Foreign Relations. The latter decides each
case on its merits after consulting with the seven member Intersec-
retarial Consulting Commission (La Comision Intersecretarial para
Inversiones Extranjeras), which basically considers the social and
economic effects of the venture. The names of the eventual Certifi-
cate Participation holders need not be known in advance, in applying
for such a Trust Use Permit. The transaction is finalized before a
Notary Public.
A Trustee bank, in order to proceed, will have to be furnished:
(a) a certificate of title obtained from the aforementioned Public
Property Register;
(b) a Certificate of Freedom of Encumbrances;
(c) a copy of the corporate charter, if incorporated; and
(d) an appraisal of the real estate for tax and fee purposes.
Charges for services by a Trustee bank are based on the size, improve-
ments and value of the realty. Trustees also charge an annual
16. Law to Promote Mexican Investment, supra note 14.
17. See M. Rodriguez, Acquisition of Real Property in Mexico by Non-Resident
Aliens (unpublished paper submitted as a class requirement to Professor Chayet).
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handling fee payable by participation holders. Currently transfers
result in an additional charge of 1 percent of the then value of the
property. 8
Financing of land purchases in Mexico through Mexican sources
is available, but because of the high (by U.S. standards) interest rates
and the shortness of the term of the usual mortgage, it is not generally
used by foreigners. If necessary to finance in Mexico, however, then
the required formalities must be observed. One should keep in mind
that a mortgage is a right in rem, therefore, a foreigner who is a party
to a mortgage instrument must get a permit from the Ministry of the
Interior to participate in such transaction. 9 Conditional sales con-
tracts (Venta con Reserva de Dominio), after compliance with the
formalities, may also be used in Mexico to acquire realty except for
realty Trusts. The latter must be paid for in full upon purchase due
to the fact that title to the property has to be transferred free and
clear to the Trustee. Possession under a conditional sale is in the
buyer, with title remaining in the seller, until he is paid in full.
According to Rivera, 20 until full payment is made, neither party can
resell, and a suitable notation in the public records (Registro Publico)
assures this is not violated. Foreclosures, if a default occurs on a
mortgage, require a court decree. 2' If a foreign lender attempts to
foreclose on land in a restricted zone, he cannot acquire title to the
property, but will be paid off from the sale.?
VI. LEASES
A lease of residential property in the prohibited zones by a for-
eigner for more than ten years is considered a type of real estate
precluded by Article 27 of the Constitution. Leases with maximum
ten year terms are permissible, and they may be legally renewed.,
Permission to lease for up to ten years, whether in the restricted areas
or elsewhere, does not require the prior consent of the Ministry of
Foreign Relations for qualified persons, but the area for residential
use is limited to the home and yard. For the establishment or opera-
tion of a commercial or industrial enterprise, governmental consent
is required, and only the area necessary for operation can be obtained.
18. Estrella, Legal and Practical Aspects of Trust Agreements on Real Property
in Coastal and Border Areas-Role of Banco Nacional de Mexico (unpublished paper
presented as part of a Mexican law symposium sponsored by the Los Angeles County
Bar Association).
19. Rivera, An Introduction to Secured Real Estate Transactions in Mexico, 12
Aeiz. L. REv. 290 (1970).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Gutierrez, Investment in Real Property in Mexico: An Overview of Constitu-
tional and Statutory Restrictions, 12 ARIz. L. REv. 270 (1970).
23. Id. See also OAS supra note 5, at 246.
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Agricultural land per se may be leased.24 The maximum lease term
for commercial purposes is 15 years and for industrial uses is 20
years.2 A lessee is not permitted to sublet in whole, or in part, nor
can he transfer his rights without the consent of his lessor.26
VII. CONCLUSION
The law of Mexico relating to the acquisition of real estate by
foreigners rests first, and properly, on the Constitution of 1917, par-
ticularly Article 27. Other provisions, though, are scattered through-
out various statutes and regulations. All this inevitably leads to the
conclusion, as in the United States, that it is always wise not only to
have your own lawyer represent you, but also to have him work with
a competent Mexican counterpart, when attempting to carry out any
transaction involving the acquisition of real property interests in
Mexico.
The foreigner is welcome in Mexico as investor, tourist and im-
migrant, under conditions prescribed by Mexico to protect its inter-
ests and to allow the outsider to enjoy fairly the benefits of this lovely
land and its rich culture and heritage.
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LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE IN MEXICO
MARCELLUS R. MEEK*
Very few, if any, areas of Mexican law have caused as much
confusion, or given rise to as many questions, as that of land owner-
ship by persons other than Mexican nationals. The reason, of course,
is the almost constant state of change and development that the law
has undergone over many years and, particularly, the last few de-
cades, up to and including the enactment of what is commonly known
as the Foreign Investment Law of May 8, 1973.'
The purpose of this short paper is to present the state of the law
concerning land ownership in Mexico as it exists in the year 1974, and
perhaps detect some further trends in the development of the law, at
least for the predictable future. We shall begin, then, with the posture
of the law as it stands today, but will take an historical approach as
an aid to discovering the pattern of the future.
The basic principles regulating and restricting land ownership in
Mexico by foreigners are established in Paragraph 1,2 Article 27 of the
Federal Constitution 3 which, by way of translation, reads as follows:
Only Mexicans by birth or by naturalization and Mexican companies
shall have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters and their acces-
sions or to obtain concessions for exploitation of mines or waters. The
state may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be considered nationals with respect to
such properties and not to invoke, therefore, the protection of their gov-
ernments for anything referring thereto: under penalty, in case of breach
of the agreement, of forefeiture in favor of the nation the properties they
have acquired by virtue of the same. Within a zone of one hundred (100)
kilometers [about 62 miles] from the borders and fifty (50) kilometers
[about 31 miles] from the seacoasts, foreigners may not for any reason
acquire direct ownership of lands and waters.
The agreement which this Article requires is the so-called "Calvo
Clause," 4 whereby a foreigner agrees not to invoke official assistance
* Partner, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Illinois. Director, International Law Divi-
sion, The John Marshall Law School. LL.B. DePaul University; LL.M. Northwestern
University.
The author is grateful to Jorge H. Romo for his assistance in the preparation of
this paper. Mr. Romo is an associate in the law firm of Bufete Sepulveda, S.C., Mexico
City. He received his LL.B. from the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico and
completed his work in comparative law at the Interamerican Law Institute, New York
University, in 1973.
1. Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Invest-
ment, Diario Oficial, March 9, 1973.
2. Federal Constitution of the United States of Mexico, art. 27, para. I.
3. The current Mexican Constitution became effective on May 1, 1917.
4. The Calvo Clause takes its name from the Argentine diplomat and scholar,
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from his home country in any questions arising from his ownership
of land in Mexico. As provided by Article 27 of the Constitution,
ouside the zone referred to as the "prohibited zone", foreigners may
be granted the same right to acquire property as Mexicans; provided,
that they enter into an agreement with the Mexican govenment to
consider themselves as Mexican nationals with respect to the realty
and not to invoke the protection of their own government. Breach of
this covenant will product forfeiture of the realty to the Mexican
government.
Actually, the right of a foreigner to acquire real estate may not
be considered as an absolute right, but as a product of the discretion-
ary power of the government to grant the right stated in Article 27 of
the Constitution recited above which reads ". . . The state may
grant the same rights to foreigners . . ." Likewise, Article 73, Para-
graph XVI of the Constitution vests in The Federal Congress the
power to enact laws with respect to the legal status of foreigners, as
well as to restrict private property rights, as may be required by the
public interest. (These public interest requirements may be imposed
on Mexicans as well.)
The restriction of land ownership by foreigners is, however, an
absolute prohibition when the realty is located within the prohibited
zone as stated by Article 27 to be within 100 kilometers from the land
boundaries or 50 kilometers from the seacoasts.
As we shall observe, powers vested in the Federal Congress have
been the basis for the enactment of other statutes regulating the basic
principles set forth in the Constitution.
ACQUISITION OF LAND BY FOREIGN LEGAL ENTITIES
The Constitutional statement providing that the State may
grant the same rights to acquire land everywhere outside the prohib-
ited zone to foreigners as are granted to Mexicans, has been construed
by the drafters of the Constitution and by the commentators as an
authorization only to foreign individuals, thus, foreign companies
may not acquire title to real property in Mexico. This is covered by
Article 34 of the Nationality and Naturalization Statute in a chapter
devoted to Rights and Obligations of Foreigners, which reads:
Foreign legal entities may not acquire ownership of lands, waters and
their concessions, or obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines,
waters or combustible minerals in the Mexican Republic, except in those
case in which the laws expressly so provide.
Carlos Calvo, who in the 19th century enunciated his doctrine against diplomatic
protection whereby a foreigner could appeal to his home government when proper legal
protection could not be secured by domestic remedies. Today many of the Latin Ameri-
can countries have implemented the Calvo doctrine.
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Notwithstanding the exception referred to in the preceding
translation, there is no specific statute providing for real estate ac-
quisition by foreign legal entities. On the other hand, Article 6 of the
Organic Law of Paragraph I, Article 27 of the Federal Constitution
authorizes the conveyance of land to a foreign legal entity in cases of
a judicial adjudication (e.g. forfeiture) or endowment; provided that
within a period of five years, which period may be extended if consid-
ered necessary, the property will be transferred to a qualified pur-
chaser of Mexican nationality.
As an interesting and rare exception to the above, The First
National City Bank of New York, which, by the way, is the only
foreign bank authorized to operate as a banking institution under
conditions similar to those provided for Mexican banks, has been
permitted on two occasions to acquire property rights in the real
estate on which its banking facilities are located. This exception is
an outgrowth of special powers granted under Article 10, Paragraph
XI of the General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary Organiza-
tions. They apply to credit institutions which have been granted
concessions from the government to operate in conformity with the
general principles set forth in Article 27 of the Constitution as it
relates to authorized banking institutions.
Notwithstanding the prohibition against ownership, a foreign
company may lease real estate for a term not exceeding ten years.
Furthermore, there is no objection to the execution of a mortgage on
Mexican land in favor of a foreign company and the subsequent
temporary acquisition of title to the land on a foreclosure.
As will be seen later, foreign companies may participate in Mexi-
can entities owning legal title to realty outside of the "prohibited
zone," provided that such participation shall not exceed forty-nine
percent (49%) when the Mexican company owns rural real estate.
ACQUISITION OF LAND BY FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS
Foreign individuals are, therefore, permitted to acquire land
ownership outside of the "prohibited zone" but only subject to prior
approval of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs; and further provided that such individuals have the
immigration status of either that of an "inmigrante" or "inmigrado."I
An "inmigrado" is one who is a permanent resident after five years
of being an "inmigrante." These provisions reveal the intention of the
Mexican government that ownership of land by foreign individuals
should be restricted to those who reside more or less permanently in
the country. No such rights are granted to tourists, visitors and other
5. First General Ruling of the Interministerial Commission, adopted on Sept. 3,
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aliens residing in Mexico on a temporary basis.
Although permits to acquire land are freely and regularly issued
to "inmigrados," the Ministry of Internal Affairs has the power to
impose restrictions on all activities of "inmigrados;" hence, it may
impose restrictions on the acquisition of land by them.'
"Inmigrantes" may acquire land only to the extent required and
actually used for their dwelling and that of their dependents. In spe-
cial cases, they may also be authorized to acquire other properties,
shares or other rights, provided such transactions do not contradict
the terms of their immigration visa. Further, each such acquisition
is subject to the prior authorization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and also the Ministry of External Affairs, if the acquisition is of real
estate .'
Foreign individuals with immigration status other than that of
"inmigrado" or "inmigrante" are not generally qualified to acquire
real estate in Mexico.'
An exception to this rule is made in the case of acquisition by
inheritance in which case the person may be authorized to receive
title without having either "inmigrado" or "inmigrante" status; sub-
ject, however, to the condition that the property be conveyed to a
qualified purchaser within a given period of time.' 0
These provisions are strictly enforced and violations thereof are
sanctioned by forfeiture to the state in which the property concerned
is located. In addition, notary publics, registrars and other officers
who authorize or record such illegal conveyances are subject to sus-
pension and fines." Public officials and notaries are required to give
notice to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of all acts, deeds and con-
tracts which they authenticate to which foreigners are parties.'2 Fail-
ure to give such notice is subject to fines of varying amounts.'
Special mention should be made of the fact that the above provi-
6. Regulations to the General Law of Population (Immigration Law), art. 67, sec.
I.
7. Id. art. 14 in connection with art. 71 of the General Law of Population.
8. According to art. 14, sec. AI, of the Regulations to the General Law of Popula-
tion, and the Emergency Presidential Decree of 1944, permits may be issued in excep-
tional cases to political refugees and students, whom according to the Law of Popula-
tion are non-immigrants. In practice, this was rarely done and we know of none being
issue since the war years.
9. Regulations, supra note 6, art. 14, sec. AV, and the Emergency Presidential
Decree of 1944.
10. In practice this period is generally for two years.
11. Regulations to the Organic Law of Constitutional Article 27, para. I, and the
Emergency Presidential Decree of 1944, arts. 5 & 6.
12. Regulations, supra note 6, art. 14, sec. BI.
13. General Law of Population, art. 109.
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sions apply only to those alien individuals residing in or physically
located in the territory of Mexico. Generally, the government has
taken the position that the same requirements are not applicable to
the execution of contracts by alien individuals not located in Mexico.
For example, an alien not physically present in Mexico may acquire
a mortgage or a beneficial interest in real property held in trust 4 or
even acquire direct ownership of Mexican land so long as it is outside
the "prohibited zone." Conversely, an alien temporarily in Mexico as
a tourist or visitor may do none of these things.
ACQUISITION OF LAND BY MEXICAN LEGAL ENTITIES WITH FOREIGN EQUITY
By Mexican legal entities are meant those entities which are
formed in accordance with the laws of Mexico and which have their
legal domicile therein, 5 thus, foreign ownership of equity does not
disturb a company's Mexican nationality.
Mexican companies whose articles of incorporation do not ex-
pressly prohibit the ownership of shares or other interests in the com-
pany by foreigners, will not be entitled to own real estate in the
"prohibited zone."
Mexican companies with or without foreign shareholders must
secure a permit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for each convey-
ance of real property. They usually encounter few obstacles when it
is located outside the "prohibited zone," and the acquisition of the
land is necessary to fulfill the company's purposes as stated in its
Articles of Incorporation. In addition an agreement must be entered
into with the government referred to earlier in pursuance of the
"Calvo Clause."' 6
The same permit requirement applies to the execution of leases
having a term exceeding ten years; trust agreements under which a
company is the beneficiary; and to the acquisition of controlling
interests in existing enterprises that deal in real property. Broad
discretionary power is given to the Ministry of External Affairs to
limit such permits to Mexican-controlled and managed companies. 7
Prior to May 8, 1973, the practice of the Ministry was to issue
such permits to Mexican companies regardless of the percentage of
foreign ownership, but only on a showing of"proof that the real prop-
erties concerned were indispensable to the corporate purpose" of the
company. 8 After that date, it is likely that (in applying the provisions
14. Ruling issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sept. 24, 1962.
15. Nationality and Naturalization Statute, art. 5.
16. Organic Law of Constitutional Article 27, art. 2; also Regulations to the Or-
ganic Law of Constitutional Article 27, arts. 2 & 3.
17. Emergency Presidential Decree of 1944, art. 3.
18. Ninth General Ruling of the Interministerial Commission, adopted on March
24, 1949.
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of the new Foreign Ivestment Law), the Ministry of External Affairs
or the National Foreign Investments Commission will require a ma-
jority of Mexican participation, whenever the acquisition of land is
deemed a new foreign investment even by already existing compa-
nies. 9
RURAL PROPERTY FOR CORPORATE PURPOSES
Commercial stock companies are denied the right to acquire,
possess or administer rural agricultural property. Rural land is de-
fined as land located outside the limits of a city, town or village. A
Mexican company desiring to acquire urban property will be likely
to secure permission with ease, but, when rural land is involved, the
company must present evidence (with its application for permit) that
the land is essential to its corporate purpose.
The Ministry of External Affairs also requires a statement of
consent from the governor of the state in which the land is located.
20
RURAL PROPERTY FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES
Acquisition of rural land for agricultural purposes is subject to
special regulations relating both to ownership and to the surface area
of land that may be held privately under the agrarian laws.
For historical reasons, and to prevent the concealment of the true
ownership of rural land, commercial stock companies, even 100 per-
cent owned by Mexicans, may not acquire, possess or administer
rural agricultural properties.2 '
The prohibition applies to both stock corporations and limited
partnerships with shares, but not to other commercial companies
whose capital is not represented by stock (i.e., limited liability com-
panies are not included in the prohibition, provided that their capital
is owned at the least by a Mexican majority or by Mexican companies
controlled by Mexican nationals).2
The maximum area of rural land that may be privately owned
depends upon either the quality of the land or the use to which it is
put. The maximum ranges from 100 hectares (247 acres) to 800 hec-
tares (1,976 acres). Properties not exceeding such surface areas are
called "small agricultural properties" and are not subject to expropri-
ation for communal property purposes.
2
COMMUNAL RURAL LAND ("EJIDO")
Communal rural land or "Ejido" is a parcel protected by the
19. Foreign Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 12, sec. III.
20. Federal Constitution of the United State of Mexico, art. 27, para. 6, sec. IV.
21. Id.
22. Organic Law of Constitutional Article 27, art. 3; and Regulations to the Or-
ganic Law of Constitutional Article 27, art. 7, sec. I.
23. Agrarian Code of December 31, 1948.
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agrarian code and which is dedicated to communal use by peasants.
This land may not be conveyed, leased or mortgaged either to Mexi-
can nationals or to foreigners; and any act or contract violating that
prohibition is null and void."
A prospective purchaser of rural land should not rely on an ap-
parently valid deed, until he has searched the records in the local
branch of the Department of Agrarian Affairs and the Federal Agrar-
ian Register. Moreover, a statement of clear title from such agrarian
authorities is advisable.
Having now discussed the earlier enacted laws and constitutional
provisions which contol or otherwise restrict the ownership of land in
Mexico, we may proceed to a discussion of the most recent legislative
enactment affecting land ownership in Mexico.
NEw FOREIGN INVESTMENT STATUTE
On May 8, 1973, the Foreign Investment Statute became effec-
tive. Among its features affecting the subject matter of this paper, is
a provision to the effect that every Mexican company to be incorpo-
rated from that date forward should have at least 51 percent Mexican
owned equity. That provision, of course, means that land holding
companies are similarly limited.
The law has no retroactive effect, thus, Mexican companies 100
percent owned by foreign shareholders will not be subject to forced
divestiture. It is likely, however, that when applying for any of the
required permits, as, for instance, to change the present operations
of an existing company, the government will no doubt continue to
press for Mexicanization along present guidelines.
Provided the expansion of an existing Mexican enterprise does
not involve new business, new fields of economic activity or new
products, it seems to be clear that an expansion of existing operations
will be permitted without express authorization and, therefore, with-
out divesting equity to Mexican nationals.
THE PROHIBITED ZONE
As mentioned earlier, Article 27 of the Constitution specifically
prohibits a foreigner from holding title to realty within the "prohib-
ited zone." Foreigners, however, have in the past been able to enjoy
the use of such property and acquire the equivalent of beneficial
ownership thereof without openly violating this constitutional prohi-
bition. This result, traditionally, has been accomplished through the
use of nominee Mexican companies 5 or trusts.
24. Id.
25. A Mexican company owned by foreigners is also prohibited from owning realty
in the "prohibited zone," hence, nominees were employed to hold the stock.
1974
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The use of nominee companies or land holding companies even
though neither expressly authorized nor prohibited, became the most
common method for foreigners to hold an interest in land in the "pro-
hibited zone," even in such well-known resort areas as Acapulco. It
was the stated intention of the drafters of the Presidential Decree of
April 30, 1971 to eliminate the various subterfuges that had been used
to defeat or circumvent the spirit of the Constitutional principle.
With respect to the use of a trust arrangement, the Decree provides
that the trust may be handled only through Mexican financial insti-
tutions so authroized to act in accordance with the General Law of
Credit Institutions and Organizations.
The essential requirement of any such arrangement is that legal
title to the realty must vest in the trustee " and that any foreign
beneficiaries thereof may not acquire in rem rights in the trust res.
The Decree does not define the term "foreigner" or "foreign benefici-
ary," but we can assume that the definition included in the Regula-
tions to Article 27 of the Constitution will also govern the interpreta-
tion of this legislation. This raises the possibility that foreign corpora-
tions will not be permitted to create, or become beneficiaries of a
trust; since, as noted, foreign corporations (but not foreign individu-
als) cannot "participate" in Mexican entities holding legal title to
realty within the prohibited zone. It has been our experience, how-
ever, that a beneficial interest in a private land trust has not been
equated to equity participation in a commercial company. A foreign
corporation may, therefore, be permitted to become the beneficiary
of a real estate trust without violating Article 27 of the Constitution.
Since the permission is discretionary, one cannot be certain that "it
will be granted where the beneficiary is a foreign corporation. Never-
theless, in the past, several such permits have been granted.
The Decree enumerates various other requirements attendant
upon the use of a trust, as follows:
1. An application to create the trust must be submitted to an
Inter-departmental Consultant Commission for its approval. This
Commission is composed of representatives from the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Treasury, Industry and Commerce, and
from the Department of Tourism. The application will be considered
in the light of the economic and social aspects of the proposed acquis-
ition in accordance with standards which are vague enough to allow
the Commission almost complete discretion to approve or reject the
request.
2. Legal title to the realty must remain vested in the trustee
during the trust term. The fact that legal title vests in the trustee will
26. The trustee must be the financial institution.
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not, however, preclude the certificate holders or the beneficiaries
from managing the trust. Mexican trust jurisprudence contemplates
instances where the trust instrument obligates the trustee to consult,
and implement the decision of the trust beneficiaries. As the owner,
the trustee will have the right to rent the realty, but only for terms
not exceeding ten years. We assume that this ten year limitation
applies to initial lease terms, and that they can be renewed for similar
periods.
3. The trust may issue "certificates of participation" to evi-
dence the equitable interest of the beneficiaries or others in the trust
res.27 The certificates of particpation must be nominative or regis-
tered, and may be transferred only upon notification to, and approval
of, the trustee. The certificates are not, however, amortizable over the
term of the trust or otherwise.
4. The trust cannot last for more than thirty years. At the end
of this period, the trustee must sell the realty to individuals or legal
entities capable of owning realty within the "prohibited zone," i.e.,
Mexican citizens, Mexican owned or controlled companies, and pre-
sumably, another qualified trustee (but not the same beneficiaries).
5. Upon termination, the trustee must distribute its net earn-
ings to the holders of the certificates of participation in proportion to
their respective holdings. The net earnings of the trust might include
rental income in addition to the proceeds from the sale of the realty
upon its termination.
The use of a trust to acquire an interest in realty located within
the "prohibited zone" has also now been regulated by the newly
enacted Foreign Investment Law. In substance, this legislation incor-
porates all of the requirements and provisions set forth in the Presi-
dential Decree of 1971. The Foreign Investment Law specifically re-
quires, for example, that direct ownership vest in the trustee at all
times, 28 that the term of the trust not exceed thirty years, and that
the certificates of participation be nominative or registered and not
amortizable over the term of the trust or otherwise.
The Foreign Investment Law adds, however, a significant re-
quirement to the effect that the trust must be registered with, and
approved by, the National Registry of Foreign Investments. The Re-
gistry is charged with reviewing any proposed transaction in the light
of its social and economic value to Mexico. These standards are, of
course, quite similar to the criteria used by the Interdepartmental
27. In practice, however, fiduciary institutions will not issue certificates, unless
the trust is intended to develop realty and to allow for public trading of the interests
therein. Trustees will, instead, executive private land trusts.
28. The certificates of participation cannot, as a result, represent a direct alloca-
tion of the legal rights to the trust res.
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Consultant Commission mentioned earlier. Failure to register with
(and obtain the approval of) the National Registry of Foreign Invest-
ments will result in the unenforceability of the trust against the trus-
tee; and, most likely, in the inability of the trustee to make distribu-
tions to the beneficiaries or certificate holders. It should be men-
tioned, too, that the Foreign Investment Law provides criminal pen-
alties to aid the enforcement of its provisions.
FINANCING REAL ESTATE
A) Secured Transactions
The most widely used methods in real estate financing in Mexico
are mortgages, conditional sales, and sales subject to rescission.
A mortgage, as defined by the Civil Code29 is a guarantee in rem
constituted on property which is not delivered to the creditor. The
mortgage holder is given the right, in case of non-payment of the
obligation, to be paid out of the value of the property.
Through a conditional sale, the seller retains the title until the
purchaser has completed his payment obligations to the seller."
A third method commonly used in Mexico is a sale subject to
rescission, whereby title passes to the buyer but will revert to the
seller upon the buyer's failure to pay one or more installments of the
purchase price.
3'
Of these three methods, the first two have been more frequently
used by financing institutions, when granting loans for real estate
acquisitions. Even foreign credit institutions have used one or more
of these methods in securing loans granted by them.
A fourth secured transaction device which is now commonly used
in Mexican practice is the land trust. Through such a trust, the
lender (who normally becomes the trustee) takes title to the property
and holds it in trust for his own benefit. Depending upon the trust
terms, if the borrower does not pay his debt, the trustee may declare
that the property placed in trust has become his absolute property
or sell it elsewhere.
32
B) Banking and Financing Institutions
Mexican law makes a distinction between banks that receive
deposits from the public (and that regularly make short term loans
on a personal basis) and investment institutions that undertake
29. Civil Code for the Federal District and Territories, art. 2893.
30. Id. art. 2312.
31. Id. art. 2310.
32. The trust is regulated by the Law of Credit Institutions and Organizations,
effective since 1941.
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credit operations for longer terms and for specific areas of financing.
Some of the types of institutions comprised in the second cate-
gory are as follows:
i) Savings Banks-These banks engage in granting loans, guar-
anteed by mortgage, up to 15 years; but emphasis is placed upon the
channeling of loans toward low cost housing.3
ii) Finance Companies-Their purpose is the financing of pro-
duction and investment of capital. These companies may undertake
any form of debit operations such as loans for housing, refinancing,
mortgages, etc., but similarly, their main emphasis insofar as housing
is concerned is the financing of low cost home construction. The
housing to be constructed should fulfill all requirements .to conform
to the general government policies to the effect that loans by these
institutions may only be granted to those persons (either individuals
or companies) residing in Mexico. 4
iii) Mortgage Credit Companies-This type of institution is
authorized to engage in typical mortgage operations, that is, the fi-
nancing of building and dwelling construction.
However, the Law provides a limit on the percentage of the loan
vis-a-vis the total value of the property as follows:
a. Up to 30 percent when the construction is designated to
house machinery or fixtures which represent more than half of the
value of the property mortgaged.
b. Up to 30 percent when the construction can easily be modi-
fied.
c. Up to 70 percent when the credit is for the construction,
acquisition or improvement of dwellings with a value not in excess of
$16,000.
d. Up to 80 percent when the credit is for the construction or
acquisition of low cost dwellings.
3 5
AVAILABILITY OF FINANCING FOR NON-MEXICANS
As a practical matter, it is fair to state that Mexican nationals
are given preference in securing loans from financing institutions.
This is not true, however, if the real estate is located in new suburban
areas or resort developments, where sales and financing efforts are
focused upon non-Mexican purchasers. The common practice for this
purpose is to require from the borrower a down payment of approxi-
mately 20 percent of the aggregate cost and providing for equal pay-
33. General Law of Credit Institutions and Organizations, arts. 18-24.
34. Id. arts. 26-33.
35. Id. arts. 34-39.
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ments over a period of time ranging from five to ten (or more) years
with interest of no less than one percent per month.
TITLE INSURANCE
While title insurance is a typical form of insurance originating
in the United States, it is relatively unknown in Mexican practice.
However, there are no legal impediments to its use in Mexico, pro-
vided that the title insurer be an insurance company authorized to
do business in the country.
Conveyances of real estate are performed through a notary public
and recorded in the public registry of property. As a general principle,
registration of a notarial deed is the method used to evidence title
under Mexican law. Of course, the title being transferred must have
been validly obtained or granted and, therefore, all federal and local
regulations (i.e., agrarian laws) complied with.
Historically, the number of challenged real estate titles has been
insignificant, but there is always a risk present, especially in those
states where the registries are not kept with the same accuracy as
they are in major cities.
In conclusion, the acquisition of land in Mexico is not simple,
even for Mexicans.
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The practice of law on the border of two countries that are as
dissimilar as the United Staes and Mexico can be not only frustrat-
ing, but also intriguing. Mexican lawyers who come in contact with
problems of law in the United States, just as their North American
colleages that have cases involving law in Mexico, come out of their
experiences more aware of the unique problems of their clients.
A United States attorney who is called upon by a client to advise,
help and guide him with a matter in Mexico must understand that
Mexican law and its structure has evolved from Aztec, Mayan and
Spanish legal systems with strong roots in Roman Law and a clear
influence of the Code of Napoleon. At the same time, Mexico is a
republic with a Federal Constitution patterned after its United States
counter-part, providing for division of power into executive, legisla-
tive and judicial branches. There are 30 states, one Federal Territory
and one Federal District; and both the federal government and each
state have their own civil, criminal, and tax laws. Mexico has both
federal and state courts. The Mexican Federal Congress has a Senate
and a Chamber of Deputies; the state legislatures only have one
house. Also, Mexico has an army and numerous police, crime preven-
tion and investigative bodies.
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the principal points of
commercial and other laws that are of interest to U.S. attorneys that
represent clients with interests in Mexico.
II. COMMERCIAL AcTs
Mexican Law considers any business transacted with intent to
gain or profit as an act of commerce governed by the Commercial
Code,' which is complemented in its deficiencies by the Civil Code
of the Federal District (Mexico City).2 The following acts are consid-
ered to be of commercial nature: all speculative sales, sales of stocks,
shares and securities of corporations; all contracts pertaining to
government loans, bonds and securities; all negotiable instruments;
the operations of freight and passenger transportation companies,
private or public works construction companies, tourism companies,
editorial and publishing companies; all bank and insurance opera-
* Partner, Gonzalez Vargas & Gonzalez Baz, Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico.
1. Commercial Code, Diario Oficial, Jan. 1, 1890.
2. Civil Code of the Federal District.
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tions, checks, bills of exchange or the transfer of monies from one city
to another; sales of harvests by the grower and any other similar acts.'
The differentiation between commercial and civil acts is impor-
tant in the field of contract law, since commercial contracts are more
simple and less formal. The parties to a commercial contract are
bound by the terms of the contract, without necessarily having to
fulfill specific formalities and requisites, except where the Commer-
cial Code so demands for their validity.
4
While it is possible to enforce verbal agreements in Mexico, it is
better, as a general principle, to have all points of agreement and
understanding between the parties of contacts in writing. In the past,
obligations set forth or defined in the statutes of either the Commer-
cial or Civil Codes need not be repeated in the text of a contract, since
it was assumed that their existence in the statutes was sufficient to
make them binding upon the parties. However, experience has taught
that this assumption is not correct, since any controversy requires the
interpretation by a third person of the intent and meaning of the
parties in relation to the contracted obligations. The results could be
contrary to those originally desired or intended. Today, the other
extreme is fast being reached in certain contracts such as leases,
where certain particulars are specified such as who is to pay gas,
water, electricity and telephone bills, the Stamp Tax and registration
fees.
In the course of protecting the rights of his clients in Mexico, a
United States attorney will become familiar with two institutions of
great importance: the Keeper of the Public Records of Property and
Commerce, and the Notary Public. The Public Records of Property
and Commerce is a government institution, and the Keeper or Recor-
der is a government employee appointed by the governor of the
State.
5
The office of Notary Public is a quasi-governmental post. To be
eligible for the post an individual must have a degree in law, at least
3 years practice (not a requisite in all 30 states) and practice in a
notarial office for at least six months under the tutelage of a Notary.
The Notary must notify the government of the date when such prac-
tice starts and the date when the training is completed. Upon request,
the applicant is then granted the right to take a written and oral
examination before a board of notaries and the government repre-
sentative; if he passes, he will be granted a Certificate (Patente)
3. Commercial Code, supra note 1, art. 75.
4. Id. art. 78.
5. Registry of the Public Records of Commerce, art. 1, Diario Oficial, Dec. 20,
1885.
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which permits Notaries to appoint him to temporarily act for them
in their authorized absences. The certificate is also qualfication to
take another examination to fill any notarial vacancy that may occur.
The appointment of Notary Public is for life. A Notary is not a gov-
ernment employee, but he is in a manner of speaking, an officer of
the government who must in many states give up the practice of other
phases of law. What a Notary attests is held to be true until proven
otherwise, in which case he is stripped of his appointment and penal-
ized.' Notarial fees are set by law; he posts a heavy bond or mortgage
guarantee to insure his acts, and he can only be removed for specific
cause as determined by the law.
All mortgages, sales and transfers of real property, trust con-
tracts and incorporation proceedings must be affected before a
Notary Public. 7 Since there is no title insurance in Mexico, in lieu
thereof the Notary Public checks back in the public records for at
least ten years, obtains proper attestations as to freedom from liens
or encumbrances and even picks up all former titles to protect the
buyer." With very few exceptions, all powers of attorney have to be
granted before a Notary Public. The Notary keeps permanent records
of all his acts in government authorized bound books (Protocolos)
that are sent to the state archives for permanent safekeeping.,
Few commercial operations and civil contracts of any magnitude
are free from Notarial intervention.
A bill of exchange that is not accepted or paid and a promissory
note that is not paid must be protested by a Notary Public.'0 Con-
tracts made in a foreign country in a foreign language that must be
recorded or which are to produce their effects in Mexico must be
officially translated and then "protocolized" by a Notary Public."
The minutes of Special Shareholders Meetings of a corporation
must also be protocolized by a Notary Public.'2
III. CORPORATIONS
In order to organize any stock-issuing or public corporation in
Mexico, it is necessary to first obtain a permit from the Department
6. Amendments to the Administrative Code, State of Chihuahua, Book on Notar-
ies Public, July 14, 1972.
7. Civil Code of the Federal District, arts. 2317, 2320.
8. Id. art. 2893.
9. Law of Notaries Public of the Federal District, Diario Oficial, Feb. 23, 1946.
(All states have similar laws.)
10. General Law of Negotiable Instruments, arts. 139-49, Diario Oficial, Aug. 27,
1932.
11. Federal Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 131-32, Diario Oficial, March 13, 1943.
12. General Law of Business Corporations, art. 194, Diario Oficial, Aug. 4, 1934.
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of Foreign Relations, 3 as the incorporating shareholders must agree
with the Mexican government through this department to one of two
conditions:
(1) That the corporation will not admit any foreigners as own-
ers of shares of stock; or,
(2) That any foreigner that in the act of incorporation, or at any
time thereafter, acquires any shares of stock or equity interest
therein, [s]he will consider him [her] self as a Mexican national in
regards to same and agrees not to invoke the protection of his govern-
ment in relation to same.
The penalty for violating the agreement in (1) above is that the
acquisition of the stock shall be held as null and void and the corpora-
tion's capital will be considered as reduced in relation to the value of
the annulled operation. In (2), a violation results in the forfeiture of
the stock to the government. 4
Five persons are required to form a corporation, and the stock-
holders must never number less than five persons. 15
Mexican corporations may be managed by a Board of Directors
or by a Sole Administrator, 6 both of whom are elected by and must
report to the shareholders at their annual meetings. 7 Supervision and
certain control is exercised by one or more examiners (Comisarios)
appointed by the stockholders. The examiner may or may not be a
stockholder, but he may not be an employee of the corporation."
Board meetings are held at least once a year, or as often as
necessary. 9 Regular Shareholders' Meetings (Asambleas) are held
yearly to deal with ordinary business Special Meetings are held to
deal with special matters such as changes in the statutes and by-laws
and others prescribed by law.
Shareholders' Meetings must be held at the corporate domicile 0
after publication of a notice to that effect which must be made 15
days prior to date of the meeting. The publication must be made in
a newspaper with large circulation in the city where the corporation
is domiciled, and/or the Official Gazette of the state or federal gov-
13. Regulations of the Organic Law of Subsection I of Article 27 of the General
Constitution, Decree of June 29, 1944, art. 2.
14. Id.
15. General Law of Business Corporations, supra note 12, art. 89, 239 subsec. IV.
16. Id. art. 142.
17. Id. arts. 142-63.
18. Id. arts. 164-71.
19. The statutes and by-laws may stipulate that board meetings be held monthly,
as is mandatory for financial institutions, or as often as is deemed necessary.
20. General Law of Business Corporations, supra note 12, art. 179.
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ernment, and such notice must contain the agenda of the meeting.'
At least 50 percent of the stock must be represented in order to
constitute a quorum, and a vote of the majority of those present
is needed for validity of the resolutions passed.2 2 In Special
Stockholders' Meetings 75 percent of the stock must be represented
to constitute a quorum, and a majority vote thereof is required for
valid resolutions. 23 If the necessary quorum is not present as a result
of the first notice of a Regular Shareholders' Meeting, then a second
notice shall be published and a quorum is deemed to exist regardless
of what percentage of stock is represented.2 4 A common practice has
been established that when all shares of stock are represented, the
requirement of publication of prior notice is dispensed with, and the
resolutions passed are held as legal.
The scope of activities of a corporation depends on its charter or
permit. Thus, care should be exercised in filing the petition in proper
form so that the permit granted will allow a full range of activities
within the desired field, as every change of by-laws to add new pur-
poses or objects in corporate activities requires a resolution from a
Special Stockholders' Meeting, another permit from the government,
plus notarial protocolization and recording.
25
Stock issuing corporations must have a stated capital no less
than 25,000 Pesos ($2,000 U.S.).26 Upon incorporation, the capital
must be totally subscribed, but not necessarily paid in, as payment
of 20 percent of the subscribed capital is sufficient. The unsubscribed
portion of the capital must be subscribed within a year's time.2
A corporation may also have a variable capital, where it has a
stated minimum capital, but stipulates that it will have an unlimited
amount as maximum capital. These corporations add the words
"Capital Variable" to their names, or the full abbreviation "S.A. de
C.V.".2 18 The shares of stock are nominative shares. 29 The increase or
decrease in capital (which can never be below the stipulated mini-
mum) is effected by resolutions passed either by the Board of Direc-
tors or the Shareholders' Meeting depending on the provisions of
the statutes and by-laws of the corporation. 0 This is a highly
21. Id. art. 187.
22. Id. art. 189.
23. Id. art. 190.
24. Id. art. 191.
25. Id. art. 182.
26. Id. art. 90.
27. Id. art. 97.
28. Id. arts. 213-21.
29. Id. arts. 9, 218.
30. Id. arts. 213, 221.
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recommended form of incorporation due to the flexibility given in
adjusting financial needs.
All stock issuing corporations may issue either common or pre-
ferred stock, or various series of stock. Preferred stockholders have
limited voting rights, but are assured a 5 percent or larger dividend,
depending on the corporate by-laws." Dividends may be paid on
unpaid portions of stock that have been subscribed but only partially
paid.2 Corporations may not trade in or buy their own stock.3 3 The
limits and benefits granted to each kind or series must be specified
as well as how they are to be amortized or withdrawn upon changes
in the capital structure:"
Partnerships (Sociedad en Nombre Colectivo and Sociedad en
Comandita) and Companies of Limited Responsibility (Sociedad de
Responsabilidad Limitada) also exist in Mexico. Partnerships do not
issue stock, they require at least two partners and at least 5,000 Pesos
capital. Partnerships must be constituted procedurally in the same
manner as a corporation: a permit must be obtained from the Depart-
ment of Foreign Relations, and a contract of partnership must be
made and signed before a Notary Public and recorded in the Public
Records of Commerce.3 5 The restrictive nature of the applicable stat-
utes as to manner of management and responsibilities between the
partners and toward third parties make partnerships less attractive
for use in international operations.
All corporations and partnerships in Mexico are governed by the
"Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles" (General Law of Mercan-
tile Companies), which is a Federal Law. Companies organized under
the terms of this Law are considered to be of Mexican nationality and
may open branches and agencies in any part of the country and
abroad.
A corporation organized under the laws of any country other than
Mexico desiring to operate in Mexico under its foreign charter, may
open a branch or agency by obtaining a prior permit from the Depart-
ment of Industry and Commerce and by registering with the Public
Records of Property and Commerce.3 1 In order to obtain such permit
and registration, the foreign corporation must prove that it was incor-
porated in accordance with the laws of its home country. Then it
must file a copy of its statutes, by-laws and articles of incorporation
31. Id. art. 113.
32. Id. art. 117.
33. Id. art. 134.
34. Id. arts. 111, 141.
35. Id. arts. 2, 5.
36. Id. arts. 250, 251.
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(which may not be contrary to Mexican public policy) and other
related documents together with a certification of a Mexican diplo-
matic or consular official to the effect that the company was properly
incorporated under the law of its home state, in the Public Records
of Commerce. 7
The foreign corporation may do business in Mexico either
through an agent or representative, or by establishing a branch of the
corporation within Mexico. The cost of establishing a branch is ap-
proximately the same or slightly higher as that of organizing a Mexi-
can corporation. There are certain advantages to doing business in
Mexico through an established branch: merchandise and goods may
be directly owned by the company through its branch, capital invest-
ment in the branch may be increased as the need arises and expenses
of the branch may be placed on the home office books as an opera-
tional expense.
There are also disadvantages of such a branch operation. The
branch may not own real estate in Mexico, tax exemptions and other
benefits may not be claimed by the branch and difficulty in obtaining
immigration permits for its foreign personnel exists. Finally, all obli-
gations arising from labor disputes would affect all mother company
assets in Mexico, not just those of the branch.3 Furthermore, any
change in Mexican operations not covered by the home company
charter would require that said charter be reformed and the changes
protocolized and recorded. The major obstacle, however, is obtaining
the permit to operate and to register the corporation in Mexico in the
first place.
IV. INVESTMENTS-MEXICAN AND FOREIGN
Mexico has always proclaimed that foreigners and nationals are
entitled to equal treatment under the law. The Federal Constitution
so stipulates in its Article 1, the Civil Code for the Federal District
so provides in Article 12, and the Law of Nationality and Naturaliza-
tion provides in Articles 30 and 32 that the Laws of Mexico shall be
equally applied to Mexican nationals and to foreigners without dis-
tinction. Furthermore, the last-named law provides that foreigners
have the right to seek diplomatic protection in cases of denial of
justice or willful and notoriously malicious delay in the administra-
tion thereof. 9
This guarantee of equality must not be confused with a surrender
or waiver of rights or protection of the national interests. The rule of
equal treatment has been interpreted to mean that in Mexico the
37. Id.
38. Federal Labor Law, arts. 13-15, 41, Diario Oficial, April 11, 1970.
39. Law of Nationality and Naturalization, art. 32, Diario Oficial, Jan. 20, 1934.
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government will not give preferential treatment to foreign investment
over Mexican investment. Mexico has just enacted a law to this ef-
fect-the Law for Promoting Mexican Investment and Controlling
Foreign Investment."
Foreign investment as defined by this law is investment made by
(1) foreign corporations; (2) foreign individuals who are not bona fide
permanent residents of Mexico, or those who due to their activities
are tied in with or bound to entities or groups making their economic
decisions abroad; (3) foreign legal entities without legal personality;
and (4) Mexican enterprises in which a majority of their capital is
owned by foreigners, or in which foreigners control management in
any way.'
It is also provided that unless so determined by special laws or
regulations or unless specifically authorized by the Foreign Invest-
ment Commission, investment by foreigners shall not exceed 49 per-
cent of the corporate capital of any corporation, and that foreign
participation in corporate management shall not exceed the percen-
tage of its investment." The Foreign Investment Commission is em-
powered to modify this general rule and to grant authorization for
higher percentage of alien participation when such an investment "is
convenient for the economy of the country."' 43 Leasing the essential
assets of a corporation is considered to be equivalent to their pur-
chase.4 This law also provides that, in order for a foreigner to acquire
more than 25 percent of the stock, or more than 49 percent of the
corporate assets, a prior permit must be obtained. 5 Such authoriza-
tion is also required for execution of acts through which management
of a corporation passes into foreign control. Shares owned by foreign-
ers must be nominative shares, and the name, address and national-
ity of the owner mut be shown on the stock certificates, as foreigners
may only acquire bearer shares when they obtain a special permit to
do so.4 Capital investment by bona-fide permanent residents of Mex-
ico is considered to be a Mexican investment, unless due to his activi-
ties, the resident alien is tied in with or bound to groups or entities
making their economic decisions abroad.47
The Foreign Investment Commission has the authority to deter-
mine the percentage and conditions of a proposed foreign investment
40. Diario Oficial, March 9, 1973.
41. Id. art. 2.
42. Id. art. 5.
43. Id.
44. Id. art. 8.
45. Id.
46. Id. arts. 2, 25.
47. Id. art. 6.
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in existing businesses or in new business establishments, 8 participa-
tion of existing foreign investment in new areas of economic activities
or in new fields of production" and to establish the government's
policy on foreign investment in general. The Commission must con-
sider whether the proposed investment constitutes a complement to
Mexican capital or whether it will displace existing Mexican invest-
ment, effects of the proposed foreign investment on the balance of
payments and whether it will increase Mexican exports, the effect of
the investment on employment and the extent employment and
training opportunities for Mexican technicians and administrative
personnel will be created.5 0 The utilization of Mexican materials and
components and the new investment's aid in the development of
needy or backward zones and areas of Mexico, in view of the technol-
ogy that it will provide and the extent of its identification with the
government's aims and programs for the overall development of the
country must also be considered by the Commission.
The Law for Promoting Mexican Investment and Controlling
Foreign Investment also creates the Registry of Foreign Investment.5
It is mandatory that the following register therein:
a. Aliens or foreign corporations making investments regulated
by this law, and resident aliens of Mexico who are connected with or
subject to foreign economic financial groups;
b. Mexican corporations in which foreigners have an equity in-
terest;
c. Trust contracts in which foreigners are the designated bene-
ficiaries, or those trusts, the purposes of which are the execution of
acts regulated by the law; and,
d. All shares of corporate stocks owned by, pledged to or given
as collateral to foreigners and any transfer or assignment thereof.-
The law further contains innovative measures stipulating penal-
ties for non-compliance or violations of its provision. It orders corpo-
rations who are bound to register with the Foreign Investment Regis-
try, and who fail to do so, not to pay dividends until they comply with
the law; and it further orders them not to pay dividends on the shares
of shareholders who must register therein and fail to do so, until they
comply with the law.5 3 It further stipulates that any person who
makes false representations or who commits any act which aids for-
48. Id. art 12.
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 13.
51. Id. art. 23.
52. Id.
53. Id. art 27.
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eigners to circumvent any provision of the law may be punished with
a prison sentence of up to nine (9) years and a fine of up to 50,000
Pesos ($4,000 U.S.). 54 Any and all acts consummated in violation of
the Law shall be null and void and may not be invoked or used in
any court action, or before any official or government authority. The
violator shall be penalized with a fine in an amount equal to the value
of the operation,5 and the managers, directors, inspectors, examiners
or members of the Board shall be jointly liable with the corporation
for the fulfillment of and compliance with all obligations under this
Law.
56
In addition, the law reserves exclusively unto the state all invest-
ment in matters pertaining to petroleum and hydrocarbons, basic
petrochemical industry, exploitation of radioactive minerals and the
production of nuclear energy.5"
Investment is reserved exclusively to Mexican nationals or to
Mexican corporations which specifically exclude foreigners as share-
holders in the fields of banking, finance, insurance, radio and televi-
sion, air and maritime transportation, urban and interurban trans-
portation and all freight and passenger transportation on federal
highways, distribution of gas and all other activities determined by
specific laws or regulations covered by executive degrees.
The provisions which stop payment of dividends and distribution
of profits due to non-compliance of registration by the corporation are
harsh and drastic in the sense that they may affect innocent share-
holders who may not reside in Mexico or have any information on
such requirements. The prohibition of free transfer and assignment
of shares of stock affecting shareholders who reside abroad deprives
them of the right of first refusal to subscribe and acquire additional
shares of stock on increases of capital not subscribed and paid for by
other stockholders; 58 this right which was their's prior to the existence
of the law makes the application of these measures retroactive and
seemingly contrary to constitutional provisions.
However, the government has repeatedly stated that these are
not "new rules of the game," that they always existed but went un-
noticed, and that now for the sake of discipline they have been en-
acted into one law.
V. BANKS & BANKING OPERATIONS
One of the main means for obtaining foreign capital has been
54. Id. art 31.
55. Id. art 28.
56. Id. art. 29.
57. Id. art. 4.
58. General Law of Business Corporations, supra note 12, art. 132.
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through the sale of bank securities issued by various Mexican banks.
These securities have been very attractive to foreigners due to the
high rates of interest paid, and the stability of the peso.
Mexico has one federal law regulating all banking institutions
and their operations. The federal government is the only entity that
can issue bank charters;" consequently, all banks in Mexico are na-
tional banks and as such they can open branch banks throughout the
country. There are no state banks.
There are three categories of banks in Mexico:
a. Commercial Banks, which can accept deposits for checking accounts
and savings accounts, extend short-term and certain long-term loans,
discount negotiable instruments, issue letters of credit, buy and sell for-
eign currencies, pignorations, escrows and trusts;
b. Mortgage Banks which extend long-term loans guaranteed by mort-
gages in real-estate and issue and offer long-term securities; and,
c. Investment Banks who extend term loans and issue and offer to the
public certificates and bonds bearing a high interest rate.u
Most bank securities have set maturity dates although some can
be cashed in at any time with little or no penalty.
Supervision and control of all bank operations are effected
through the National Banking and Insurance Commission,6' which
has been so efficient that no Mexican Bank has closed or been de-
clared bankrupt in the last 40 years. The present Banking Law also
regulates credit unions and bonded warehouses. Under our present
day system of banks and auxiliary institutions, any conceivable
banking operation that may legally be effected in other parts of the
world can be effected in Mexico with the same, and at times greater,
degree of safety.
VI. SOCIAL SECURrrY AND LABOR LAWS
No one who operates a business based in Mexico can avoid com-
ing in contact with the Labor and the Social Security Laws. Both are
federal laws applied throughout the country.2
Social Security covers all employees and workers, their spouses,
and children under 18, that are unemployed. It grants them medical
attention, medicines, hospitalization, surgery, maternity care, old
age pensions and compensation for permanent or temporary disabil-
ity. 3 The corresponding fees vary in relation to salaries and are paid
59. New General Laws of Credit and Auxiliary Institutions, art. 2, Diario Official,
May 31, 1941, amended by Decree, Dec. 31, 1947.
60. Id. art. 3.
61. Id. arts. 160-76.
62. Federal Labor Law, Diario Oficial, April 1, 1970; Social Security Law, Diario
Oficial, March 12, 1973.
63. Social Security Law, supra note 62, arts. 11, 62, 63, 65, 92.
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in part by the employee, and by the employer. An employee that
earns only the minimum salary pays nothing.64
The scope of this Law is now being amplified so that Social
Security may provide nurseries and child-care centers for working
mothers, and it is intended that its benefits be granted to domestics
and to farm labor in the near future. Its clinics are far-flung in every
city in the country, with major hospitals in the state capitals, and
huge medical centers in Mexico City, and certain regional centers
with a high density or industrial development.
The Labor Law is a paternalistic law that tends to favor labor.
It regulates the length of the daily and weekly shift, 65 determines
payment of wages, 66 and, through a special commission, sets the stan-
dard for minimum wages every two years in accordance with the
needs of the economic areas into which the country is divided. 7 It
determines the grounds for discharging an employee, and sets the
rules for payment of severance wages when dismissal is unjustified
(three months wages plus salaries for duration of the trial). 6
Strikes are a right guaranteed to labor by the Federal Constitu-
tion. 9 When a strike is called a plant is closed and elections are held.
The strike is legal only if the majority of workers vote in its favor,
otherwise the plant is reopened and the workers must return to work
within 24 hours or lose their jobs."
Labor unions in Mexico are not as big, powerful and aggressive
as United States unions, and with the exception of a few, such as the
National Miners Union, the Petroleum Workers Union, National
Electrical Workers Union, are years behind the United States labor
movement in their organization, power, wealth and sophistication.
Since the Mexican Revolution received full backing of labor during
its struggle it is only natural that the government today is strongly
pro-labor and has been a great labor activist through the laws that it
has enacted including the new Housing Law.7" The Labor Law pro-
vides that Mexicans are to be preferred over non-Mexicans,72 and
union members over non-union workers in job vacancies. 73 However,
64. Id. art. 42.
65. Federal Labor Law, supra note 62, art. 61.
66. Id. art. 90.
67. Id. arts. 551-63.
68. Id. art. 50.
69. MExicAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, art. 122.
70. Federal Labor Law, supra note 62, art. 463.
71. Law of the National Authority for the Employee Housing Fund, Diario Oficial,
April 24, 1972.
72. Federal Labor Law, supra note 62, art. 7, 154.
73. Id. art. 154.
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most industries operate under open shops and they freely hire non-
union workers without any trouble. A company may only employ 10
percent foreigners in relation to its total labor force.74
The principal objections that foreigners have against the Labor
Law are that it limits their right to suspend work in the factories at
will, and that they are not free to fire a worker unless they have a just
cause as defined by Article 47 of the Law, without paying severance
wages, and that it does not provide for a training period for appren-
tices.
The interpretation of the Labor Law lies in the hands of Labor
Boards, made up of representatives of the government (the Presiding
Officer) of labor and of management. There are both Federal and
State Labor Boards, sitting in Mexico City, the state capitals and
cities with high industrial density. The proceedings in labor disputes
are designed for fast decision, but claims have multiplied to such an
extent that it still takes months to obtain a judgment. Appeals in
labor matters are heard by Federal Circuit Courts.7" No State Appel-
late Courts hear appeals on labor matters. When constitutional mat-
ters are at stake, then an appeal may go up to the Federal Supreme
Court, but this has generally been done away with.
Collective bargaining agreements may be signed by a' company
with a union only if a majoriy of the workers are members of the
union." The collective agreements are revised every two years" and
it is extremely rare that once such an agreement has been signed that
it can be cancelled. If the union loses it majority, another union may
then become the bargaining agent for the workers. 8 Negotiations are
neither as complicated, nor bound by as many rules as they are in
the United States, but labor matters are of such delicate nature and
so affect the life of an industry, that the practice of labor law is a
highly specialized field.
Individual labor contracts must be signed with each worker
where no union contract exists.79 They should be as detailed as possi-
ble for they constitute the basic rules for the rendition of personal
services and to determine the rights of both parties. Dedication to the
drafting of these documents in keeping with the statutes of the Labor
Law is highly advisable, even though the law specifies that no specific
formality or solemnity is necessary for making a labor contract. It is
74. Id. art. 7.
75. Law on Amparo, art. 158, Diario Oficial, April 30, 1968.
76. Federal Labor Law, supra note 62, art. 386.
77. Id. art. 399.
78. Id. art. 389.
79. Id. art. 20, 24.
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specific in saying that the worker may not waive any of his rights for
any reason, and any section that contains any waiver is null and void
and cannot be enforced." The state will not permit it since, in a sense,
it considers itself the protector of the weak, the down trodden, the
poor workingman.
80. Id. art. 5.
TRANSFERS OF TECHOLOGY IN MEXICO
DAVID H. BRILL, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its pursuit to lessen Mexican economic dependence upon for-
eign economic interests, the Mexican government, through the Con-
gress, enacted two basic laws which came into effect in 1973. One was
the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign In-
vestment,' while the other was the Law on the Registration of the
Transference of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents
and Trademarks2 [Technology Law]. Although both laws are the
cornerstone of Mexico's new economic nationalism, it is my purpose
to comment on the Technology Law (Ley sobre el Registro de la
Transferencia de Tecnologia y el Uso y Explotacion de Patentes y
Marcas).
There is general agreement among Mexican government circles
and the national business community that Mexico, as most develop-
ing countries, requires a considerable amount of foreign technology
to speed up the rate of development. There obviously must be tech-
nological interdependence not only between the developing countries
and the industrialized countries, but between the industrialized
countries themselves. However, the Mexican government felt that the
foreign suppliers of technology were in many cases taking advantage
of the Mexican users by supplying inadequate or obsolete techology
at high prices. The Mexican government also felt that the foreign
supplier of technology frequently imposed improper restrictions on
the Mexican user, particularly in the exportation of products pro-
duced in Mexico using foreign technology. Such restrictions impeded
the development of Mexico's program for exportation of manufac-
tured goods.
I1. TAX REFORMS-TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS
Before January 1, 1971, the Mexican Income Tax Laws, in some
cases, led to abuses by the foreign purveyor of technology. This was
particularly true in the case of Mexican subsidiaries of foreign com-
panies which furnished these subsidiaries with technical services.
The Income Tax Law applied a fixed rate of 20 percent on the gross
amount of the technical service payment made to the foreign supplier
of the service. At the same time, payments of royalties for patents
and trademarks were subject to essentially the same progressive rate
as the corporate tax rate and, as of the date mentioned above, could
* Partner, Goodrich, Dalton, Little & Riquelme, Mexico City.
1. Diario Oficial, March 9, 1973.
2. Diario Oficial, Dec. 30, 1972.
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reach 42 percent of the gross payment. It obviously was very benefi-
cial for the foreign supplier of technology, who at the same time was
the major stockholder in the Mexican company, to charge as much
as he could for technical services at the expense of royalties and
dividends. There was of course a double fiscal benefit since the tech-
nical service payments made were not only taxed at a very favorable
rate, but were also deductible as a normal business expense. Pay-
ments of as much as 10 to 15 percent were not uncommon, and in
some cases it would have been difficult to demonstrate that the serv-
ices actually rendered were worth the payment. Furthermore, techni-
cal service payments were often made to companies domiciled in
capital sanctuary countries like Panama, Liechtenstein and the Ba-
hamas. These payments consequently were subject to little or no
taxation in the recipient country, and frequently, the company in the
capital sanctuary country receiving the payment was merely a paper
company with no facilities of its own to render the technical services.
The Mexican fiscal authorities proceeded to amend the Income
Tax Law to remedy these abuses. The law was amended to provide
that the company receiving the technical service payment must pos-
sess its own facilities to the degree necessary to actually render the
services. Such companies could no longer designate another company
located in a high tax area to actually render the technical service.
Fiscal authorities also became more inquisitive as to the actual serv-
ices rendered and would disallow deductions for technical services
when the Mexican user did not have sufficient documentation in the
form of plans, formulas, correspondence, copies of proper immigra-
tion documents, etc. to prove that the technical services were actually
rendered and received.
Patents and trademarks may of course be owned by companies
established in capital sanctuary countries. However, the entire in-
come tax question has become moot, since as of January 1, 1971, the
income tax rate on technical services follows essentially the same
progressive schedule as the tax on patents and trademarks and on
corporate earnings, reaching 42 percent in all cases. The essential
difference is that in the case of technical services and patents and
trademarks the tax is payable on the gross payment, while on the
corporate income, tax is applied to net earnings. The Mexican user
is obligated, and held jointly liable under Mexican tax laws, to with-
hold from payments on technical services and patents and trade-
marks the appropriate tax and pay it to the fiscal authorities on
behalf of the foreign purveyor or owner of 'the industrial property
involved.
III. THE TECHNOLOGY LAW
In addition to the very significant tax reforms which effectively
eliminated tax abuses, arising from technical service and industrial
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property payments, the Mexican Government saw fit to further regu-
late the transference of technology, and the use and exploitation of
patents and trademarks, through the new law governing these activi-
ties. This law does not touch nor affect the registration of ownership
of patents and trademarks which are governed by the Law on In-
dustrial Property.3 The new law requires the registration and ap-
proval of the transference of technology and the use and exploitation
of patents and trademarks.
A. Introductory Articles-Registration
Article 1 of the Technology Law provides for the formation of a
National Registry of Transference of Technology under the Depart-
ment of Industry and Commerce. A previous law created the National
Council of Science and Technology, charged with the development of
basic scientific research and practical technology in Mexico. The
Technology Law provides that this Council shall act as a consulting
body to the Department of Industry and Commerce for the imple-
mentation of the Law.
Article 2 requires the registration of any document or contract of
any kind which will result in any act being carried out in Mexican
territory with reference to:
a) The licensing for the use of or authorization to exploit trade-
marks;
b) The licensing for the use of or authorization to exploit patents
and improvements thereto, models and industrial drawings or designs;
c) The furnishing of technical know-how, and technical services
through plans, diagrams, models, instructions, formula, specifications,
training of personnel, etc;
d) The providing of basic engineering services or details for instal-
lations or manufacture of products;
e) Any type of technical assistance; and
f) Administrative services and services for the operation of compa-
nies.
Not covered by the Law are, among other things, copyrights,
commercial names and commissions paid to foreign commission
agents engaged in promoting the export of Mexican goods and serv-
ices. The fact that copyrights are not covered permits a certain flexi-
bility not only in the copyright field, but in any type of design which
is subject to copyright, such as furniture and clothing designs.
As Article 2 specifically refers to the licensing of use or authoriza-
tion, it is clear that the outright sale of patents and trademarks is not
subject to the Law. It would seem that a sale of patents and trade-
marks could be made at any price agreed upon. Perhaps someday a
3. Diario Oficial, Dec. 31, 1942.
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tax audit might raise the question as to whether the purchase price
was a reasonable business expense, but this is an entirely different
problem.
Physical or juridical persons of Mexican nationality or foreign
residents or companies or branches established in Mexico which in-
tervene in, or are beneficiaries of, any of the acts or agreements cov-
ered by this Law, have the obligation to request registration of such
acts. The foreign purveyors of technology, resident abroad, may re-
quest registration of any act in which they take part. Consequently,
there are at least two parties in each agreement who may request
registration of the agreement, although the obligation is only upon
the party resident in Mexico.
The Law of course emphasizes the transference of technology
from a foreign purveyor to a Mexican user. However, contracts be-
tween two Mexican companies covering those acts regulated by the
Law must also be registered. It is true that the Registry authorities
tend to look more benignly on contracts between two Mexican com-
panies, even when foreign controlled, than where the purveyor is
located outside of Mexico.
Article 4 requires that contracts to be registered must be
presented within 60 days following the date of their execution. If they
are presented within this period of time, once registered, they will be
considered as valid from the date of their execution. If they are pre-
sented more than 60 days after execution, their validity is only from
the date on which they are presented. All amendments to any regis-
tered contract, as well as notice of early termination of an agreement,
must also be presented for registration.
The teeth in the Law are contained in Article 6, which states that
any contracts or amendments not registered will produce no legal
effect whatsoever and, consequently, cannot be enforced before any
administrative or judicial authority. This is, of course, also applicable
for all tax considerations and any deductions made for payments
under an agreement not duly registered will be disallowed by the tax
authorities. Even royalty-free contracts must be registered, although
the difficulty of registering a royalty-free contract is slight.
B. Restrictive Clauses-Grounds for Refusal
Article 7 provides 14 different conditions, any one of which, if
included in an agreement, is grounds for refusing registration. These
are as follows:
1. When the technology is freely available in the country as
long as the same technology is involved. The application of this con-
dition is very difficult because of the many types of technology avail-
able in almost an infinite variety of situations. The Registry has a
Technical Department made up of engineers, technicians and spe-
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cialists in various fields. They in turn are empowered to call upon the
National Council for Science and Technology to help locate and eval-
uate applicable technology in any given case. One of the two most
common grounds for requesting reconsideration of a rejected registra-
tion is that the technology, which the Registry believes is available
in Mexico, is not in fact the same technology as that being contracted
and cannot do the job in question. The Registry has been reasonable
in listening to well-founded arguments which tend to demonstrate
that the technology being furnished is not freely available in the
country.
2. When the price to be paid for the technology being trans-
ferred is out of line with the technology acquired, or constitutes an
unjustified burden on the national economy. Within the Registry, the
Economic Evqluation Department, among its other functions, ap-
proves or disapproves the amount of royalty or technical service pay-
ment being contracted. Although nothing in the Law stipulates what
the royalty may be nor sets up any guidelines for this royalty, this is,
nevertheless, probably the most serious stumbling block as far as the
foreign purveyor of technology is concerned. Unfortunately, in many
cases, there is disagreement between what the Department of Indus-
try and Commerce is willing to approve and what the purveyor con-
siders the going world price of his technology to be.
It is very difficult to determine what rate of royalty or technical
service payment will be approved. As a general rule, the Department
of Industry and Commerce has unofficially stated that 3 percent of
the total sale of the user of the technology would be the maximum
rate, requiring in many cases a lower rate. If it can be shown that the
technology is truly unique and that the product or service being pro-
duced is of special value to the economy, higher rates may be ap-
proved, although there has not been any rate over 6 percent author-
ized to date. Of course, if the rate is to be applied only to a certain
product line and not to the total production of the user, then a higher
rate limited to that particular product line can be negotiated.
The situation of a Mexican user, wholly owned or majority con-
trolled by the foreign purveyor of technology, creates a special prob-
lem. The Department of Industry and Commerce has tended to dis-
allow any royalty for trademarks between parent and subsidiary, al-
though occasionally approving a rate of one percent. In the case of
technical services rendered, and patents licensed, by the parent to
the subsidiary, the Department has been more lenient and has
usually judged these contracts on their merits. There is, generally, no
restriction on the Mexican user paying a royalty or technical service
fee to more than one foreign purveyor, if the foreign purveyors are
unrelated. In other words, it is entirely possible to justify a 3 percent
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royalty to each of two, or more, unrelated foreign purveyors. The
problem of pricing technology will probably remain as the greatest
point of contention between the purveyor and the Department of
Industry and Commerce.
3. When clauses are included by which the purveyor is permit-
ted to regulate, or to intervene directly or indirectly, in the adminis-
tration of the acquirer of the technology. Under Mexican law, the
administration of a company generally refers to the Board of Direc-
tors. It would be a most unusual contract which permitted the purve-
yors of technology to interfere with the operation of the Board.
4. When the acquirer is obligated to transfer, whether for con-
sideration or gratuitously, to the purveyor of the technology, any
patents or improvements obtained or developed by the acquirer. In
the past, many contracts have required the licensee to transfer to the
licensor any such improvements. Although this is no longer possible,
there would seem to be no prohibition on obligating the acquirer of
the technology to license to the licensee, although not transfer in
ownership, any improvements developed by the acquirer.
5. When limitations are placed upon the acquirer with refer-
ence to research or technological development. This does not seem to
be a serious matter as such limitations have always been extremely
rare.
6. When the licensee is obligated to acquire tools, equipment,
parts or raw materials exclusively from a determined origin. In addi-
tion to commercial considerations, this clause has generally been put
in to assure the licensor that high quality standards are maintained
by the licensee, and often this could only be done by purchasing
certain material from the licensor. However, as long as this is not an
exclusive obligation, there would seem to be no prohibition upon the
licensee being obligated to purchase a certain amount of equipment
or material from the licensor.
7. When exportation of the goods or services produced by the
acquirer is prohibited or limited in a manner contrary to the interests
of the country. This is one of the most important considerations in
determining whether an agreement shall be registered. In many
cases, it has been the custom of the licensor to drastically limit the
export possibilities of the licensee, usually to protect the licensor's
own national market, its other export markets or countries where it
already has license arrangements. Such restrictions are basically in
contradiction with one of the principal, current Mexican economic
policies, which is to encourage exportation in every way possible.
However, some limitation on exportation is possible, if not contrary
to the interests of the country, as determined by the Department of
Industry and Commerce. It is difficult to determine what this means
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except in each individual case. However, it is easy to imagine that a
world wide prohibition on exportation would be completely unaccept-
able, whereas limitation in certain areas where existing license agree-
ments already were in force, would probably be acceptable. Where
there are already license agreements emanating from the same licen-
sor, the domestic legislation of the other countries in question would,
usually, prohibit the importation of the same licensed products from
a third country, thereby eliminating in most cases the need for export
restrictions.
8. When the use of complementary technology is prohibited.
Normally this is not a problem.
9. When the acquirer is obligated to sell exclusively to the
purveyor of technology the goods produced under the technology
agreement. The operative word, again, would seem to be "exclu-
sively," and as long as the obligation was non-exclusive, we would not
anticipate any objection. Also, there seems to be no restriction on
naming the purveyor of the technology as sales agent for export. Such
designation could be exclusive, although the acquirer would be free
to accept or reject the export opportunities presented by the agent.
10. When the acquirer is obligated to permanently utilize per-
sonnel designated by the purveyor of the technology. Again, this
would not seem to present any difficulty, as rarely, if ever, does the
purveyor expect to have a technician on a permanent basis at the
plant of the user. It is quite normal to have such technicians for a
temporary period, which would vary in accordance with the unique-
ness or difficulty of the technology concerned. In any event, the
immigration authorities, upon authorizing the work permits of such
foreign personnel, generally limit them in time and usually require
that two or more Mexicans be trained in the same speciality.
11. When the volume of production is limited or when prices for
sale or resale either nationally or for export are imposed by the pur-
veyor upon the acquirer. The Department of Industry and Commerce
prohibits any clause which requires return of technical information,
except for patented data, upon expiration of the contract, on the
grounds that such return would henceforth limit production. Addi-
tionally, the licensee cannot be restricted from manufacturing li-
censed products, after termination of the license agreement.
12. When the acquirer is obligated to enter into exclusive sales
or representation agreements with the purveyor of technology, in na-
tional territory. Normally, the acquirer wishes to be named exclusive
agent, which would not, in fact, be prohibited by this restriction.
Rather, this restriction is an attempt to prevent the usual clause, that
the acquirer cannot engage in the production of a competitive prod-
uct or undertake a competitive representation. This can cause serious
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trouble for the purveyor, but is one of the restrictions which can be
waived by the Department of Industry and Commerce, as will be seen
below.
13. When excessive period is established for the life of the
agreement. In no case may such periods exceed 10 years obligation
upon the acquirer. This means that 10 years is the maximum period
which may be obligatory upon the acquirer of the technology. How-
ever, there is nothing to prohibit a contract which is obligatory upon
the purveyor, but voluntary on the part of the acquirer, after the 10
years have expired. In many cases, the Department of Industry and
Commerce is insisting upon lesser periods than 10 years.
14. When any differences or interpretation or compliance with
the agreements are submitted for resolution to foreign tribunals. This
of course is one of the pillars of Mexican economic policy and is not
subject to waiver by the Department of Industry and Commerce. This
restriction would apply only to foreign courts but not to foreign arbi-
tration tribunals and therefore disputes could be submitted to the
various existing international tribunals for arbitration which have
been often designated in these contracts in the past. All contracts
must also be governed by Mexican law, and no clause stipulating the
application of a foreign law will be allowed.
Article 8 permits the Department of Industry and Commerce to
register those contracts which violate one or more of the foregoing
restrictions, when the technology being transferred is considered of
particular interest for the country. However, the Department may
not waive those restrictions stipulated in numbers 1, 4, 5, 7, 13 and
14.
C. Activities Not Subject to Registration
There are certain activities, according to Article 9, not included
within those acts or agreements subject to registration. These include
the following:
1. The use of foreign technicians for the installations of facto-
ries and machinery or to carry out repairs. This is a most important
point to keep in mind when determining the technical service fee
applicable to the initial installation of equipment. Rather than list
this charge as a separate item, it is more convenient to include it
within the overall purchase price of the machiney and equipment.
2. The furnishing of designs, catalogues or assistance in general
which are acquired with machinery or equipment and which are nec-
essary for installation as long as this does not imply an obligation to
make subsequent payments. This point, similar to the foregoing,
emphasizes the necessity of not separating charges for these items
from the overall price of the equipment being purchased.
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3. Assistance in repairs or emergencies, as long as this is de-
rived from some act or contract which had been previously registered.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, it is believed that
subsequent emergency repairs, implied or explicit, in the warranty of
the sale of any equipment, are not subject to the Technology Law.
4. Instruction or technical training provided by educational
institutions, personnel training centers or by companies to their
workers.
5. The operations of In Bond, or jobbing plants, which are regu-
lated by special legal rules or dispositions. These "In Bond" plants
are, generally, engaged in labor intensive manfacturing procedures,
and their entire output is exported. These plants enjoy privileged
treatment under the Foreign Investment Law, wherein they may be
wholly foreign owned and may, also, import machinery, raw materi-
als, components and semi-finished parts free of duty. Following this
privileged treatment, the Technology Law totally exempts these op-
erations from its terms.
D. Acceptance, Rejection and Reconsideration
In order to prevent bureaucratic delay, Article 10 requires the
Department of Industry and Commerce to determine whether a con-
tract shall be registered within 90 days of the presentment for regis-
tration. If the Department fails to render any resolution during that
period of time, contracts shall be automatically registered. Insuffi-
cient time has transpired to determine the policy of the Department
of Industry and Commerce as to the percentage of contracts which
will be accepted for registration.
Transitory Article II of the Law provides that arguments exe-
cuted before the effective date of the Law would enjoy a period of two
years to adjust to the dispositions of the law and to be registered. In
order to enjoy this two year grace period, it was necessary to present
existing contracts to the Registry officials, within 90 days following
the date on which the law went into effect, in order to take note of
same (not to register them). Although the Law went into effect on
January 30, 1973, the Registry officials computed the 90 day period
on the basis of official government working days, and thus the period
expired on June 25, 1973. Up to that date, virtually no contract was
presented for registration, but only for taking note thereof. Subse-
quent to that date, new contracts enjoy a period of 60 official working
days from the date of execution to be presented for registration, after
which government has 90 official working days to accept or reject
them. In reality, this is a period of anywhere from 6 to 7 months
subsequent to June 25, 1973, and therefore, it can be seen that not
too many contracts have been either accepted, or rejected, as of the
date of this writing.
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It would be fair to state that the majority of contracts presented
for registration, and acted upon, have been initially rejected by the
Department on the basis that they did not comply with some require-
ment of the Law. The majority of these rejections have been based
on the allegation of the Department of Industry and Commerce that
the royalty was too high.
In case of rejection, the affected party may, under Article 14 of
the Law, request a reconsideration of the resolution, accompanying
any elements of proof which he deems pertinent. A period for hearing
the proofs will be opened, and after all elements of proof are pre-
sented, the Department of Industry and Commerce must resolve the
reconsideration within 45 days. If the Department has not rendered
its decision upon the reconsideration within that period, it will be
presumed that the reconsideration is resolved in favor of the moving
party. Currently, we know of a number of contracts under reconsider-
ation, which have been finally rejected. In several cases the reconsi-
derations have been resolved in favor of the moving party. But we
shall need several more months of experience before we can deter-
mine the current policy of the Department of Industry and Com-
merce.
If administrative reconsideration should be denied, the affected
party has other judicial remedies available. If he feels that his consti-
tutional rights have been violated, for example, failure of the De-
partment to properly motivate the original denial of registration or
of the reconsideration, the affected party may bring an "amparo"
proceeding in a Federal District Court. The best procedure is of
course to negotiate the terms of the contract prior to its initial rejec-
tion and, certainly, prior to any negative ruling upon the reconsidera-
tion.
Article 11 of the Technology Law permits the Department of
Industry and Commerce to cancel the registration of any.contract
which is amended or altered in a manner contrary to this Law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The National Registy for the Transference of Technology is not
a public registry and, consequently, not open to the public. As a
matter of fact, one of the concerns of the owner of the technology is
the fear that secrecy might be violated and confidential manufactur-
ing processes devulged to competitors. To try to avoid this problem,
Article 13 states that the personnel involved in the operations of the
Registry are obligated to maintain absolute; secrecy with respect to
the technological information subject matter of the agreements or
acts which must be registered.
The supporters of the Technology Law believe that it will help
ensure Mexico's economic independence without impeding the trans-
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ference of technology so essential to its economic development. As in
the case of every well-intentioned law, its success rests in the hands
of those entrusted with its implementation.

IMMIGRATION, IMPORTATION AND LABOR LAW
APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN IN MEXICO
ROBERT L. TANNER*
A general understanding of the laws of immigration, importation
and labor is essential to a foreign businessman intending to operate
in Mexico. For the purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that
the foreign businessman wishes to legally enter Mexico with the in-
tent to manage a business concern. Since he will first encounter the
entry requirements of the Mexican Ministry of the Interior (Secre-
taria de Gobernacion) immigration law will first be considered. Then
discussion will focus on the laws regulating imports by the business-
man, and finally the labor laws which will affect his business opera-
tion.
I. IMMIGRATION LAW
The specific body of law which governs immigration is known as
the "Ley General de Poblacion."' In January 1974, the Mexican Con-
gress revised the law, and that revised edition will be the focus of this
section.'
Upon entering Mexico, the foreign businessman must obtain the
proper immigration permit. The law divides the categories of the
immigration permits generally given to foreigners into three areas:
non-immigrant (no inmigrante),3 immigrant (inmigrante),4 and per-
manent alien resident (inmigrado). 5 The basic difference between the
three types of permits is that the first is strictly for temporary resi-
dence, while the other two permit a residency of greater permanence.
A. Non-Immigrant Status
In recent years, the obtaining of immigrant papers of the type
which eventually could lead to permanent alien residence status has
been difficult since, as a general rule, the Ministry of the Interior
prefers that the foreigner wishing to work in Mexico first apply for
and work under a non-immigrant permit. This is usually issued in
* Member of the law firm of Goodrich, Dalton, Little & Riquelme, Mexico City.
1. This literally translates to "Population Law", even though it is commonly
known as the "Immigration Law". Possibly the literal title is better understood by
explaining that in addition to immigration, the Ministry also is responsible for demo-
graphic statistics and control. Ley General de Poblacion art. 3.
2. Diario Oficial, Jan. 7, 1974. The revised government fees to be paid for the
issuance of the various immigration permits and documents were published in the
Diario Oficial, Dec. 31, 1973. To date there has been no modification to the existing
Reglamento or "Regulations" to the law, but it can be expected in the future.
3. Ley General de Poblacion art. 42.
4. Id. art. 44.
5. Id. art. 52.
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form of a visitor's (visitante) permit, which is a sub-category similar
to "tourist," "student," "board member," "political exile" and
"distinguished visitor." All of these sub-categories are temporary in
nature and require a special permit.
The visitor's permit is of two general types depending on the
purpose for which it is to be used. One type is sometimes referred to
as a "business visa" and is issued by a Mexican Consul abroad by
express authorization of the Ministry of the Interior. It permits the
holder to engage in business conferences, conduct market surveys and
other related, but certainly limited, activities., The holder's salary,
however, must come from outside Mexico. Allied with this type of
visa is a 30 day permit for technicians to enter Mexico to install,
repair or service specialized equipment and machinery.'
The second type of visitor's permit entitles its holder to more
latitude and must always be requested and processed in Mexico City
at the Ministry of the Interior by the sponsoring company.' In con-
trast to the first type, this permit allows the holder to work directly
with the Mexican sponsoring company and to draw a salary there-
from.'
Availability of the visitor's permit is important, as it can be
obtained fairly easily under present conditions, and the higher capi-
talization and other requirements for the more coveted immigrant
permit do not exist. The requirements for this type of permit will be
dealt with later.
Other advantages in holding a visitor's permit are that the for-
eigner may leave and re-enter as often as necessary, may bring in a
car from outside Mexico"' and, under certain circumstances and with
prior permission from Mexican Customs Authorities, may bring in
household furnishings. This non-immigrant permit is valid for an
initial six months' period and presently may, in most cases, be re-
newed every six months for a 24 month period." At the end of the 24
month period the person holding a non-immigrant visitor's permit
may either apply for another like permit or apply to the Mexican
Government for an immigrant permit.
6. Instructivo Conjunto, based on Ley General de Poblacion art. 42, issued jointly
by the Secretaria de Gobernacion and the Secretaria de Relacciones Exteriores on Oct.
30, 1953.
7. Circular 30-A, Nov. 18, 1965, issued by the Secretaria de Gobernacion. How-
ever, the Circular specifically lists fifteen nationalities whose technicians can come
into Mexico under the Circular.
8. Reglamento de la Ley General de Poblacion, art. 71, para. 3.
9. Supra note 6.
10. Codigo Aduanero art. 369, § 2.
11. Ley General de Poblacion art. 42, § 3 and Reglamento de la Ley General de
Poblacion art. 71, § 1.
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B. Immigrant Status
Although it has been indicated that the non-immigrant permit
is, in practice, easier to obtain than the immigrant, it should not be
concluded that the immigrant permit is impossible to obtain. Its
issuance, however, does require the applicant to show sufficient
need."1
In addition, there are special requirements imposed on the Mexi-
can company applying for the permit. The company, first of all, must
have been in existence at least two years and must employ at least
ten Mexican citizens for every foreign immigrant employee." If the
corporate domicile is within the Federal District or any contiguous
area, the company must have a paid in minimum capitalization of
600,000 Mex. Cy. ($48,000 U.S.). If the corporate domicile is in any
other area, the company must have a paid in minimum capitalization
of 200,000 Mex. Cy. ($16,000 U.S.)." It is exceedingly difficult to
obtain the immigrant permit, even if all the previously mentioned
requisites are met, if the applying or sponsoring company is a "serv-
ice" company, as opposed to a "manufacturing" company.
Once the immigrant permit is obtained, the foreigner is lawfully
entitled to work in Mexico, but only within the terms of the permit
which must be renewed every year for five years. 5 Even though the
renewal is discretionary with the Mexican Government, it is nearly
always granted. At the end of the five year period, the holder of an
immigrant permit can apply for a permanent alien resident status
(inmigrado), 6 and the time accumulated under the immigrant per-
mit may be counted toward permanent alien residence status. The
immigrant permit, unlike the visitor's permit which allows multiple
entries, restricts its holder on the time he may be outside Mexico to
90 days in each of the first two years. The days may not be credited
or accumulated for use in the next year. 7 During the remaining three
years there is no restriction as long as he is not outside Mexico for
more than eighteen months during the whole five year period.'
Presently, it appears that most foreigners enter Mexico under the
justification that they are to either discharge duties of high responsi-
12. There are seven categories of immigrant status, these include retiree, investor,
professional, executive, scientist, technician and next of kin.
13. Ley Federal del Trabajo ("Federal Labor Law") art. 7.
14. Reglamento de la Ley General de Poblacion art. 51, § 1, 2 and art. 56, § 2.
15. Ley General de Poblacion art. 45 and Reglamento de la Ley General de Pobla-
cion art. 52.
16. Ley General de Poblacion art. 53.
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bility or that they possess special skills, or both, and thus are needed
by the Mexican company offering them employment which must
always apply for their permit. The person holding the immigrant
permit can change employment only if he can find a succeeding spon-
soring company to request the authorization to change employer.
In recent years when it has become increasingly difficult to rou-
tinely obtain immigrant permits, the Mexican Government has indi-
cated that the reason for this difficulty has been the desire to imple-
ment the policy that such permits would be for persons who in fact
expected to permanently stay in Mexico. 9 Non-immigrant permits
would be for persons most probably not intending to acquire perma-
nent residence in Mexico, such as officers with multinational compa-
nies assigned to Mexico for a relatively short period and then trans-
ferred to a subsidiary in another country.
Under no circumstance is a tourist card ever acceptable as a legal
entry document into Mexico for the foreigner employed in Mexico.
The proper working papers must be obtained in each case. For exam-
ple, a foreign executive wishing to attend and vote in a board meeting
of his company's Mexican operation must obtain a special permit-a
tourist card is simply not proper. 20 One should also remember that
whether the permit obtained is immigrant or non-immigrant, the
authorization must specify the work to be performed by the holder
and under no circumstance should the person engage in another type
of endeavor, remunerative or not, without authorization.
2'
C. Permanent Alien Resident Status
Reference has been made to the permanent alien resident status
(inmigrado), so let us consider briefly that authorization. This permit
is granted only after the foreigner has resided in Mexico as an immi-
grant for five years, requires no renewals and its holder may freely
change employment or even go into business for himself. That busi-
ness is not restricted as it is for the immigrant, i.e., no minimum
number of Mexican employees or capital. The permanent resident
alien, however, may not be out of the country for all of any two
consecutive years or more than five out of any ten year period.2 2 He
generally has all the rights of a Mexican citizen, except those of
voting, engaging in political activities and owning land in certain
areas of Mexico.3
19. This in fact is exactly what Article 64 of the Ley de Poblacion states.
20. Several years ago, the Secretaria de Gobernacion ruled that a mere "business-
man's visa" is not sufficient for such purposes, and that the second type visitor's
permit (no inmigrante) is the proper document. In the new law the situation is specifi-
cally covered by art. 42, § 4.
21. Ley General de Poblacion art. 60.
22. Id. art. 56.
23. The law does require all "foreigners" to obtain a permit to acquire real prop-
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H. IMPORTATION BY FOREIGN EXECUTIVES
If the business executive has secured his proper entry documents,
his next concern will be with the import laws which will affect his
business as well as his personal belongings. Thus, the next section
will deal with the pertinent laws regulating imports, beginning with
the importation of personal belongings.
A. Personal Belongings, Machinery and Equipment
In the previous section it was indicated that foreign executives
may come to Mexico as either a "visitor" or "immigrant" and that
there are specific importation regulations which apply to each immi-
gration status. If the party is coming to work in Mexico under a visitor
permit and is classified as a "technician," then he may bring in a car,
but must post a bond at the border to guarantee that the car will be
taken out of Mexico when the visitor papers expire. The bond posted
is usually based on a value assigned the corresponding model, make
and year of the car by the Mexican Government and is usually con-
siderably higher than the market value in the United States. Mexico
does have its own automobile production plants set up by the princi-
pal manufacturers of the world, but unfortunately the prices are from
50 to 80 percent higher than the prices in the United States, and thus
strict vigilance is required to avoid contraband of automobiles.
It should also be pointed out that a person immigrating to Mex-
ico with immigrant entry papers, as defined in the previous section,
is entitled to bring in his household goods, not including an automo-
bile, within one year of his arrival in Mexico.24 Such household goods
and personal effects must be used goods, and the importing party
should have invoices to so verify. All electrical appliances, especially,
must be accompanied by their invoices or sales slips, and such appli-
ances less than six months old are subject to duty charges of up to
150 percent of their value on the Mexican market or denial of entry.
Most international moving companies or large Mexican law
firms are acquainted with the documentation which must be pre-
pared and filed before the goods enter Mexico, such as an "inventory"
in Spanish, a "certificate of residence" and a notarized photo copy
of the shipper's immigration papers. Any fire arms included in the
household goods require a permit from the Ministry of National
Defense, and this permit must be applied for and obtained before the
erty and shares. Ley General de Poblacion art. 66. See Reglamento de la Ley General
de Poblacion art. 53, to the effect that the Secretaria de Gobernacion is authorized to
determine place of residence of immigrants.
24. Codigo Aduanero de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos arts. 299, 300, 301 Diario
Oficial, Dec. 31, 1951.
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guns enter Mexico.2 5 It is important to note that the Mexican Govern-
ment issues these permits only for sporting guns.
After he has arranged for the importation of his personal belong-
ings, the newly arrived foreign businessman will want to know about
the laws which will control his importation of machinery and equip-
ment. One of the first things he must consider is the permit require-
ment."
If the law indicates that a permit is required, then the procedure
is to file a petition with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce
requesting an import permit. Within the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce are a multitude of committees composed of representa-
tives of private business usually connected with the type of operation
for which the equipment is needed. If a committee feels that the
equipment or goods whose importation is requested is available in
Mexico, the permit will be denied, and a list of such suppliers pro-
vided, with the suggestion that they be contacted for the purpose of
acquiring the product locally. If, due to technical requirements, the
equipment, goods or machinery available locally in fact is not the
same as that desired to be imported, it is possible to appeal to that
committee for a review of the situation, and attach letters from the
Mexican manufacturers or suppliers indicating that they cannot pro-
duce the equipment or material in the form required by the proposed
operation. In such case, an import permit is then usually issued, but
only for that equipment or material which may not be obtained lo-
cally. At times, this means importing only a part of the equipment.
This same modus operandi is also used in the importing of raw
or finished materials which are used to make another product. Unless
it is shown that the material desired to be imported is extremely
unique, and at times it is necessary to disclose the chemical composi-
tion of the material to prove the point, an import permit will be
denied if the same materials, in the committee's opinion, are avail-
able locally.
B. Rules 8 and 14
There are also regulations of the Mexican Customs legislation
which are of more than routine importance to the importer of
machinery and equipment.
25. Reglamento de la Ley de Armas de Fuego y Explosivos Diario Oficial, May 6,
1972; Ley de Armas de Fuego y Explosivos Diario Oficial, Jan. 11, 1972, and the
Circular de la Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico No. 301-11-72, Aug. 29, 1953,
clause five.
26. Most of such information is found in the Tarifa del Impuesto General de
Importaciones Reestructurada por Decreto de 3 de noviembre de 1964.
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The first of these is known as Rule 8 (Regla 8).27 As a general rule,
the import duties are higher for individual parts of a unit when indi-
vidually imported than when they are imported already assembled or
incorporated into a unit. This rule, aimed at such a situation, pro-
vides that any importation of machinery and equipment under the
rule will be taxed as if it were the whole unit and not on the basis of
being separate parts of the machinery or equipment. However, a
special permit is required from the Mexican Treasury. Such permits
are granted only to importers who will use the parts directly them-
selves and who have submitted and have had approved an
"integration plan." This type of plan states that over a specific period
of time, usually ten years, the Mexican company doing the importing
will obtain a high percentage of the raw materials and finished mate-
rials used in the production from Mexican sources. Integration plans
usually provide for a low percentage of integration in the initial years
of manufacturing and from 75 to 100 percent in later years, depending
on the market conditions in Mexico.
A second important rule for importers is known as Rule 14 .2S This
rule provides a 65 percent import tax reduction on the importation
of manufacturing machinery and equipment which may not be ac-
quired in Mexico. The imported machinery and equipment may nei-
ther be moved from its location, rented, nor sold for three years fol-
lowing importation, without prior authorization from the Mexican
Treasury. Violation of the law causes payment of the 65 percent tax
benefit, plus a fine equal to twice the tax. One year is permitted to
install the machinery and equipment, but extension is possible.
C. Plan de Decentralizacion Industrial
Mention should also be made of certain legislation 29 permitting
a reduction of 50 to 100 percent in the importation and stamp tax,
depending on the zone in Mexico where the plant is located. However,
this law requires that 51 percent of the equity of any Mexican com-
pany availing itself of this law be in Mexican hands. In July 1972, the
Government indicated zones where industry could be established in
order to avail itself of these tax benefits, as the location of the plant
would determine the amount of exemption available to the opera-
tion .3o
As the previous discussion indicates, a number of resrictions on
importing into Mexico do exist. One must be especially careful to
27. Reglas para la Aplicacion de la Tarifa de Importacion. Diario Oficial, Nov. 10,
1964.
28. Id.
29. This can be translated as "Plan to Decentralize Industry". Diario Oficial,
Nov. 21, 1971.
30. Presidential Decree published in the Diario Oficial, July 20, 1972.
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import all goods or equipment under the proper import classification
provided in the Customs Code in order to ensure minimum import
duties. Of course, as in any area of law, competent counsel may at
times be needed and will prove to be most valuable.
III. LABOR LAW
Assuming that the foreign executive has been established in his
post as either a technical supervisor or even the general manager of
a Mexican company, it will be advantageous for him to know some-
thing of the general principles of Mexican labor law to which he will
be subject.
First of all, the employees of any concern in Mexico are granted
an individual employment contract by law, 3' though not always in
writing, whereas unionized employees will usually be given a written
collective labor agreement. Thus, a non-union worker who does not
have a written contract still has a contract under law and is pro-
tected.
Most authorities will agree that Mexican labor law is definitely
employee oriented, however there is protection which a written em-
ployment agreement does provide the employer. The agreement
should show exactly how long the person has been an employee, a
factor of importance in the event of compensated severance. Further-
more, if the employment contract indicates that the employment
shall be at the plant domicile without specifying the precise address,
and the company decides to change its plant domicile, the employee
must follow. His refusal will result in less severance pay for the
worker.
So all employees do have an employment contract, either written
or unwritten, and are entitled to vacations, annual bonus, minimum
wage, regulated work shifts, profit sharing, benefits under the Na-
tional Fund for Workers' Housing, the right to unionize and contest
discharge.
A. Vacation
The Labor Law provides that employees with more than one year
of employment shall be entitled to an annual paid vacation, which
under no circumstance will be less than six working days.
3 2 Six of
these days must be permitted to be taken consecutively 33 and shall
be increased two working days, up to twelve, for each subsequent year
of employment. After the fourth year, the vacation period is increased
by two working days for every five years of service.
3'
31. Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 21.
32. Id. art. 76.
33. Id. art. 78.
34. Id. art. 76.
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The annual vacation period is mandatory and may not be ex-
changed for remuneration.-- Furthermore, all employees are entitled
to a premium payment equal to 25 percent of the salary payable
during the time they are on vacation." Accordingly, should the em-
ployer ask the employee to stay on the job and pay him double, he
will still be entitled to take his vacation at a later date and receive
the 25 percent additional pay.
The days of vacation required by law refer to working days, not
calendar days.37 In other words, since Sundays are never working
days, if a person with four years service takes all of his 12 days
together, it could mean, under the right calendar arrangement, as
many as 16 or 17 days actually away from the job. Should the
employer-employee relationship terminate prior to the time that the
employee has actually worked one year, then he is entitled to the pro
rata days of vacation for the time worked.
3
Having completed one year of employment, the vacation period
should be granted to the employee within the following six months.
The employers are also required to annually provide the employees
with a communication indicating the number of years of service and
the number of days of vacation to which they are entitled, as well as
the dates on which the vacation should be taken.
38
B. Annual Bonus
Employees are entitled to a minimum annual bonus, equivalent
to 15 days' salary, which must be paid prior to December 20 of each
year. Employees who have not completed one year of employment are




A minimum wage plan is provided under Mexican law" and
varies according to the region of the country." In Mexico City, Fed-
eral District, the minumum wage for unskilled employees up through
December 31, 1973, was 44.85 Mex. Cy per day net to the employee,
but as of January 1, 1974, the minimum wage became 52.00 Mex. Cy
i($4.16 U.S.).13 When an employee receives only the minimum wage,
35. Id. art. 79.
36. Id. art. 80.
37. Id. art. 76.
38. Id. art. 79.
39. Id. art. 81.
40. Id. art. 87.
41. Id. art. 90.
42. Art. 564 of the Ley Federal del Trabajo provides for regional minimum salary
commissions which have the responsibility of convening every four years and examin-
ing the economic situation prevailing in the 111 "economic zones" of Mexico. Each
commission also has the responsibility of setting the minimum salary for its zone.
43. There are also minimum professional wages fixed for each zone. By "profes-
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the employer may neither withhold income taxes nor his Social Secu-
rity quota, but instead is required to pay from his own funds the
Social Security quota of the employer and the employee." The mini-




If the employee's salary is the minimum wage and no higher, it
may not be subjected to any compensating factors, discount or reduc-
tion, except in the case of board allotments decreed by court author-
ity to provide for the family of the employee or to pay the rent re-
quired of the employee under the National Fund for Workers' Hous-
ing and the corresponding quotas."
If the employee receives more than the minimum salary, then 30
percent of the employee's monthly pay in excess of the minimum
wage may be withheld by the employer in order to repay debts owed
to the employer by the employee in question. 7
An employee's salary may be garnisheed in cases of board allot-
ments decreed by court authority in favor of the wife, children, par-
ents and grandchildren; the law emphasizes that employers are not
required to comply with any other type of judicial or administrative
order of attachment. 
4
E. Work Shifts
The day shift, according to law, is from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.
and the night shift from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. The maximum shift
duration is 8 hours if day, 7 hours if night and 71/2 hours if combina-
tion of day and night.4 9
Overtime may not exceed more than three hours daily, nor occur
more frequently than three times a week.5 In the event that the
employee does work more than nine hours overtime, the hours in
excess thereof shall be paid at triple rate, with the first nine hours at
sional," the law refers to basically skilled and semi-skilled labor such as a pharmacy
clerk, home appliance repairman, parking lot attendant, bartender, seamstress and
social worker. The minimum salaries for such employees range from 66.10 Mex. Cy
($5.29 U.S.) to 83.90 Mex. Cy ($6.71 U.S.). The minimum wages presently in effect
were published in the Diario Oficial, Dec. 28, 1973.
44. Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 97.
45. Id.
46. Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 97.
47. Id. art. 110.
48. Id. art. 112. Article 113 provides that the wages of an employee earned in his
last year of employment and any severance pay are preferred credit over any other
including secured debt, fiscal and Social Security.
49. Id. arts. 60, 61.
50. Id. art. 66.
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double rate, independent of sanctions which may be imposed upon
the employer for violating the law.'
F. Discharge of Employees
The employer may discharge an employee without having to pay
any severence pay if the cause for the dismissal is justified as defined
in the law.52 It is generally difficult to prove justified cause.
If the employee has at least one year's service in a position which
is not one of "trust" in the company and the cause is not justified,
then the employee may ask for either reinstatement or the required
severance pay through the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration.
5 3
However, if an employee has less than one year's service, held a
position of trust or if there exists the situation described in the follow-
ing paragraph, he may not ask for reinstatement.54
If, in view of the type of work done, the employer and employee
are in permanent and direct contact and, as a result, a normal work-
ing relationship is not possible, the Board of Conciliation is empow-
ered to rule that the employee not be reinstated. Quite frequently the
poor relationship which builds between an employer and a given
employee is not one which can justify discharge for cause, therefore
management must weigh carefully the probabilities of cost and suc-
cess should the employee decide to contest the discharge. More fre-
quently, the employer decides to negotiate with the employee for a
written resignation, and in exchange pays the employee the required
three months' pay plus 20 days' pay for each full year of employment
with the employer, calculated on the employee's present salary.5
If the employee in question has less than one year of service or
held a position of trust, then, as indicated, he is not entitled to rein-
statement, and the employer has no choice but to pay the three
months and 20 days' settlement unless, of course, justified cause for
discharge is proven.
Trial period contracts are not legal, and definite term employ-
ment contracts are not valid except in clear cases, such as in the
construction industry or in filling a temporary absence.56 Under defi-
nite term contracts, if the period of employment is less than one year,
then the employee's severence pay shall be equal to half the salary
51. Id. art. 68.
52. Id. arts. 46, 47. The latter article lists the causes for justified discharge.
53. Employees of "trust" are, according to article 2 of the Law, generally consid-
ered to be ranking staff members such as directors, administrators and managers.
However, article 9 provides that such a classification is determined by what the em-
ployee does and not by title held. Also see, art. 182 of the Law.
54. Ley Federal del Trabajo arts. 48, 49.
55. Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 50.
56. Id. arts. 35, 36 and 37.
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earned while an employee, plus an additional three month's pay. If
the work period exceeds one year, then it shall be nine months' pay
plus an additional twenty days' pay for each year of service afer the
first year. 57 On the other hand, if the contract is for an indefinite
period, then the severence pay shall be the three months' pay plus
twenty days' pay for each full year of service as previously discussed.
5
1
In the event of a dispute between employer and employee con-
cerning dismissal for justified cause, if the Board of Conciliation de-
termines that the cause for dismissal was unjustified, the employee
has a right to the salary which he would have earned during the time
that his case was before the Board.
59
In addition to the severence computation indicated above, there
are other items which must be taken into consideration and paid to
the employee in the event of justified and unjustified discharge. One
of these is the seniority payment which consists of twelve days' pay
for each year employed provided the employee has at least fifteen
years of service."' This right of the employee became law in May of
1970, and the courts have now ruled that in cases not only of dis-
charge, but resignation as well, the employer pays nothing unless the
employee in question has at least fifteen years service." In addition,
the new law establishes 1970 as the base year for calculating this
severence pay. Thus, in 1974, the employee is entitled to a maximum
unit of four in calculating the amount to which he is entitled.6 2 In the
event of a long time employee, the amount payable will be considera-
ble even though the pay is based on the daily salary, which for this
calculation will not exceed double the minimum wage regardless of
true earnings.3 In other words, the minimum salary of 52.00 Mex. Cy
presently in force in Mexico City, Federal District, would mean a
twelve day payment of 1,248.00 Mex. Cy ($99.84 U.S.) multiplied by
the number of years of employment, but not to exceed four (pres-
ently), and only if the employee has fifteen years service. This pay-
ment is required even for an employee voluntarily resigning, or upon
his death."
G. Employee Living Quarters
Chapter III of the Federal Labor Law of 1931 provides for em-
57. Id. art. 50, §§ 1, 3.
58. Id. art. 50, §§ 2, 3.
59. Id. art. 48.
60. Id. art. 162, § 1.
61. Informe 1973-Suprema Corte de Justicia. Amparo Directo 767 '73. Jose Diaz
Lopez y otros. (1 Julio 1973).
62. Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 486.
63. Id. art. 162, § 3.
64. Id. art. 162, § 5. However, in the event of death the payment is calculated
for all the years of employment and not just as of May 1970.
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ployee housing in accordance with Article 123 of the 1917 Mexican
Constitution. However, the provisions on housing were never enforced
and remained a dead letter until May 1970.
The amended Federal Labor Law which became effective on
May 1, 1970, expanded Chapter III and established a set of proce-
dures and implementing laws to require the provision of housing by
employers. However, for practical purposes the law was not put into
effect and in April 1972 the Mexican Labor Law was modified to
accommodate the prior promulgation of the Law of the Institute of
the National Fund for Employee Housing." A consequence of this law
is that instead of the employer financing and supervising the con-
struction of employee housing, he now pays monthly five percent of
his payroll to the Fund in order to finance such housing. The law also
provides that the maximum salary for the calculation for any em-
ployee will be the equivalent of ten times the general minimum salary
fixed for the zone in question. 6
Once the housing is available, the employee has the obligation
of paying the rent and taking care of the dwelling as if it were his own.
In addition, the employee must notify the company of any defect of
construction or deterioration and must vacate the dwelling within 45
days following the end of the employment relationship. 7 The em-
ployee is further prohibited from sub-leasing the dwelling or using it
for any other purpose.6
H. Employee Profit Sharing
In 1963, the National Commission for Employee Participation in
Company Profits published a resolution to provide for the calculation
of employee profit sharing,"6 and the first distribution of profits took
place in 1964.
The procedure for calculating the employees' share of profits is
complicated. Basically it involves calculating a net distributable por-
tion by taking deductions from the gross profits subject to distribu-
tion (net profits without deduction for loss carry-forward and re-
serves). The first is a fixed deduction, for investor equity and rein-
vestment of capital, of 30 percent from the gross profits subject to
distribution. Then, a variable deduction, determined by utilizing the
appropriate capital-to-labor ratio of the company in conjunction with
65. Diario Oficial, Apr. 22, 24, 1972.
66. Ley Federal del Trabajo arts. 136, 144.
67. Id. art. 151.
68. Id.
69. Diario Oficial, Dec. 13, 1963. The National Commission for Employee Partici-
pation in Company Profits (Comision Nacional para la Participacion de los trabaja-
dores en las Utilidades de las Empresas) had been previously created by Presidential
Decree, see Diario Oficial, Nov. 21, 1962).
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the table provided in the resolution,7" is taken, resulting in the net
distributable portion. The employees' share in the profits of the com-
pany is 20 cent of this net distributable portion. The company's prof-
its is, thus, the result of the gross profits subject to distribution minus
the employees' share (20 percent of the net distributable portion).
According to this procedure, under the most optimum condi-
tions, the employees' portion will never exceed 12.6 percent of net
profits. After deducting income taxes, the share is divided in half, one
half going to all employees based on the number of days worked
during the year without taking into consideration their salaries. The
other half is distributed in proportion to the employees' total salary
for the year.7 The employees' salary for the sake of this compuation
does not include bonuses, overtime and other compensations.7"
Newly organized companies are exempted from the obligation of
sharing profits with employees for the first year. The same is true
during the first two years of operation for new companies manufac-
turing new products in Mexico. Determination of the novelty of the
product will be in accordance with the new industries law.73 Mining
companies during the period of exploration are not required to share
profits, and there are other exceptions not pertinent to this discus-
sion.7" Furthermore, corporations whose corporate capital is less than
that fixed by the Ministry of Labor for given branches of industry are
also exempt.75 Members of the Board of Directors, the Managing
Director and the Manager of the company may not share in profits
and the profits shall not be considered as part of the salaries for the
purpose of computing severance pay.7" Part time employees who
have not worked at least 60 days during the year are not entitled to
profit sharing,7 7 but the wages of all personnel not entitled to profit
sharing must, notwithstanding, be included in the calculation.
78
In 1970, when the Labor Law was updated, its Articulo Septimo
Transitorio stipulated that the resolution could not be reviewed until
ten years had passed as of December 13, 1963. That term has now
expired and presumably we can now expect modifications to the reso-
lution, even though to date no such proposal has been forthcoming.
70. Resolucion de la Comision Nacional para la Participacion de los Trabajadores
een las Utilidades de las Ernpresas arts. 1-8 Diario Oficial, Dec. 13, 1963.
71. Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 123.
72. Id. art. 124.
73. Ley Fedral del Trabajo art. 126, §§ 1, 2 & 3.
74. Id. art. 126, §§ 1, 2, 3 & 4.
75. Id. art. 126, § 5.
76. Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 127 § 1, and art. 129.
77. Id. art. 127, § 7.
78. Resolucion art. 4.
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I. Right to Unionize
Prior authorization is not required from any governmental au-
thority in order to organize a union, which may consist of either
employees or employers." There must be at least 20 employees to
form a union, and once organized it must be registered with the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.80 Employees must be at least
14 years of age to join,' but cannot be either forced into or out of any
union, 2 and employees of "trust" may not join the employees'
union.3 Employees less than 16 years of age or of foreign nationality
may not be on the governing board of the Union.4
This article concludes leaving much unsaid in regard to Mexican
immigration, importation and labor law. However, it is hoped that it
has succeeded in giving an accurate sketch of some of the most signif-
icant points as well an indication of when Mexican counsel should be
consulted on questions requiring more detailed opinions.
79. Id. art. 357.
80. Id. arts. 364, 365.
81. Id. art. 362.
82. Id. art. 358.
83. Id. art. 363.
84. Id. art. 372.
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MEXICAN TAXATION: LAW AND PRACTICE
ROBERT LA VEGA MILLER*
The mere scope of the subject matter indicates the sheer pre-
sumptuousness of any attempt to state the law and practice of taxa-
tion of any modem country in a law review article. Rather, the effort
of the author will be to eschew the abstract approach ordinarily pre-
ferred by the Civilist in favor of the practical and pragmatic approach
preferred by the American practitioner. Through experience, it has
been determined that most Americans tend to ask certain usual ques-
tions about Mexican taxation, and the effort will be to anticipate
those questions and respond to them. For those requiring greater
depth on specific subjects, a detailed bibliography is provided in
Appendix B.
I. WHAT IS THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE MEXICAN SYSTEM OF
TAXATION?
In its origin, the Mexican system drew heavily upon the French
and Italian models.' Over more recent times, the experience of the
United States has influenced the Mexican system.2 Indeed, it is not
uncommon to find highly placed persons in the taxation administra-
tion with LL.M. degrees in taxation from various American law
schools. Additionally, Mexican authorities have computers and per-
sonnel with the ability to manage them. The net result is a highly
sophisticated system of taxation and collection bearing more similari-
ties to, than differences from that of the United States, superimposed
over historical traditions, perhaps traceable more to the Italians, of
overcentralization and widespread tax evasion, to the point of being
a national scandal.3 Having mentioned evasion as a fact, it is unlikely
* LL.B. Loyola of Los Angeles; LL.M. (Foreign & Comparative Law) New York
University; Diploma, Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Mexico; Research Fellow in Comparative Law and Taxation in Mexico for the Pan
American Union, Organization of American States; Instructor Private International
Law, Glendale University College of Law; private practice Los Angeles, California.
1. For an excellent treatment concerning the basic differences between the civil
law and common law traditions, see J. MERRYMAN, THE CivtL LAw TRADIION (1969).
For the conceptual aspects of civil law taxation in general and the Mexican theory in
particular, see S. ROJAS, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO (1965); F. ZAVALA, ELEMENTOS DE
FINANZAS PUBUCAS MEXICANAS (1969).
2. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with any aspects of United States
taxation. On the general subject of United States taxation of foreign operations see R.
RHOADES, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS (1971).
3. Widespread tax evasion has reached the point of becoming a national scandal.
See Excelsior, Nov. 4, 1973, at 6; Excelsior, Nov. 5, 1973, at 1; Excelsior, Nov. 17,
1973, § A at 15; Excelsior, Nov. 24, 1973, at 1.
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that any foreigner would seriously consider participating, due to the
sensitive nature of his presence and the constant scrutiny and vigi-
lance usually devoted to foreign persons and enterprises in Mexico.
I. WHAT Is THE CURRENT SOURCE OF TAX LAW IN MEXICO?
The statutory source of Mexican income tax law is the Ley del
Impuesto Sobre la Renta of December 30, 1964 (hereinafter LISR),
consisting of 89 Articles. The LISR specifically provides that the
Regulations of January 30, 1954, regulating the superceded income
tax law of December 30, 1953, are to remain in effect until new regula-
tions under the new LISR can be issued.4 As of this date, no new
regulations have been issued, and the 1954 Regulations, consisting of
220 Articles, continue in force. 5
Governing most of the general provisions of administration and
collection within the taxation system is the Codigo Fiscal de la
Federacion (Fiscal Code) effective April 1, 1967, and consisting of 246
Articles.' Somewhat similar to a combination of the United States
Internal Revenue Code Regulations, revenue rulings and cumulative
bulletins, are the innumerable Circulars, consisting of published and
unpublished directives and interoffice memoranda, designed to inter-
pret, clarify and effectuate the provisions of the LISR. Finally, the
decisions of the Tribunal Fiscal (Tax Court) and the Suprema Corte
de la Nacion (Supreme Court) augment the other sources of tax au-
thority.'
I. ARE TAXES ANY LESS IN MEXICO?
In Mexico, the highest rate of the progressive income tax is 42
percent. This rate is applied to those individuals whose income 'is
greater than $3,500 per year and to those businesses with income in
excess of $40,000 per year. However, this relatively low top rate is
somewhat misleading. Two important reasons are first, other small
direct and indirect taxes are levied which cummulatively reduce cash
flow, and secondly, deductions from income are not as liberal as those
in the United States. The net effect is that a greater amount of
income is exposed to the lesser rate, therefore the tax impact is not
4. Ley del Impuesto Sobre la Renta, arts. 34 and 36 [hereinafter cited as LISH].
5. Reglamento de la Ley del Impuesto Sobre la Renta, Diario Oficial, Feb. 10, 1954
[hereinafter cited as RLISR].
6. Codigo Fiscal de la Federacion, Diario Oficial, Feb. 4, 1967 [hereinafter cited
as Codigo Fiscal].
7. The entire system is activated by the enactment of the annual Federal budget,
the latest being the Ley de Ingresos de la Federacion Para el Ejercicio Fiscal de 1974,
Diario Oficial, Dec. 31, 1973, effective Jan. 1, 1974. The 1974 Budget projects a national
income of approximately $18.5 billion, of which approximately 52 percent comes from
taxation on the income and operations of persons and enterprises. See Ecelsior, Dec.
14, 1973, at 22-A; Excelsior, Jan. 3, 1974, § A at 8, 9.
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significantly more favorable than the tax impact in the United
States.
IV. How Is THE SYSTEM ADMINISTERED?
Every taxpayer must enroll in the Registro Federal de Causantes
(federal register of taxpayers),8 administered by the principal taxing
authority, la Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico (hereinafter
Hacienda).9 Upon enrollment, the taxpayer is given a cedula de
causante (identification number), which is a code based upon an
arrangement of the taxpayer's name.
Depending on the nature of income, income tax returns must be
filed and estimated taxes, withholding taxes and taxes otherwise due
must be paid periodically with Hacienda. Since there are so many
interim and periodical returns and payments necessary, one must be
ever alert to filing dates."° In general, businesses must make
estimated payments in May, September, and December, and must
file their annual returns within three months of the close of their
fiscal year. Individuals must file an anticipatory return in August and
an annual return in April." Tax payments may be made to specified
banks and financial institutions, as well as to the treasury itself. Due
to the normal slowness of the government's administrative machinery
and partially to provide incentives for those who might have had
second thoughts about tax evasion, Hacienda frequently provides no-
penalty grace periods for taxpayers to comply with their fiscal obliga-
tions.
Hacienda has the authority to conduct audits of all taxpayers'
returns. 2 There is a five-year statute of limitations, which may be
interrupted in only one very limited circumstance. 3 Upon audit, if
the auditing official determines there is an additional tax liability
owed to the government by the taxpayer, the official must give
written notice to the taxpayer explaining the basis for his determi-
nation of the taxes allegedly due. It is at this point that the system
tends to break down. The taxpayer has three days from the receipt
of notice of the alleged deficiency to either pay the assessment, under
protest if he so desires, or to deposit 100 percent collateral and peti-
tion Hacieda for an administrative review. If the taxpayer does not
8. Codigo Fiscal, supra note 6, art. 93.
9. In English, la Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico is sometimes referred
to as the Ministry of Finance.
10. Since all merchants and enterprises must be members of a quasi-
governmental Chamber of Commerce of Industry, the principal publication of the
group, ComERcIo, provides a useful monthly reminder to its recipients of all the critical
dates.
11. LISR, supra note 4, arts. 35, 85.
12. Codgio Fiscal, supra note 6, arts. 84, 85.
13. Id., arts. 32, 33, 168.
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act within the required three day period, he faces immediate attach-
ment of his property in an amount equal to the assessment plus
penalties and costs." The short three day period is, therefore, a criti-
cal time in the process and exerts pressure on all parties to seek
alternative remedies.
In the event that the taxpayer is able to provide the required
collateral and elects to pursue his administrative remedy, Hacienda
maintains a certain amount of authority to settle the dispute. The
administrative procedure is supposed to be completed within a rela-
tively short period of time. 5 If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the
administrative review, he has fifteen days from the notice of the
adverse administrative decision to petition the Tax Court for further
review."e
The Tax Court is an independent administrative court with ex-
clusive jurisdiction over tax disputes. While it originally was con-
ceived to deal only with tax matters, its jurisdition has expanded. All
taxpayers will receive a fair determination of their tax liabilities from
the highly independent and well-qualified magistrates. From the
determinations of the Tax Court, certain appeals are possible to the
Federal Court system, and ultimately to the Supreme Court of Mex-
ico. 8
The government has recently made a serious effort to decentral-
ize the fiscal bureaucracy. Some of the decentralization has involved
agreements with state authorities to provide the states a share in the
administration and the revenues of the federal tax system. It is still
too early to determine the impact of this effort.
V. WHAT ARE THE TAXES?
The principal federal income tax is the Ley del Impuesto Sobre
la Renta, which generates approximately 28 percent of the total Fed-
eral income. There are no state income taxes. The top marginal tax
rate, generally for incomes above $40,000 per year for businesses and
above $3,500 per year for individuals, is 42 percent, although a sur-
charge may raise the rate to 48.65 percent for businesses on amounts
between $40,000 and $120,000 annually. 9 Taxable income includes all
income from whatever source, unless specifically excluded. 2
14. Id., arts. 110, 111, 112, 157.
15. Id., art. 159.
16. Id., art. 192.
17. See generally, A. PoRRAs Y LopEz, DERECHO PROcESAL FiscAL (1969).
18. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 103, 107; Ley de
Amparo, arts. 114, 158.
19. LISR, supra note 4, art. 34.
20. Id., art. 18.
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With the exception of real property, there is no distinctive treat-
ment of capital gains. As to income received from the sale of real
property, while the tax rate is the same as on other income, the
taxable base varies from 100 percent of the realized gain upon a sale
within the first two years to 50 percent after a ten year holding pe-
riod.2
The next major tax, which provides nearly 24 percent of the
national income, is an excise tax on industry and commerce. The tax
is generated in approximately equal proportions by the Mercantile
Receipts Law" and special excise taxes upon specific industries. The
Mercantile Receipts Law provides for a basic four percent tax on
receipts from most sales of goods and services, with the rate increas-
ing to 10 to 15 percent on products usually considered luxuries. The
tax is administered by joint federal-state coordination, with the
states receiving 45 percent of the taxes collected. 3 The special excise
taxes upon specific industries vary considerably according to the in-
dustry. The specific laws regarding these excise taxes are collected in
various tax publications which should be consulted in each individual
case.
Other major sources of the Mexican Federal income, constituting
direct or indirect taxation as the case may be, include import and
export duties, payments for social security, and the stamp tax, which
together amount to 12 percent of the Federal Budget.
Additionally, taxes are levied by state and local authorities, in-
cluding a rather modest property tax. Inheritance taxes are no longer
important. Profit sharing and other socially oriented requirements of
the labor laws, as well as burdensome bookkeeping requirements,
similarly must be calculated as part of the government-imposed costs
of doing business. The sum total of the various fiscal obligations
creates a total tax impact on cash-flow and operation not signifi-
cantly different from that in the United States.
VI. WHAT REDUCTIONs ARE AVAILABLE TO REDUCE THE TAX IMPACT?
Principally, there are nine allowable deductions from the gross
income of enterprises, and eight deductions from the gross income of
21. LISR, supra note 4, arts. 60, 70, 71. Prior to January 1, 1973, the reference
was only to urban property and a complete exemption was provided for after the initial
ten year holding period. The annual exemption for the gains on sales of securities by
individuals was codified in an amendment to LISR art. 60 (III) and also became
effective on Jan. 1, 1973. This exemption is of limited value, particularly because of
the low volume, non-fluctuating operation of the Mexican securities market.
22. Ley Federal de Impuesto Sobre Ingresos Mercantiles, Diario Oficial, Dec. 31,
1951.
23. Id., arts. 14, 15, as amended, Diario Oficial, Dec. 31, 1973.
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individuals." The most important of these deductions for businesses
are cost of goods sold, depreciation and amortization and ordinary
and necessary business expenses. These deductions are very strictly
applied and are limited in their application. For example, deprecia-
tion and amortization is generally limited to a straight-line rate of
from 3 to 35 percent, with the average falling at about 5 percent. The
deductibility of ordinary and necessary business expenses is more
limited in scope than that to which businessmen in the United States
are accustomed. 5
Individuals are permitted to deduct medical expenses, income
from Social Security, interest payments, restricted charitable
contributions, and some ordinary and necessary business expenses.
Moreover, the individual taxpayer is entitled to personal exemptions
of $720, $480, and $240, respectively, for himself, his spouse, and each
of his lineal dependents.
Because Mexico is a developing nation, the government fosters
industrial growth in certain industries deemed to be socially desirable
by allowing greater adjustments to gross income, including a lower
tax base, accelerated depreciation, exemptions from certain taxes
altogether, subsidies and tax rebates. The adjustments are also af-
fected by the ownership and location of the enterprise.
While some special tax treatments are available within the in-
come tax law itself,2 the remainder are contained in a variety of laws
and decrees found in diverse publications. For example, investment
in an industry which promotes tourism or industrial development
receives special fiscal treatment. 8 Shopping centers established in
certain border cities receive special treatment also.29 The Secretary
of Industry and Commerce periodically publishes a list of desirable
"new and necessary" industries covering a range of activities. The
Secretary has the power to grant special fiscal stimuli to those seeking
24. LISR, supra note 4, arts. 20, 82.
25. Id., art. 26 and RLISR, supra note 5, art. 54.
26. LISR, supra note 4, arts. 81, 82.
27. For example, LISR, supra note 4, art. 21 (i) (b) (11), (12) permits a 35 percent
depreciation and amortization rate where the capital investment is dedicated to the
improvement of the environment or to develop national technology. Similarly, LISR,
supra note 4, at art. 34 allows a tax credit of 40 percent for certain agricultural and
fishing enterprises and a 50 percent credit for book publishers.
28. Diario Oficial, June 20, 1973.
29. Diario Oficial, Nov. 19, 1973. The so-called "free zone" of the northern border
area has provided considerable benefit for those withn its scope; Diario Oficial, July
19, 1968 and Mar. 17, 1971. See also Cowan, Mexican Border Industrialization
Program, 8 COMP. JuR. REv. 17 (1971); D. BAERRESON, THE BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION
PROGRAM OF MEXICO (1972).
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to engage in such activities. To foster reinvestment, there is no
undistributed earnings tax.
VII. WHERE MAY SPECIFIC INFORMATION BE OBTAINED?
Most of the large United States accounting firms operate in Mex-
ico and are able to provide detailed information on specific tax prob-
lems. Additionally, the relevant governmental agencies are very help-
ful. A brief listing of these agencies is attached hereto as Appendix
A. One would be well advised to speak directly to the various officials,
however, rather than attempting to obtain information by correspon-
dence. There are also a number of general books and articles on the
subject of Mexican taxation. Most important are the various loose-
leaf services on Mexican taxation. These services are essential for
anyone desiring to keep abreast of the current developments in Mexi-
can taxation. Appendix B contains a bibliography to which the reader
is directed for more specific information.
VIII. Conclusion
The Mexican tax system bears many similarities to the United
States system. While some differences are readily apparent, such as
the heavy emphasis on withholding taxes from all sources, the strong
development and social-orientation reflected in the tax system and
the gross evasion problems, the overall impact on the legitimate tax-
payer is much the same as in the United States. Indeed, the com-
plaint that the government is placing too heavy a tax burden upon
its citizens is in no way unique to the United States, and is an increas-
ingly familiar sound in Mexico.
30. SECRETARIA DEL INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO, INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN MEXICO
(1971); Diario Oficial, Jan. 4, 1955.
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APPENDIX A
Sources of Information
Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico
Palacio Nacional, Mexico 1, D.F.
Switchboard: (905) 5-85-40-11
International matters: (905) 5-21-72-37
Secretaria de Industria y Comercio
Av. Cuauhtemoc Num. 80, 6 0 piso.
Mexico 7, D.F.
International Information: (905) 5-78-86-42
Industrial promotion: (905) 5-88-59-93
Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior
Avenida Insurgentes Sur 1443, Mexico, D.F.
Switchboard: (905) 5-63-43-00
International promotion: (905) 5-63-62-65
Camara Nacional de Comercio
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MEXICO'S BORDER INDUSTRIAL PROGRAM: LEGAL
GUIDELINES FOR THE FOREIGN INVESTOR
The border between the United States and Mexico stretches ap-
proximately 2600 kilometers.' It includes the boundaries of four states
on the U.S. side and six on the Mexican side. Several large cities are
located on the border with a total population reaching far into the
millions.' To most Americans, the border area has been simply a
tantalizing taste of tequila, trinkets, and honky-tonks. For the Ameri-
can businessman, however, the area has come to represent more than
this, for along the border an important economic phenomenon has
quietly been developing. This phenomenon, known as the Programa
Fronteriza de Industria (hereinafter referred to as PFI),3 allows for a
unique combination of factors of production between the two coun-
tries. Essentially, it permits the duty-free importation of component
parts into Mexico, where they can be assembled by the plentiful labor
supply of Mexico and then exported back to the U.S. with a duty
charged on the value added in Mexico.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROGRAM
The impetus behind the PFI stems from the dismal economic
situation that prevailed in the border towns during the sixties. Some
figures estimated unemployment as high as fifty percent.' On the
U.S. side, unemployment has also been a traditional problem, with
one study placing unemployment rates as high as fifteen percent in
some areas.
5
The high unemployment rates on the Mexican side were directly
related to the large influx of people that had migrated from the inte-
rior. The reasons for this migration were twofold. First, the migration
to the border towns was a result of the transition of the Mexican
1. Mexico's Border Program, no date, at 10 (unpublished material provided by the
Mexican Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
2. Some of the Mexican border towns involved and their U.S. counterparts in-
clude: Tijuana-San Diego, Mexicali-El Centro, Nogales-Nogales, Palo-
mas-Deming, Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, Piedras Negras-Eagle Pass, Nuevo Lar-
edo-Laredo, Reynosa-McAllen, Matamoras-Brownsville. Hunt, Industrial Devel-
opment on the Mexican Border, Bus. REv., February 1970, at 9 [hereinafter cited as
Hunt].
3. A number of names are used to refer to the border program including "Pro-
grama de Industrializacion Fronteriza" and simply the "Border Program."
4. Hunt states that in 1968 of the 126,000 man work force in Ciudad Juarez, 15
percent were unemployed; in Nogales it was estimated that 50 percent were unem-
ployed. Hunt, supra note 2, at 5.
5. Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., Industrial and Employment Potential of the
U.S. Mexico Border, Dec. 1968 (prepared for the Economic Development Administra-
tion, U.S. Dept. of Commerce) at 76, 218, 222, 240.
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economy from a predominantly agrarian to an industrialized econ-
omy. "This transition has generated an increase in the actual as well
as potentially available industrial labor force." 6 Secondly, many
Mexicans were attracted to the area by the hope of obtaining permits
to work in the U.S. Bracero Program, which allowed Mexican farm
labor to enter the U.S. temporarily to help with the harvest.7 This
program, formalized by a 1951 bilateral agreement between the U.S.
and Mexico, attracted a great number of Mexicans. 8 In 1965 the
Bracero Program was terminated 9 and the waves of Mexican workers
washed against the legal dam which had been erected."0 In 1968,
hundreds of peasants from the interior were still arriving, enticed by
the prospect of jobs in the U.S." Some did not know the Bracero
program had been terminated.
The first attempt by the Mexican government to do something
about the depressed economy of the North was Programa National
Fronteriza in 1962.'1 PRONAF, as it was commonly known, "was
directed toward the tourist dollar, [but] its underlying objective was
to enhance the general economic condition of the border area."' 4 Un-
like the later PFI, it was not designed to encourage foreign investment
but was aimed at Mexican national development.' 5 The threefold
objectives of PRONAF were:
1. to encourage Mexican industrialization on the border;
2. to subsidize the transportation of Mexican manufactured goods to
the northern areas by providing tax credits and freight rebates; and
3. to fund commercial and tourist centers in the border area."
6. Taylor & Bond, Mexican Border Industrialization, 16 MSU Bus. Topics 34
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Taylor & Bond].
7. Id. at 34. For a general discussion of the Bracero program, see Walker, Border
Industries with a Mexican Accent, 4 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 25 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Walker].
8. Estimates differ as to the maximum number of Mexicans that participated at
one time. One source puts the figure at 185,000. BAERRESEN, THE BoRDER INDUSTRIALI-
ZATION PROGRAM OF MExIco 3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BAERRESEN]. Another sources
estimates the total as high as 450,000. WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO-LAWS
AND POLICIES 192 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
9. Act of Dec. 13, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-203, 77 Stat. 363.
10. Mexico's Border Program, supra note 1, at 1.
11. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 1, 1968, at 79.
12. See Jackson, The Border Industrialization Program of Northern Mexico, Fall
1968, at 18 (found in Selected Reprints of Academic Papers on Mexico's Border Indus-
trialization Program, collected by the McAllen Chamber of Commerce, McAllen,
Texas) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
13. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at 2.
14. Jackson, supra note 12, at 2.
15. See Cowan, Mexican Border Industrialization Program, 8 COMP. J. REv. 17,
18 (1971).
16. Id. at 18.
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Although a number of civic improvements" and increased tourist
traffic' and expenditures'9 are attributed to PRONAF, the program
did not succeed in solving the serious unemployment problem. There-
fore, the Mexican government, encouraged by the success of other
countries in attracting "factories specializing in assembling and pro-
cessng U.S. products for the U.S. market," 0 began studying the pos-
sibility of allowing American manufacturers to operate on the Mexi-
can side of the border. Finally, in May 1965, the President of Mexico
in his Report to the Nation announced the Programa de Industriali-
zacion Fronteriza - the border industrial program.2'
II. FRAMEWORK OF PFI
A. The Legal Provisions
The legal basis for the PFI is relatively simple. It allows foreign
firms to import component parts duty-free to be assembled or fin-
ished by cheap labor in the foreign country." These finished products
can then be shipped back to the U.S., or to any other foreign country,
with a duty only on the value added in Mexico. The main concern
by the Mexican government is keeping these products from finding
their way into the Mexican economy where they will compete with
domestically produced goods.2 3
The legal provisions which established PFI remained sketchy for
a number of years.24 Although the procedures for the processing of
applications from companies wanting to participate in the border
17. Baerresen lists such thing as the improved appearance of border cities, modem
entry gates, shopping centers and additional schools. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at 2.
18. Between 1965 and 1967 tourist traffic into Mexico increased 11 percent. In
1968, the year of the Olympics in Mexico, tourism increased 18 percent. Hunt, supra
note 2, at 4.
19. From 1961 to the end of 1966 tourist expenditures rose 48 percent to $540
million. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 192.
20. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at 3.
21. Hunt, supra note 2, at 5.
22. Taylor & Bond, supra note 6, at 35.
23. Trevino, Border Assembly Operations, April 1969, at 31 (found in Selected
Reprints of Articles on Mexico's Border Industrial Program, collected by the McAllen
Chamber of Commerce, McAllen, Texas) [hereinafter cited as Trevino].
24. Probably the reason for the uncertain state of the law has been the desire by
the government to handle each application individually. Such a procedure allows the
government to evaluate each application on the basis of the "product to be assembled,
the proportion of imported raw materials and component parts to be imported into
Mexico, and the estimated number of Mexican laborers to be employed." Taylor &
Bond, supra note 6, at 36. Another source suggests that the criteria considered by the
Mexican officials includes: 1) the export industry may not manufacture goods already
exported by Mexico; 2) the plant established must be labor-intensive; 3) the wages
paid to workers must be in accordance with minimum wages in force; and 4) the factory
must be built on an adequate site. The Mexican Export Industries, 3 BANK OF LONDON
AND SoUTH AMERICAN REv. 624 (1969).
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program were established in two inter-secretarial agreements in June
1966,2 it was not until March 17, 1971, that the PFI was codified as
a specific Mexican law.2 Even this official document, which sets forth
"the program's function, rules and the method of administration,
' '
2
does not include all the Mexican regulations relating to PFI. Many
of the regulations are found in other sections of the Mexican code.28
The following is a summary of the basic Mexican regulations relating
to PFI:
1. Parties must be registered with the Ministries of Finance and Public
Credit and Industry and Commerce.
9
2. Companies who have obtained the proper authorization may tempo-
rarily import raw materials, machinery, parts, containers, etc., provided
that 100 percent of all imports are eventually returned to their place of
origin.W"
3. An assembly operation does not require the assembling company
established at the border or elsewhere to acquire title to the foreign source
raw materials in order to import, process and re-export the same.
3'
4. The Department of Industry and Commerce will set up controls in
the identification of raw materials and the finished materials.
32
5. A twelve-month time limit, which may be renewed, is placed on
imports of foreign products. 3
6. Article 325 of the Customs Code provides for the posting of bonds to
guarantee customs duties in the case of temporary importations.1'
7. Assembled products will be permitted to be re-exported free of duties,
provided that the imported articles have never been removed from the
fiscal enclave. Raw materials and articles of a national or nationalized
nature which are added are subject to duties."
8. Customs clearance may take place at the border, at the company's
plant or at an industrial park.31
9. Industries which apply for permission to establish themselves in bor-
25. No. 164 Hacienda (June 1, 1966) and No. 4132 Industria y Comercio (June 20,
1966). Cited in Hunt, supra note 2, at 4.
26. Art. 321, para. 3, Customs Code, as cited in Mexican Border Industrialization
Program, 1971 (available from the Secretaria .de Industria y Comercio); also cited in
Trevino, supra note 23, at 32; and Cowan, supra note 15, at 25.
27. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at xv.
28. Although there has been some suggestion that the lack of a clear legal basis
may cause concern to investors, the latest figures do no bear this out. In 1973, with
350 companies participating, $600 million worth of products were exported from the
border area. Bolin, Border Industry Facts for 1973, MExicAN AM. REv., Sept. 1973, at
14.
29. Art. 321, para. 3, sub art. 5, Customs Code, supra note 26.
30. Id. at art. 321, para. 3, sub art. 7.
31. Id. at art. 324.
32. Id. at art. 322.
33. Id. at art. 321, para. 3, sub art. 7.
34. Trevino, supra note 23, at 32.
35. Arts. 393, 334, Customs Code, supra note 26.
36. Id. at art. 321, para. 3, sub art. 12.
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der towns shall ipso facto be considered as being subject to the tax system
for all purposes connected with their operation.
37
10. Since it is impossible to fix general rules for all industries participat-
ing, each case will receive individual evaluation and specific control regu-
lations.3
No change in U.S. laws was necessary, as the legal basis was
found in Section 807 of the U.S. Tariff Schedules, which states:
Articles assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components,
the products of the United States which (a) were exported in condition
ready for assembly without further fabrication . . . .(c) have not been
advanced in value or improved in condition abroad except by being as-
sembled and except by operations incidental to the assembly process
such as cleaning, lubricating, and painting . . ..A duty upon the full
value of the imported article, less the cost on value of such products of
the United States. 3
A similar section allows for the same treatment of metal compo-
nent parts to be assembled outside the United States. 0 Together,
these sections make possible the re-importation of American made
products with a duty only on the value added. It should be noted,
however, that value added does not necessarily mean only the cost
of Mexican labor. H. E. Outlaw, U.S. district director for customs at
Laredo, points out: "Value is added whenever the nature of the prod-
uct is altered. When a Mexican worker adds a buttonhole, for exam-
ple, the whole value of the article changes, and it becomes subject to
higher duties."'" This misunderstanding caused a Dallas firm to as-
semble television cabinets which were later faced with prohibitive
duties at the border.2 Similar difficulties can probably be avoided by
obtaining advance clearance from the particular customs district in-
volved.1
3
B. Establishing a Company Under the PI
Assuming that the American businessman has decided to estab-
lish an assembly or finishing plant in one of the border towns under
the PFI, the following discussion will focus on the procedures which
should be followed in receiving preliminary approval, establishing the
corporation and obtaining final approval.
The potential investor must first obtain the preliminary ap-
37. Id. at arts. 22, 47, 471-81.
38. Id. at arts. 350(1), 352, 353, 356.
39. 19 U.S.C. 807 (1963).
40. 19 U.S.C. 806.30 (1963). The latest statistics indicate that "imports from
Mexico under Section 806.30 are fairly negligible, about $10 million in 1971," (unpub-
lished material furnished by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, June 30, 1972).
41. BusINFSS WEEK, Dec. 2, 1967, at 122.
42. Id.
43. See Walker, supra note 7, at 30.
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proval of the Mexican government for the establishment of the plant.
This prior approval is obtained by completing form EF-14, and sub-
mitting it to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce with a duplicate
copy sent to the Finance and Public Credit Department." In general,
the data required in this form includes the name of the corporation
and its location and address, the corporate capital structure and
investment program, the product or products to be processed, the
processes to be carried out with the products and the probable labor
to be employed . 5 Once this application has been approved, operation
of the plant should begin within 120 days, as delay will necessitate
an application for extension."
Once preliminary approval is obtained, temporary importation
may begin upon. completion of forms EF-16 and EF-17.47 The first
form makes possible the temporary importation of raw materials and
component parts, while the latter allows for the temporary importa-
tion of machinery and equipment." Both forms must be filled out in
six copies and should be submitted to the same address as form EF-
14 .49
Preliminary approval also means that another important step,
the establishment of the business organization, may be taken. The
organization may take the form of either a branch or subsidiary. The
subsidiary is generally favored because of several disadvantages com-
mon to branches under Mexican law. For example, branches cannot
own real estate, take longer to form and are not well regarded by
Mexican authorities. 5 Conversely, subsidiaries take less time to form,
receive tax advantages and are regarded as nationals under Mexican
law." Throughout the remaining discussion, the assumption is that
the form of association will be a subsidiary formed according to Mexi-
can law.
Mexican law provides for five forms of association:
44. Form EF-14 is available from the Ministry of Industry & Commerce, General
Bureau of Industry, Avenida Cuauhtemoc No. 80, Mexico 7, D.F.
45. Mexican Border Industrialization Program, supra note 26, at 17.
46. See Procedures for Starting an Assembly Plant Along the Northern Border of
Mexico, June 14, 1972 (unpublished material available from the San Diego Chamber
of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Procedures].
47. Both these forms are available from the same address as given for form EF-
14, supra note 44.
48. Mexican Border Industrialization Program, supra note 26, at 22, 23.
49. Id.
50. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., INVESTING, LICENSING AND TRADING CONDITIONS
ABROAD-MExICO, 1973, at 7 [hereinafter cited as INVESTING-MExICO].
51. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT 72-027: ESTABLISHING A
BUSINESS IN MEXICO 9 (July 1972) [hereinafter cited as OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT].
VOL. 4:89
1974 COMMENT
1. Sociedad en nombre colectivo;
2. Sociedad en comandita simple;
3. Sociedad en comandita por acciones;
4. Sociedad anonima; and
5. Sociedad de responsibilidad limitada.2
Of these five, the one most recommended for border industry pur-
poses is the Sociedad anonima, or corporation. The corporation offers
the advantages of limited liability and relative freedom of transfer of
ownership interests, and is the only form allowing a large number of
persons to participate." The corporation must consist of at least five
shareholders and, once established, becomes a legal entity with jurid-
ical personality. 4 Although the law establishes minimum require-
ments, a certain amount of flexibility exists so that the parties may
structure the corporation to meet their needs. 55
If the decision is made to form a corporation, the articles of
association must be drafted. This instrument must contain basically
the same information as is required by U.S. law for incorporation.5
The next step is to apply to the Ministry of Foreign Relations for a
permit to form a Mexican company. This is required by the emer-
gency decree of 1944, and must be inserted in the articles of
association by the notary.57 It is recommended that this procedure be
handled by a lawyer in Mexico City within ten to fifteen days after
incorporation. " The articles of association must also contain the
Calvo Clause, which requires that "any foreigner who acquires shares
52. For a good discussion of the forms of association see id.
53. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 219.
54. Id. at 220.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 221. Specifically, it must include:





6. Board of Directors;
7. Name, address, place and date of birth, and occupation of the stock-
holders;
8. Manner in which the stockholders' capital is to be subscribed;
9. Company's vigilance;
10. Date for stockholders' general meeting;
11. Corporate year;
12. Inventories and balances;
13. Legal reserves, profits and losses;
14. Plans for dissolution and liquidation of the company;
15. Transitory clauses.
See Procedures, supra note 46, at 1.
57. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 221.
58. Procedures, supra note 46, at 1.
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in the corporation agrees that he will be considered as a Mexican with
respect to his shares and that he will not invoke the diplomatic pro-
tection of his home government."5 Next, the articles of association
should be presented to a notary, who will keep the original in the
bound books of the notary and will issue certified copies to the corpo-
ration. 0
After being constituted with the notary, a petition together with
the articles of association should be filed with the Department of
Public Property Registry.6" A hearing will be held, although in many
cases it will be waived, and "the judicial order . issued and the
recordation effected as a matter of routine."6
After the corporation has been established and the necessary
registrations made, final approval should be secured by filing form
EF-15 3 with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. This form,
though similar to EF-14, requires more data, including the amount
of investment, a charter of the corporation (if possible), copies of
registration with various agencies and information relating to raw
materials and labor, processing costs and productive capacity.
4
A final form, EF-18, must be filed quarterly with the Ministry
of Industry and Commerce. 5 This form, requesting information on
lists of imports and exports, cost of processing, bonds, shrinkage and
waste, customs control and taxes, is to fulfill the interest of the Mexi-
can government in the development of assembly plants under PFI.
The procedure is finally completed by registration with several
agencies, including:
1. The Federal Tax Collector's Office;
2. Social Security;
3. Health Department;"
4. State Commercial Tax Department;
5. Municipal Treasury Department;
6. Public Department of Labor;
7. National Importers and Exporters of the Mexican Republic at the
Mexican Institute of Foreign Trade;
8. General Statistics Division of the Directory of Industry and Com-
merce Department; and
9. National Chamber of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce. 7
59. WRIor, supra note 8, at 221.
60. Id. at 220.
61. Procedures, supra note 46, at 1.
62. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 222.
63. This form is available from the same address as form EF-14, supra note 44.
See Mexican Border Industrialization Program, supra note 26, at 3.
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id. at 24.
66. One source indicates that a permit must be obtained from the Ministry of
Public Health approving the company's premises. Cowan, supra note 15, at 23.
67. Procedures, supra note 46, at 2.
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To the American businessman, the procedure which has just
been described may seem a bit confusing. Therefore, to help the
prospective investor, the Mexican government has established quasi-
official committees which are located in certain border towns.6 8 These
committees, known as Comites Consultivos de Formento Industrial
Para la Zona Fronteriza Norte, have as their stated purpose the re-
sponsibility "to assist the potential investor, to forward the proper
applications for permits, and to submit along with the firm's papers
an opinion, based on the information rendered by the applying firm,
as to the firm's suitability in regard to the purposes of the program." 9
Specifically, the Comites will:
1. Forward for approval studies based on data supplied by the appli-
cant;
2. Forward similar studies for the importation of raw materials, machi-
nery, etc.;
3. Forward special applications for extraordinary imports;
4. Submit applications when immigration factors are involved; and
5. Submit subsequent applications for additional raw materials and
machinery. "
In addition to the Comites, Chambers of Commerce on both sides
of the border can be extremely helpful in "moving to Mexico."' Sev-
eral of the U.S. border towns have formed industrial teams which, in
conjunction with similar organizations on the Mexican side, provide
the potential investor with guidance on such subjects as electricity,
legal assistance, housing, and taxes.
7 2
C. Acquiring Land and Buildings
Upon the decision to move to Mexico, the investor's considera-
tion must turn to obtaining suitable land and building facilities for
the assembly plant. In this regard it would seem that a major obstacle
exists, because Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution prohibits:
The acquisition by foreigners, including foreign companies, of title to
land or bodies of water within the so-called prohibited zone-that is,
within 100 kilometers [about 62 miles] of the land borders or 50
kilometers [about 31 miles] of the seacoast. . ...
Furthermore, laws and regulations, drafted from a concern for self-
defense, make foreign ownership of interest in any companies, that
68. One source says these Comites are located in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and in
Mexicali, Mexico.
69. Jackson, supra note 12, at 8.
70. Cowan, supra note 15, at 27.
71. Jackson, supra note 15, at 10.
72. See generally The El Paso-Juarez Twin Plant Concept Handbook-1973-
1974 (available from the El Paso Industrial Development Corp. and the El Paso Cham-
ber of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as El Paso-Juarez Handbook].
73. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 115.
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own land in the prohibited zone, impossible.74 The drafters of the 1917
Constitution, who had just freed themselves from Spanish domina-
tion, took steps to prevent any future creeping domination. The pro-
hibition, though openly evaded during much of Mexican history, con-
tinues on the books to our time.
The American businessman would be well advised not to violate
this prohibition, as the penalties can be severe. For example, any acts
or contracts can be held void, and certificates or interests can be
declared "without any value."15 In addition, the energency decree of
1944 sanctions the seizure of property by the government for a viola-
tion.7" Penalties of imprisonment, fines (up to 10,000 pesos) and pen-
alties against consuls, notaries and other officials for authorizing a
prohibited instrument may be imposed."
The Mexican government, realizing the need for foreign indus-
tries to acquire land in order to operate, has made several methods
of acquisition possible. The most common way of holding land is by
a lease."' Because this lease is usually for ten years or less, it does not
violate the emergency decree of 1944, which requies a permit for land
holdings longer than ten years.79
An alternative means of acquiring land is by placing it in trust.
This was made possible by a Presidential Decree of April 30, 1971,
which allows a foreign company to acquire the property which is then
placed in trust in a Mexican bank. 0 Applications for such a trust
must be made to the Mexican Department of Foreign Relations, and
the Mexican Inter-Secretarial Commission.' Under a trust plan, land
may be held up to thirty years and must be sold to a Mexican entity
at the end of the trust period.
2
Some confusion exists regarding the ownership of buildings. The
implementing law of Article 17 seems to extend the prohibition to
"lands and their accessions," but since "accession" is not clearly
defined in Mexican law, the Ministry of Foreign Relations has per-
mitted foreign-owned companies to acquire buildings in the prohib-
ited zone."' As is the case with land, the most popular means of
74. Id.
75. Id. at 116.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Quick Facts About the El Paso - Juarez International Twin Plant Program,
March 1973 (unpublished material furnished by the El Paso Industrial Development
Corporation) [hereinafter cited as Quick Facts].
79. See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 117.
80. See OvFsEAs BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 7.
81. El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 4:40, at 1.
82. OvERsEAs BUSINESs REPORT, supra note 51, at 7.
83. WIGHr, supra note 8, at 118.
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acquiring buildings is by lease. One of the significant developments
in this regard has been the growth of industrial parks in participating
Mexican towns. 4 Developers will build "shell or turn-key facilities to
the tenants' specifications." 85 The cost of leasing these facilities
ranges from $.10 to $1.50 per square foot, depending on such factors
as age of the building, type of construction and interior finishing.8 A
further advantage of industrial parks is that they are located within
the bonded manufacturing zone, thus making the resolution of bond-
ing problems somewhat easier.
87
The businessman will welcome the fact that expropriation is low
on the list of investment hazards in Mexico.8 In fact, the alien in
Mexico is protected by Article 27 of the constitution which provides:
private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public
utility and by means of indemnification ....
III. OTHER FACTORS To CONSIDER
A. Labor
The major factor making PFI attractive to the foreign investor
is the availability of productive labor at a comparatively low cost.
This section focuses on this factor, and deals specifically with mini-
mum wages, fringe benefits, labor contracts and dismissal of workers.
Mexican minimum wages, which are established biennially in all
regions or zones,"0 are determind by a tripartite group consisting of
a chairman and six representatives from labor and six from busi-
ness.8 ' These determinations can, however, be reviewed or revised by
a federal commission in Mexico City. 2 The rates for both skilled and
unskilled labor are determined by the cost of living, the general eco-
nomic conditions and the needs of companies . 3 It should be noted
that these minimum requirements can often be increased by as much
as 25 percent by negotiated collective labor contracts. 4
During the past few years, minimum wages have tended to rise
sharply all over Mexico. For the period 1970-71, minimum wages were
84. Steiner, The Mexican Border Industrialization Program, TEXAS Bus. REv.,
July 1971, at 147 [hereinafter cited as Steiner].
85. Quick Facts, supra note 78, at 1.
86. El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 3.00, at 1.
87. See Steiner, supra note 84, at 147.
88. OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 7.
89. Id.
90. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at 23. Another source says there are 109 zones;
INVESTING-MEXICO, supra note 50, at 18. Still another source states that the rates are
determined by the states; Taylor & Bond, supra note 6, at 38.
91. OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 13.
92. BARRE9SEN, supra note 8, at 23.
93. Id.
94. See INVESTING-M.XICO, supra note 50, at 18.
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increased 15.5 percent, while in 1972-73 they were upped an average
of 16-20 percent."' In the border area, the average increase from 1968-
69 to 1970-71 was 13.7 percent. 6 For 1974-75, the projected increase
for all of Mexico is 15-20 percent. 7 There is, of course, political pres-
sure by local communities to keep minimum wages low, and thus gain
an advantage, but the local commissions are aware of this and strive
to prevent "adjustments that significantly alter the present pattern
of wage levels among competing areas."98 Some comparative mini-
mum wages which an investor presently faces are:
1. Ciudad-Juarez-42.30 pesos per day;"
2. Reynosa-33.75 persos per day;'"
3. Tijuana-62.30 pesos per day;'' and
4. Nuevo Laredo-39.85 pesos per day."'
2
Compared with other countries where programs similar to PFI oper-
ate, Mexico pays relatively high minimum wages. For example, Mex-
ico pays an average of 28 cents to 46 cents (U.S.) per hour, whereas
Hong Kong pays 30 cents, Japan 54 cents, Korea 13 cents and Tai-
wan 14 cents."'
The foreign investor should also consider that the Mexican
worker must be paid overtime for any work done beyond the legal
requirement. Male workers receive double pay for overtime beyond
eight hours per day, and female workers receive triple pay.'9 4 A new
law, passed in 1970, obligates employers to pay triple time for work
beyond nine hours of overtime.3 5 Any work done on Sundays must
be compensated at 25 percent above the daily wage.36
95. Id.
96. BAERRFSEN, supra note 8, at 24.
97. INVESTING-MEXICO, supra note 50, at 18.
98. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at 26.
99. El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 4:10, at 1. These minimum
wages do not include fringe benefits. One dollar = 12.49 pesos.
100. Mexico's Border Industrialization Program for U.S. Manufacturers at Rey-
nosa, Tamps., Mexico, no date, at 2 (unpublished material furnished by the McAllen
Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Reynosa].
101. Procedures, supra note 46, at 4.
102. Covarrubias, Memorandum Regarding Mexican Border Assembly Opera-
tions, March 25, 1972, at 1 (unpublished material available from the Laredo Chamber
of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Covarrubias].
103. BARRESEN, supra note 8, at 24. It should be noted that all of these minimum
wages are before fringe benefits.
104. Steiner, supra note 84, at 146. One source, however, states that women can-
not work overtime and "if this prohibition is violated, overtime should be paid two
hundred per cent more than salary payable for the hours of the working shift." Proce-
dures, supra note 46, at 5.
105. Steiner, supra note 84, at 146.
106. INVESTING-MExICO, supra note 50, at 18.
VOL. 4:89
COMMENT
In estimating costs of labor, the border investor should take into
consideration not only minimum wage, but also fringe benefits which
may amount to as much as 50-60 percent of the minimum wage.10a
Bonuses are one of the major fringe benefits accruing to the Mexican
worker. For example, a worker on vacation must be paid his daily
salary plus a 25 percent bonus.' °0 At Christmas, a bonus of fifteen
days salary must be paid before December 20th.10
Besides bonuses, Mexican law guarantees the worker a certain
amount of time off from work with pay. The Mexican laborer is given
every seventh day off with pay."10 After a year's work, he is guaranteed
six days of paid vacation, which must be increased by two days for
each additional year of employment up to a total of twelve days."'
Finally, the Mexican laborer is entitled to five paid holidays every
year, and a sixth every six years on Inauguration Day."1
2
Social security is another fringe benefit which must be included
in the total cost. The Mexican social security system covers such
items as:
accidents and illnesses (10% salary up to seventy-two weeks), non-
occupational diseases and paid maternity leave, day-time nurseries, disa-
bility, old age and various death benefits; and unemployment insur-
ance."
The cost of social benefits "is shared among employers (62.5 percent),
employees (25 percent), and the government (12.5 percent)."" 4 The
rates paid by employers range from 11.75 to 13.4 percent of the pay-
roll, and are paid every two months."' Mexican law, also, requires
companies, with more than 100 employees, to maintain a doctor and
infirmary, while companies with more than 300 employees must es-
107. Id. at 26. Another source estimates the rates as high as 60 percent. Id. at 18.
Some confusion exists in regard to minimum wage. One source says that American
companies must pay 50 percent higher minimum wages. Taylor & Bond, supra note 6,
at 38. This is not mentioned by any other source. The conclusion of this author is that
the 50 percent additional pay is probably confused with the 50-60 percent cost of fringe
benefits.
108. El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 4:10, at 2.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id.
111. INVESTING-MExico, supra note 50, at 19. Generally employers grant 15 days
total and some pay an additional 15-day bonus.
112. Id. Some sources say there are seven legal holidays each year. El
Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 4:10, at 1; also Steiner, supra note 84, at
146. Some labor contracts also call for 9-10 additional paid holidays.
113. INVESTING-MExico, supra note 50, at 20.
114. Id.
115. Covarrubias, supra note 102, at 2. Another source puts the rate between 8.3
and 11.7 percent. Steiner, supra note 84, at 146.
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tablish hospital facilities."' Many companies have voluntarily estab-
lished savings plans, life insurance, sports facilities and lunches."
'7
Potentially, one of the most beneficial fringe benefits to the Mex-
ican worker may be profit sharing. This benefit, established under a
1964 law, requires all firms to distribute 20 percent of "net distributa-
ble profits" to their employees, excluding managers, directors, ap-
prentices and those who have worked less than sixty days during the
fiscal year."6 The determination of "net distributable profits" is a
complicated procedure, that can probably be best accomplished by
a Mexican accountant, attorney or management consultant. Basi-
cally, it involves deducting a fixed deduction of 30 percent and a
variable deduction of 10-80 percent from the base, which includes net
pre-tax earnings and profits set aside for capital reserves, bad debts
and other contingency reserves minus corporate taxes."'
Some border cities claim that profit sharing does not affect in-
dustry under PFI,'1" but companies should be prepared to pay "an
increased wage bill as a result of the profit-sharing requirement."' 2'
One source states:
On the average, the profit to be shared amounts to about 8% to 12%
of net (income). A survey of firms with a total of 33,000 employees showed
that profit sharing equaled 0.8% of gross income of the companies. For
the individual, his share was about 60% of his monthly take home pay,
or less than 5% of his annual wages.'2
Another source says the amount actually distributed to employees
after deduction of income tax ranges from 2.8 percent to 12.6 percent
with the average being about 12 percent.'3 However, relief is avail-
able as newly created firms are exempt during the first two years of
operation.'24 Although employees have a right to share in profits, this
does not allow them to interfere in the administraton of the firm.'
25
Some additional fringe benefits which the investor must consider
include sick pay, an education tax for which American companies pay
1 percent of payroll to support Mexican education and a new housing
support tax of 5 percent of the payroll to fund the National Housing
Program. ,26
116. INVESTING-MEXIcO, supra note 50, at 20.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Steiner, supra note 84, at 147.
121. Taylor & Bond, supra note 6, at 39.
122. Walker, supra note 7, at 29.
123. OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 14.
124. See Taylor & Bond, supra note 6, at 39.
125. OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 14.
126. See El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 4:10, at 2.
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The foreign investor must also consider the labor contract or
contracts which he will be negotiating. There are, basically, two types
of labor contracts-individual worker contracts and collective work
contracts.'" Both types contain basically the same information, but
the difference is that a collective work contract is negotiated with a
union and applies to all workers in the union.'1
There are nine national unions in Mexico, with the strongest
being the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), which
is closely allied with the PRI party of Mexico and has spearheaded
most movements for change in labor.'2 Labor strikes do not appear
to have been a great problem to industry in Mexico, as 98 percent of
strikes called in 1972 did not materialize. 1 0 The grounds upon which
a legal strike can be called are:
1. Refusal by the employer to comply with contractual obligations;
2. Refusal to accept an arbitration award; and
3. To support another legal strike provided a majority of workers
agree. 13
Generally, strikes can be minimized if companies employ a labor
supervisor and avoid aggressive negotiating.
32
Should the businessman decide to dismiss an employee, several
additional considerations are necessary. If an employee is dismissed
for cause, the firm has no responsibility, although the case may be
investigated. 13 However, upon dismissal not for cause, the employee
must be given severence pay amounting to:
three months' pay, twelve days' additional pay for every year employed,
and full pay from the time of dismissal until a final decision on the merits
of the case is reached in court, should he appeal his dismissal.' 34
A worker unjustifiably dismissed may choose between reinstatement
and indemnification.13
B. Immigration
Mexican law also contains certain provisions relating to U.S.
employees employed by the firm established in Mexico. The main
provision which will concern the firm is Section I of the Federal Labor
Law requiring "that at least 90% of a firm's skilled and unskilled
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id.
129. INVESTING-MEXICO, supra note 50, at 17.
130. Id. at 18.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Covarrubias, supra note 102, at 2.
134. INVESTING-MEXIcO, supra note 50, at 20.
135. Id.
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workers must be Mexican nationals."'' 6 Because of the lack of suita-
ble Mexican workers in certain skilled areas, the Mexican govern-
ment does allow the employment of alien technicnans, supervisors
and management personnel.'37 Although the Mexican government al-
lows the entrance of such worker, it also requires a special permit and
that Mexican workers be trained to take their places.' 8
In regard to the entrance of U.S. citizens to be employed in the
Mexican plant, some considerations on the status of the alien are




The immigrant status is usually applied to aliens who intend to es-
tablish residence in Mexico. For PFI purposes, the last two statutes
are probably most important. The non-immigrant enters on a Visi-
tor's Card and may stay for six months.4 0 If the entrance is for busi-
ness purposes, the card is renewable once; and if the entrance is for
scientific, technical, or artistic purposes, the card may be renewed
three times."' The status of investor is given to an alien who guaran-
tees he "will assume an active role in any livestock, agriculture, in-
dustrial or export business," and an investment of 200,000 pesos,




Since the businessman operating a plant under PFI is going to
be continually involved in moving component parts and finished
products back and forth across the border, he will be interested in
knowing the legal requirements which must be met in order to carry
out the transfers as smoothly as possible. As mentioned earlier, one
of the concerns of the Mexican government is that the temporary
imports do not enter the Mexican economy, but do in fact return to
the U.S. To insure their return, the Mexican government requires
that foreign companies post a bond guaranteeing that all raw materi-
als, machinery and equipment, parts, tools, and containers are re-
turned.'3 This requirement "has caused plants established under the
program to be called 'in bond' plants."'44 The two major types of
136. Id.
137. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 197.




142. Id. at 19, 20.
143. Procedures, supra note 46, at 3.
144. Hunt, supra note 2, at 5.
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bonds in use are the revolving bond and the single entry bond. The
revolving bond is used mainly for the importation of raw materials
for assembling or processing, while the single entry bond, on the other
hand, is usually employed as a guarantee for the entry of machinery
and other capital goods.'45 Both bonds are usually written for one year
and are renewable. The size of either bond depends on "production
rates, the number of shipments in process and Mexican duties (plus
10% for fines) on the materials being imported.""' Because of the
difficulties involved in increasing the size of the bond, a company
would probably be well advised to overbond "in order to accommo-
date unexpected import requirements.""' 7 The cost of the bond will
usually vary between one and two percent of its value,"' and is
"based on the Mexican customs duty on the materials if they were
conventionally imported into the Republic."'49 The Mexican govern-
ment has indicated that the bonds may be posted in the following
ways:
a. with a pledge;
b. by an authorized bonding company, paying the percentage commis-
sion;
c. by making a cash deposit; or
d. with an authorized customs area.'"
Of course, in this procedure, a Mexican customs official would be
invaluable.
The Mexican-established business will also face U.S. customs
duties on products returning to this country. The duty is determined
according to "the extent that the Mexican wholesale value of the
finished product exceeds the cost of the U.S. components."' 5 ' The
actual rates vary greatly. It is important to determine, beforehand,
the custom duties in order to avoid prohibitive rates.
5
1
One of the problems faced by industries in the past has been the
time factor in getting through customs. Delays have ranged from
twenty-four hours to three days. 5 3 Such delays can be costly. One
large firm reported paying $2,261.00 in yearly costs as a result of
145. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at 70, 71.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. A businessman must also consider an unofficial cost commonly known
as "mordida." Mordida may be thought of as a gratuity or tip and usually must be
paid if cooperation by Mexican officials is needed.
149. Reynosa, supra note 100, at 2.
150. Mexican Border Industrialization Program, supra note 26, at 4.
151. El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 5:00, at 2.
152. Bus. WEEK, Dec. 2, 1967, at 122.
153. INVESlNNG-MExICo, supra note 50, at 23.
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delays.' 5 Some suggested ways of reducing time lost in clearing cus-
toms are:
1. paying overtime to customs officials;
2. preparing all paperwork in advance;
3. the use of special one-day services at Mexican customs; and
4. substituting company employees for customs officials. 5'
Another time-saving device used by some companies is the kit sys-
tem. Under this system, a company employs a warehouse on the U.S.
side of the border where all raw materials are assembled in kits and
then sent to Mexico for assembly. A number system maintains the
identity of all materials, thus facilitating identification at customs.1
56
Finally, there is some movement toward considering industrial parks
as bonded areas, where all customs determinations may take place.
57
D. Taxation
The Mexican Income Tax Law establishes two classifications of
taxpayers:
1. Business entities, which are subject to a single corporate income tax;
and
2. Individuals, who are taxed on personal income whether from personal
services or from capital.'58
The corporate income tax rate can vary from 0-42 percent, 59 depend-
ing on the income involved, and is applied against taxable income.
Taxable income is defined as "gross income less costs and expenses
related to producing that income, with exceptions."' 60 Some examples
of deductions include bad debts, cost of goods sold, social welfare
payments and employee retirement plan payments. 6' Additionally,
any income tax paid in Mexico is deductible from U.S. federal income
tax liability. " ' Tax rates for individual income vary from 0-35 per-
cent."' Theoretically, aliens residing in Mexico must pay income tax
regardless of the source of their income, but this provision is not
enforced.'"
Mexican law also requires that a tax varying from 0-2 percent be
paid on dividends. A tax on distributable profits has been repealed,
154. BAERRESEN, supra note 8, at 72.
155. Id. at 74.
156. Id. at 75.
157. Id. at 72.
158. OvERSEAs BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 21.
159. Covarrubias, supra note 102, at 4.
160. INVESTING-MExIco, supra note 50, at 11.
161. OVERSEAS BusINEss REPORTS, supra note 51, at 22.
162. El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec. 4:70, at 1.
163. Covarrubias, supra note 102, at 4, 5.
164. INVESTING-MExICO, supra note 50, at 12.
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so now profits are only taxed when dividends are paid.' Another tax
which must be paid is the Commercial Revenue Tax (sales tax),
which is based on the gross receipts of the company at a rate of about
1.8 percent.'
State taxes are generally lower, and in addition to the education
and housing tax mentioned earlier, can include:
1. Public Investment Tax;
2. Recording fees;
3. Commercial Revenues Tax-Rate: 1.2 percent;
4. Transfer Tax on Real Estate-Rate: 1 percent; and
5. Real Estate Tax.1
7
Besides federal and state taxes, local municipalities may also levy
taxes. An example of municipal rates is provided by Tijuana, which
is approximately .05 percent of all assets. 8 Some taxes which are not
levied in Mexico are excess profits tax and capital taxes.'19
Although some firms operating in Mexico report a tax burden of
in excess of 50 percent, 7 0 taxes do not seem to have inhibited invest-
ment under PFI. Besides the incentives inherent in PFI, some addi-
tional tax concessions are available on the state level. The state of
Texas reportedly grants "ten years property tax and part of the .09%




Since its inception, PFI has grown at a remarkable pace. Starting
with only a few companies in 1965, the program now involves approxi-
mately 350 firms'72 and employs close to 65,0001 3 members of the
Mexican workforce. Although the number of companies has not ex-
panded as fast as it did in the early seventies, there appears to be a
sustained growth in the number of persons employed. For example,
in the past few years employment has increased at a rate of about 15
percent, or approximately 1,000 new jobs per month. 71
The future of PFI appears to be bright. Although the U.S. gov-
165. OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 51, at 21.
166. El Paso-Juarez Handbook, supra note 72, sec 4:70, at 2.
167. Id. Although these particular taxes are for Chihuahua, it is believed that they
are a typical sample of taxes which may be encountered.
168. Procedures, supra note 46, at 6.
169. INVESTING-MExIco, supra note 50, at 11.
170. Id.
171. Covarrubias, supra note 102, at 1.
172. Border Industry Program, June 30, 1972, at 1 (unpublished material avail-
able from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico).
173. Bolin, Border Industry Facts for 1973, MEXICAN-AMERIcAN REV., Sept. 1973,
at 1.
174. Border Industry Program, supra note 172, at 6.
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ernment maintains a position of neutrality on the program, it is be-
lieved that privately the Department of Commerce is very much in-
terested in its progress.' The Mexican government is, of course,
greatly in support of the program. The government is doing every-
thing possible to encourage investment, including tax concessions,
elimination of red tape, and the allowance of 100 percent foreign
ownership of corporations established under PFI. 176
The expansion of the program is also being urged by the Mexican
government. In 1967, provisions were established that would allow
the border program to be extended to the interior of Mexico. 7 7 Such
extensions must have approval from the Department of Industry and
Commerce, and probably would not be allowed if the industry would
compete with an already established Mexican industry. 78 Further
expansion has been made possible by the Presidential Decree of
March 17, 1971, which among other things allows for the establish-
ment of plants in the coastal area. 79 Although no plants have moved
to the coast yet, it is expected that some will do so in the near
future. 80
Further expansion of the program is possible through the en-
trance of Mexican manufacturers into the border program. Report-
edly, many Mexican manufacturers are seriously considering opening
plants under PFI.'8' Another indication of expansion is the report by
several officials that the Mexican government is studying "a measure
to permit the sale in Mexico of those border industry products which
are not competitive with domestic industry.' '8 2 Such a measure
would, undoubtedly, add new incentives to industry operating under
the program.
Ironically, the greatest threat posed to the future of the program
may be rising wages. As pointed out earlier, minimum wage rates
have increased at a steady rate during the past few years. 'm In the
state of Tamulipas, facing Brownsville and McAllen, Texas, mini-
mum wages have increased 300 percent from 1962 to 1970, an increase
175. See Mexico's Border Program, no date, at 6 (unpublished material available
from the Mexican Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.).
176. Bus. ABROAD, Dec. 11, 1967, at 21. Bolin reports the fact that PFI is unaf-
fected by the new foreign investment law which in other industry limits the proportion
of foreign participation in many cases to 49 percent. Bolin, supra note 173, at 14.
177. Trevino, Border Assembly Operations, MEXICAN-AMERICAN REV., April 1969,
at 33.
178. Id.
179. Border Industry Program, supra note 172, at 4.
180. Id.
181. Mexico's Border Program, supra note 175, at 7.
182. Border Industry Program, supra note 172, at 6.
183. See INVESTING-MEXICO, supra note 50, at 17.
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of about 35 percent per year.8 4 Although rates have leveled off some
in the past three years, the level of minimum wage rates is crucial to
tthe future of the program.
For the foreign businessman, the prospect of doing business in
Mexico under PFI will undoubtedly grow in attractiveness in the
coming years. With a stable political situation"5 and with an esti-
mated growth rate for 1973 in excess of 7 percent, such investment
will be welcome and profitable. However, as with any investment,
close attention to the pertinent legal guidelines involved is necessary
if a successful business venture is to be accomplished. Familiarity
with the pertinent laws and cooperation with Mexican officials and
institutions will make possible a rewarding investment in the
Programa Fronteriza de Industria.
Michael E. Bulson
184. Steiner, supra note 184, at 149.
185. INVESTING-MEXIco, supra note 50, at 1.

COMMENTS
FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING: A CRISIS FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
PART I-THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
On July 21, 1973, only one month after the International Court
of Justice had prohibited it,' France began a new series of atmos-
pheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific.2 The tests pose a continuing
threat of danger to the local population, their natural resourses, and
to the various nations near the test site. This possible violation of
international law, and the present inability of the world community
to stop or even postpone it, raises serious questions about the value
of available international mechanisms for solving conflict between
nations and preventing serious global environmental damage.
At the outset, two issues must be distinguished. The first is the
legality of the French extraterritorial atmospheric testing per se in
light of modern principles of international law. The second is the
specific French disegard of the World Court opinion which temporar-
ily prohibited the tests pending a ruling on their legality. Both issues
raise the possibility of serious, but separate, violations of interna-
tional law.
PACIFIC TESTING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The question of the legality of nuclear testing in the Pacific is
not a new one. It was first suggested in the mid 1950's that any
nuclear testing on the high seas might be in violation of international
law.3 At that time legal attention was focused exclusively upon the
United States testing in the Central Pacific. After the United States
discontinued atmospheric testing, the focus shifted to the French
Pacific tests begun in 1966.1
The French justification for its testing has always been fairly
simple. France has repeatedly argued that the question is strictly a
matter of security and self-defense: so long as other nations main-
tained a nuclear capability, France would continue to build hers. 5
1. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) conveniently found in 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 749 (1973).
2. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
3. Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE
L.J. 629 (1955).
4. FACTS ON FILE, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS 1964-69, at 99 (V. Mastny ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as FACTS ON FILE 1964-69].
5. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL & SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS, THE
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The only alternative would be to continue to rely upon NATO defen-
ses and the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." The unacceptable danger of
that course is either being pulled into a nuclear confrontation not of
her own making, or at the other extreme, failing to receive the NATO
or U.S. nuclear support in a time of real crisis.' Thus a limited but
independent "force de frappe" is seen as the most viable kind of
nuclear defense. President de Gaulle consistently remarked on the
unacceptability of "relying for her defense and thereby her existence
and, finally, her policy, on a foreign protectorate and one that is
uncertain anyway;" he would emphatically protest: "No! We are
worth more than that!"'
But at the basis of all the French arguments supporting her
position is the compelling rationale of equity. France has purported
to be a proponent of complete and total disarmament, but, she rea-
sons, so long as some nations continue to possess atomic weapons, it
is hypocritical and unreasonable of them to expect that others will
not exert the same right.'
What makes France unique, however, is that she has no vast
open spaces of national territory available to conduct testing Test-
ing any kind of weapons on national territory has never been consid-
ered illegal per se. 1 With a dense population it is an absolute necess-
ity to go elsewhere. Thus the French development of nuclear weapons
is bound to interfere with others' rights, at least to some degree. What
those rights are and to what degree they are interfered with will
determine the status of the testing in international law and its seri-
ousness in terms of international peace and political stability.
France first began her testing in remote regions of the Sahara
Desert in 1960" over the strong protests of the North Africans and in
disregard of a U.N. General Assembly resolution, which requested her
UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 1945-70, at 210 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNITED
NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT]; B.G. BECHHOEFER, POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS
CONTROL 546-7 (1961); KESSING'S RESEARCH REPORT, DISARMAMENT: NEGOTIATIONS AND
TREATIES 1946-71, at 322 (1972); B. RUSSET & C. COOPER, ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE:
PROPOSALS AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 24-36 (1966-67).
6. D'Amato, Legal Aspects of the French Nuclear Tests, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 66, 68-
69 (1967); W.B. WENTZ, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 84 (1968).
7. FACTS ON FILE 1964-69, supra note 4.
8. WENTZ, supra note 6 at 93.
9. The Soviet Union, China and the United States each have sufficient territory
for most of their testing. The United Kingdom has conducted most of its tests jointly
with the United States.
10. Taubenfeld, Nuclear Testing and International Law, 16 Sw. L.J. 365, 381
(1962); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 51 (1958).
11. For a discussion of the legality of the Sahara tests, see Note, French Nuclear
Testing and International Law, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 144 (1969).
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to refrain from such testing in light of the test ban negotiations then
underway at Geneva.'2 The tests were widely condemned, but the
twenty-two predominantly Middle Eastern and African states were
unable to convince the General Assembly to meet in special session
to consider the question.'1
3
Not until four years later did pressure from the newly indepen-
dent North African states cause France to discontinue her Sahara
testing. " Forced to go elsewhere, France resumed testing in the South
Pacific in 1966 at the Mururoa Atoll, 750 miles southeast of Tahiti.'"
From then on, all French testing has been conducted atmospherically
at that location.
Compared to previous Pacific testing, the current French tests
have been fairly small, and the French are understandably angry at
the furor they have caused.' The first and most extensive testing in
the Pacific was conducted by the United States, beginning as early
as 1946'" and continuing sporadically until 1962. In 1952, Great Brit-
ain became the second to conduct tests in the Pacific off the coast of
Australia.' By far, the largest series of Pacific testing took place be-
tween April and November 1962 near Christmas and Johnson Islands
in the Central Pacific; thirty-five atmospheric tests, ranging from low
to high yields, were conducted by the United States."' These massive
and sometimes harmful tests drew little public protest. Nevertheless,
a great many events have occurred since the last non-French testing
in 1962 which cast great doubt on the legality and prudence of contin-
ued testing, and explain the current protests.
TEST BAN TREATY
The most important event has been the ten year success of the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Atmosphere, In Outer
Space and Underwater (Test Ban Treaty).0 The treaty calls upon
each party to prohibit, prevent, and not carry out any nuclear explo-
sion in the atmosphere at any place under its control "including
12. G.A. Res. 1379, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). It
passed 51 to 16 with 15 abstentions.
13. UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 5 at 211.
14. FACTS ON FILE 1964-69, supra note 4 at 40.
15. Id. at 99.
16. Fischer, Cronique de Desarmement, 1971 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE Daorr
INTERNATIONAL 94 (1971).
17. Margolis, supra note 3 at 630.
18. KESSING's RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 5 at 5.
19. FACTS ON FILE, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS 1960-63, at 89-90 (L.A. Sobel
ed. 1964).
20. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space
and Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43.
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territorial waters or high seas."2 '
France is not a party to the treaty, and, therefore, argues that it
should not apply. Normally this would be accurate, but the Test Ban
Treaty may now be considered more than mere conventional law.
Two suggestions have been made that interpret the Treaty as binding
even upon non-signatories. The first is that the Treaty "may itself
have started, or at least acknowledged, a general rule of customary
International law' 2 2 which would prohibit any nation from conduct-
ing atmospheric nuclear tests. The second is that because of the
overwhelming acceptance of the Treaty2' it has become a peremptory
norm of international law (jus cogens) as recognized by Articles 53
and 64 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties." Either inter-
pretation would cause any atmospheric nuclear testing to be a viola-
tion of international law.
Critics of these suggestions point out that two of the five nuclear
powers, France and China, have not signed or complied with the
Treaty or its principles, and therefore acceptance is not wide enough
to constitute either a customary rule or a peremptory norm.2 , On the
other hand, the overwhelming majority of states have ratified the
Treaty. More importantly, no nation has taken advantage of its unu-
sually simple withdrawal clause, and no signatory has violated the
treaty.
Traditionally, customary rules and general principles have de-
veloped slowly in international law. The law was created over the
course of decades and even centuries. But as international law be-
comes increasingly involved in regulating military, commercial and
scientific activities, its development must parallel the rapid develop-
ment of technology in those fields. Such crucial issues as the potential
dangers of radiation pollution will not wait decades to be resolved.
When there is imminent harm to the human race and to the world's
resources, the law must respond accordingly.
In light of the potential danger of nuclear testing to the human
race, and the overwhelming acceptance of and compliance with the
21. Id. at art. 1.
22. D'Amato, supra note 6 at 77. One author declares that "[qluite apart from
voluntary treaty-making such as the partial.Test Ban Treaty, it may be contended that
nuclear testing and the use of nuclear weapons are prohibited by customary interna-
tional law." Lee, International Legal Aspects of Pollution of the Atmosphere, 21 U.
TORONTO L.J. 201 (1971).
23. At least 93 nations have ratified, M. NORDQUIST, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA 829 (1973); at least 110 have either ratified or signed. EPSTEIN,
DISARMAMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF EFFORT 19 (1971).
24. G. FISCHER, THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 10 (1971).
25. Mercer, International Law and the French Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1968
N.Z.L.J. 405, 420 (1968).
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Test Ban Treaty by states of every economic, social and political
persuasion, it is probable that the principles promoted by the Treaty
have become general principles of international law which apply to
all nations, whether signatories or not. When such unlikely pairs of
nations as the United States and the USSR, Israel and Egypt, Spain
and Sweden, South Africa and twenty-three Black African States26
ratify a treaty, it represents an exceptional agreement.
STOCKHOLM DECLARATION
While the Test Ban Treaty represents a specific prohibition on
testing, other instruments and activities raise more general principles
which are applicable to the French situation. The newest instrument
is the 1972 Declaration on the Human Environment (Stockholm Dec-
laration) ."
Principle 21 states that nations have the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. 2 The French claim that the damage caused
by their testing is minimal and that the sites used are better than any
used before because of their distance from population centers and
exposure to strong winds.29 Nevertheless, the French do not deny that
some damage will occur. The question then must focus on whether
the potential damage is so insignificant as to be de minimis or
whether it will be potentially so dangerous as to constitute a violation
of Principle 21.
The most significant fact about radiation is that the ultimate
long-term effects are simply unknown. It is known, however, that
radiation causes genetic effects in the form of gene mutations, chro-
mosome aberrations and changes in the number of chromosomes. :9 It
affects immune responses in many ways yet unknown to scientists.2 '
Leukemia is a radiation-induced malignancy which often appears
years after the exposure.2 It appears that lung, thyroid and breast
cancer are also induced by radiation. " A United Nations group vist-
ing Pacific islands in the vicinity of the United States' nuclear testing
in 1956 reported skin contamination, low white blood cell counts and
lowered resistance to diseases.
3'
26. NORDQUIST, supra note 23 at 824-29.
27. Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972).
28. Id. at 7.
29. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1973, at 2, col. 4.
30. Report of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Radiation, 27 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 25, at 10. U.N. Doc. A/8725 (1972).
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.N. Trusteeship, Supp. 3, at 26-28, 45, U.N. Doc. T/1278 (1959).
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Even with extensive precautions by the United States, the crew
of the Japanese fishing boat, Fukuryu Maru, was exposed to radiation
eighty miles from the testing site. All on board were injured, five were
in danger, and one died from exposure .5 The United States implicitly
admitted its legal responsibility by agreeing to a negotiated $2 mil-
lion settlement for compensation to the victims. Damage from nu-
clear testing extends beyond direct exposure to humans. The 4000
pounds of fish on the Fukuryu Maru were dangerously contaminated,
and later, over 135 tons of fish were condemned in Japan.3' As a result
of the U.S. Pacific tests, the fishing grounds of the North West Pacific
"were gravely depleted."37
The French argue that their testing is more isolated and that
there is less exposure to the resources of the sea. Yet the Polynesian
Islands have a combined population of 90,000, with fish an important
staple item.31 How the testing will affect the genetic balance of mar-
ine organisms is unknown. Radiation could either retard the reprod-
uctive processes of marine life or contaminate the marine resources,
making them unfit for human consumption. In either case, the poten-
tial damage is severe.
Almost twenty years ago it was suggested that while there was a
duty of states under international law to prevent pollution of interna-
tional waters, in the absence of any international agreements or
decisions directly on point it was "as yet an inchoate one. ' '3 The duty
is no longer inchoate. The Stockholm Declaration and other agree-
ments have codified that duty. Its acceptance is unquestioned. The
French testing is not de minimis. Its dangers are potentially severe
and scientifically uncertain. Under these conditions, continued test-
ing must constitute a violation of international law under Principle
21.
Another principle of the Declaration applies even more directly.
Principle 26 calls for man to be "spared the effects of nuclear weapons
• . . and [for] destructon of such weapons."40 This principle was
originally introduced to ban nuclear weapons testing." Its expansion
into a call for general elimination of all weapons of mass destruction
does not lessen that original intent, as a ban on testing is implicitly
included in the elimination of nuclear weapons. Further, the prohib-
35. Margolis, supra note 3, at 637.
36. Id.
37. Mercer, supra note 25, at 407.
38. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 66, 73.
39. Margolis, supra note 3, at 643.
40. Declaration on the Human Environment, supra note 27, at 7.
41. Notes, The Stockholm Conference: A Step Toward Global Environmental
Cooperation and Involvement, 6 IND. L. REv. 267, 278 (1972).
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ited "effects" of nuclear weapons clearly include environmental dam-
age from their testing.
China and France were the only two nations voting against Prin-
ciple 26, and the French delegation announced that it would not be
bound by the recommendation." For France, the Stockholm Declara-
tion is not a binding convention. But it is certainly a highly important
example of the latest efforts of the world community to deal with the
environmental aspects of the nuclear testing problem. These princi-
ples, when viewed in context with some of the traditional arguments,
create a compelling case against the legality of the French testing.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
The past debate over the legality of Pacific testing has primarily
concerned the familiar principle of freedom of the seas. This debate
began with two now-classic articles written in 1955 concerning U.S.
testing in the Pacific. In one, Margolis challenged the legality of the
testing, 3 while in the other, McDougal and Schlei justified it.44 Their
respective arguments, having been analyzed and repeated exten-
sively,4" will only be summarized here.
Margolis argues that freedom of the high seas is essentially an
absolute freedom.4" The only exception is the status of contiguous
zones.4" The creation of any wide danger or warning areas in the high
seas is necessarily an interference with this freedom and not con-
doned by international law.
On the other hand, McDougal and Schlei argue that freedom of
the seas is "not absolute, and never has been."4" The law of the sea,
they contend, is a continuously changing set of competing norms.
One group of norms is a set of principles generally described as "free-
dom of the seas," which allows freedom of navigation, fishing and the
laying of cables. Another group of norms represent a variety of pre-
scriptive demands conflicting with absolute freedom of the seas,
among which are territorial waters, contiguous zones, customs zones,
security zones, national claims to continental shelves and fishing
42. Id.
43. Margolis, supra note 3 at 643.
44. McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Mea-
sures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955).
45. See generally D'Amato, supra note 6; Fliess, The Legality of Atmospheric
Nuclear Tests: A Critical View of International Law in the Cold War, 15 U. FLA. L.
REV. 21 (1962); McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of
the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356 (1955); Mercer, supra note 25; Taubenfeld, supra note
10; Note, supra note 11.
46. Margolis, supra note 3, at 634.
47. Id. at 635.
48. McDougal & Schlei, supra note 44, at 663.
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claims." The ultimate standard as to which prescriptions will be
honored is one of reasonableness. 50 There must be a balancing test
between the interference caused to basic freedoms of the sea and the
value of the interfering activity to the world community. If, on bal-
ance, the interference is reasonable, it should be allowed. The focus
of the McDougal-Schlei argument was that the overwhelming im-
portance to the "free world" of the U.S. testing, when balanced
against the relatively minimal interference with international trade
and commerce, clearly justified the testing under international law.
The U.S. testing represented the compelling norm of self defense at
a time when ". . . expectations of imminent violence in the world
arena . . .[were] more realistic and intense." 5'
This debate was echoed in the 1958 Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea and the subsequent literature. In terms of the current
series of French tests, however, it appears that a fair application of
the criteria proposed by either side of the debate would lead to the
same conclusion.
The clearest example of Freedom of the Seas is the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas (Geneva Convention).12 Article 2 states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas
is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
The relation of Article 2 to the legality of nuclear testing was an
important point of discussion in the Second Committee of the Confer-
ence, which drafted it.53 To an extent, the debate reflected the classi-
cal argument between an absolute freedom and one explicitly based
on a standard of reasonableness, and to an extent, it reflected Cold
War politics.
49. Id. at 663-674.
50. Id. at 684.
51. McDougal, supra note 45, at 361.
52. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
53. See generally Summary Record of the 2d Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/40 (1958). Article 2 was debated as art. 27 in the draft articles and in this report.
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Poland first noted that the creation of nuclear danger zones cre-
ated de facto sovereignty which would be prohibited by the article.54
The entire Soviet bloc supported this interpretation as did Japan, 
5
India,'5 Tunisia,57 and Nepal.58 In the course of debate on Article 2,
another article was proposed which would have directly prohibited
nuclear testing on the high seas." Arguing against adoption, the
United States and Great Britain submitted that the subject of nu-
clear testing did not fall within the scope of the Conference, and
further that any applicable article must adopt a standard of
reasonableness.6 0 This article was never directly voted upon, however,
because the question was directed by the Conference to the General
Assembly for its consideration.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the position of the French
delegation on Article 2. France was one of the nations arguing most
strongly for the principle of absolute freedom of the seas. The delega-
tion suggested that "[e]xercise of the freedom of the high seas is
regulated by international law in order to ensure their use in the
interests of the entire international community."'" To this end, they
proposed language, adopted by the Conference, that in regard to the
high seas, "no State may validly purport to subject any part of them
to its sovereignty. 6 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
These debates were transpiring, of course, when only the United
States and United Kingdom were testing in the Pacific, two years
before France perfected her first nuclear device, and presumably, well
before France had an idea that events would force her to test in the
Pacific. In this regard, the French attitude on draft Article 48 (now
Article 25) is most interesting. Article 25 states:
3
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas
from the dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account any stan-
dards and regulations which may be formulated by the competent inter-
national organizations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent international or-
ganizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas
or air space above, resulting from any activities with radio-active materi-
als or other charmful agents.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id. at 21.
58. Id. at 23.
59. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L.30 (1958).
60. Summary Records, supra note 53, at 15.
61. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.6 (1958).
62. Id.
63. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 52, at art. 25.
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It is often argued that this article had been drafted to control
only peaceful and commercial uses of atomic energy, as evidenced by
the term "dumping" of radioactive wastes which seems to narrow the
intent. Several states, however, have interpreted it as directly prohib-
iting testing of nuclear weapons on the high seas. 4 Its ambigious
language could possibly justify such a conclusion. But an amendment
which was proposed in the Second Committee by France would have
assured such an interpretation. The French wanted to broaden the
scope of the Article to cover any "contamination by radioactive sub-
stances," 5 as opposed to merely "dumping." The delegation sug-
gested that to put radioactive pollution " 'on the same footing as
pollution by oil,' was a mistake; there could be no doubt that pollu-
tion by radioactive substances was much more serious.""6 Had the
French proposal been adopted, the conventional restrictions on test-
ing on the high seas would have been stronger.
In short, before France had probably ever contemplated the need
to use the Pacific for nuclear testing and was, presumably, more
objective in outlook, she stood on the side of absolute freedom of the
seas and strict controls on radioactive pollution. France did not, how-
ever, ratify the High Seas Convention and does not consider herself
bound by it. The French position is now one close to the McDougal-
Schlei approach, but even this more restrictive approach cannot jus-
tify the French testing.
The two major elements of the McDougal justification of the
U.S. Pacific testing were the reasonableness of the tests, as reflected
by their "minimal" inteference with use of the high seas, and the
importance of the testing to the "free world."67 This basic test in-
volves a balance between infringement of basic rights and necessity
to the world community.
To many in the 1950's, the necessity of nuclear parity in that
bipolar political world was of paramount importance. For the "free
world," it was essentially a matter of preparing for self defense
"under conditions of high necessity and absence of alternatives.""6
This was a view held not only by the United States, but by an "over-
whelming" majority of nations.6
9
Clearly, in the 1970's, the French testing does not have such
support. Of the nations of the world, only China has been vocal in
64. Cf. remarks of the representative of Ceylon in Summary Records, supra note
53, at 14.
65. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.6 (1958).
66. Summary Records, supra note 53, at 85.
67. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 67-68.
68. McDougal, supra note 45, at 361.
69. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 68.
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its support of the French testing. The justifications for the testing
discussed earlier simply do not create a compelling argument of ne-
cessity. On the contrary, rather than adding to world security, the
French development of a nuclear capability is a definite threat to
world security. The tests themselves have become a serious source of
friction between the Pacific states concerned and France. Addition-
ally, the danger of a catastrophic nuclear accident is far greater in a
large multipolar system of nuclear nations.70 Most importantly, how-
ever, the French development of an independent nuclear arsenal
gives impetus and justification to other nations of a similar size or
position to create their own independent nuclear forces, either as a
perceived military necessity or as a symbol of prestige.
Applying the classic balancing test, the value to the
international ommunity of the French testing is at best nonexistent
and is more probably negative. One commentary has declared that
the "French bomb is as irrelevant to the world as Louis XVI was to
the France of 1789."' 1 Therefore, for the tests to be justified, their
infringement on the basic freedom of the seas must be negligible.
There is nothing negligible about the creation of a danger zone
in the middle of the high seas with a radius of 200 miles and a down
wind corridor of 500 miles.72 It is not certain to what extent navigation
was disrupted by the danger zone during the first tests, but at least
one vessel, the American schooner Fri, was boarded by the French
and the crew physically removed in international waters.73 Even this
minimal interference with free navigation in the high seas should be
enough to tip the scales against France. More importantly, however,
it is necessary to look at the potential cumulative effects. It has been
suggested that if the French tests are justified, similar testing could
then become virtually unlimited in the Pacific, thus causing an in-
fringement of major significance.
74
In short, on the basis of a strict interpretation of freedom of the
seas, France has without doubt violated international law. Even with
the less restrictive balancing test of reasonableness, however, France
seems to be outside the bounds of international law in conducting its
Pacific testing. The risks to the indigenous population and the re-
sources on which they rely simply does not justify the negligible value
of the testing to the world community. As Margolis stated concerning
the U.S. testing in the 1950's, "it seems eminently reasonable that
70. Id. at 70.
71. French Filth, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., July 30, 1973, at 11.
72. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1973, at 2, col. 4.
73. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
74. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 76.
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. . . [those] who are undertaking to produce a weapon of such de-
structive power, are the people who should make the sacrifices which
may be necessary for perfecting it."
7 5
FRENCH DUTY UNDER ARTICLE 73
The potential dangers to the indigenous population raise the
question of French conduct under Article 73 of the United Nations
Charter. That article gives the following mandate:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibili-
ties for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet at-
tained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept
as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the
system of international peace and security established by the present
Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants..."
If Article 73 applies to the French administration of the Polyne-
sian Islands, France has clearly violated her "sacred trust" by placing
her own national interests ahead of the "paramount" interests of the
native population. France argues that Polynesia is not a trust terri-
tory within the meaning of Article 73, but is instead an overseas part
of France.
It has been persuasively argued that France is estopped from
raising this argument."' Section (e) of Article 73 requires all adminis-
tering governments to submit reports to the Secretary-General con-
cerning their territories. France did so in 1946 concerning "French
Establishments in Oceania. 7 7 At that time, the General Assembly,
arguably in reliance on the French and other nations' reports,'7 de-
clared that all territories, included in the reports submitted, were to
be considered the non-self-governing territories to which Article 73
would apply. If therefore, the French territories fall within the scope
of Article 73, it can reasonably be argued that France is in violation
of that portion of the U.N. Charter.
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY-DISARMAMENT DECADE
Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) states that each nuclear-weapon
state should do nothing to "assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
weapons or explosive devices. ' 79 It has already been noted that the
75. Margolis, supra note 3, at 647.
76. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 73.
77. Id. at 72.
78. Id.
79. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S No. 6839.
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development of a nuclear capability by France may seriously encour-
age others to develop a similar capability for reasons of either defense
or prestige. It has been said that "France provides a model for several
nuclear club candidates.""' France is not a signatory to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, but has promised to behave exactly as the con-
tracting states to the Treaty)" Thus while explicitly, but not legally,
accepting the principles of the Treaty, France is effectively violating
them.
This kind of indirect violation"' becomes more serious in light of
on-going global activities to limit or eliminate the nuclear arms race.
Since the 1950's, the U.N. General Assembly has passed over 20
resolutions calling for the end to all nuclear testing. Most impor-
tantly, it has declared "the Decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament
Decade."1'' : Indeed, the 1970's have seen some encouraging develop-
ments, such as the 1971 implementation of the Treaty on the Prohibi-
tion of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor," and the on
going Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) between the United
States and the Soviet Union." These kinds of activities have two
functions. First is to achieve practical, specific agreements to limit
arms or to introduce safety measures against accidents. Just as
importantly, they have served to create a global atmosphere condu-
cive to negotiations and to lessen tensions. This kind of atmosphere
is imperative for successful negotiations to reach meaningful disar-
mament measures. By their continued testing and development of
nuclear devices, both France and China place this healthy global
atmosphere in danger. They violate the overwhelmingly supported
spirit of the Disarmament Decade by flaunting the international
community and continuing their testing which is dangerous not only
to life and health, but to world peace and security.
VARIOUS OTHER PRINCIPLES
A variety of other possible violations of international law by the
French testing have been suggested or are apparent. A few will be
briefly mentioned.
80. WENTZ, supra note 6, at 86.
81. U.N. Doc. A/PV.1672 (Prov.) at 3, 6; also UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT,
supra note 5, at 294.
82. It has been suggested that France may be directly violating the treaty as well
by secretly providing support to an Israeli nuclear arms program. WENrz, supra note
6, at 110.
83. G.A. Res. 2602E, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
84. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, done Dec. 7, 1970.
conveniently found in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 145 (1971).
85. See generally KESSING'S RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 358-75.
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A. Poisoned Weapons
It has been argued that nuclear devices, with their resultant
radioactive fallout, should be classified as poisoned weapons within
the meaning of various international conventions8 including the
Hague Peace Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1925 Geneva
Protocol on Poisonous Gases and Analagous Materials, which was
ratified by France.87 If thus classified, the use of nuclear weapons,
because of their contamination, would be prohibited, even in time of
war. But this prohibition on the use of poisonous materials would
"apply even more compellingly in time of peace to the incalculable
poisonous effects of nuclear tests upon innocent parties.""8
B. Trail Smelter
It has been suggested that the 1941 arbitration between Canada
and the United States (Trail Smelter Arbitration) is a valid preced-
ent in international law for environmental disputes.8 9 In this dispute,
the United States sought damages and an injunction against the
operation of a smelter just across the border in Canada. In finding for
the United States, the tribunal declared that:
no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequences
and injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 0
Certainly, by analogy, injury by radioactive wastes is as serious as
injury by fumes and is, thus, includable in the Trail Smelter princi-
ple. But the applicability of the principle has been challenged as
pertaining only to determining liability and compensation for dam-
ages and not a "prohibition of prospective harmful or illegal activ-
ity."9 Yet if Trail Smelter is to serve as a principle of international
law, it must be noted that remedies for environmental damage in-
cluded both damages and injunction. If therefore, injury has resulted
of "serious consequence" which is "established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence," the activity causing the injury should be stopped.
Wheneftie issue to which the principle is to be applied is narrowed to
just the current series of French testing, no serious injury has yet
resulted. If, however, the issue is broadened to include the legality
of all testing in the Pacific or at sea in general, the injuries caused
by the U.S. testing in the 1950's, causing at least one death and the
86. Fliess, supra note 45, at 26; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 10, at 26-37.
87. C.J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 21 (6th ed. 1967).
88. Fliess, supra note 45,at 26.
89. Nanda, On Establishing Standards of International Environmental Injury 7
(not yet published); Lee, supra note 22, at 207.
90. Trail Smelter Arbitration, IAA at 1965-66.
91. Mercer, supra note 25, at 419.
VOL. 4:111
COMMENT
destruction of a large volume of fish, are of serious enough conse-
quence to justify a total prohibition against all future testing in the
Pacific.
C. Genocide Convention
It has been suggested that the 1948 Convention Against Genocide
may be violated by the French testing.12 The convention prohibits any
activity which may "destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group," in any number of ways including the caus-
ing of "serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 9 3 The
indigenous population of the South Pacific is, of course, exposed to
both serious physical and mental harm from the tests. But the Con-
vention is of limited application, because it requires that the activity
must be committed with the intent to destroy the group. No one can
seriously argue that France has any such intent.
CONCLUSIONS ON THE LEGALITY OF THE FRENCH TESTS
A wide variety of international legal principles, customs and con-
ventions have been discussed which bear on the matter. It has been
shown that the French Pacific testing, and probably any atmospheric
testing, is in clear violation of international law. An analysis of the
Test Ban Treaty, the Stockholm Declaration, the classic principle of
freedom of the seas, the test of reasonableness, the efforts of the
United Nations and its Charter, and a number of other principles and
activities provide the persuasive evidence.
In spite of their overwhelming condemnation by the interna-
tional community and their patent illegality under international law,
the tests continue. The available legal mechanisms have been in-
voked to no avail. The efforts of the international community to stop
these tests provide a disturbing case study of the inefficacy of current
procedures of enforcing international law and settling disputes.
PART II-RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter 4 suggests a variety of
peaceful methods for the settlement of disputes. The failure of these
methods (almost all have been attempted) to resolve the dispute over
French nuclear testing illustrates some of the weaknesses of the cur-
rent international system of conflict resolution.
EFFORTS TO USE THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM
The battle began in 1958 after France announced she would soon
92. D'Amato, supra note 6, at 76.
93. U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
94. "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, re-
sort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
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be proceeding with her first tests in the African Sahara. Twenty-two
African and Middle Eastern states responded by introducing the first
successful General Assembly resolution against nuclear testing.1
5 It
was directed exclusively against France, spoke of the "dangers and
risks" of the Sahara testing, expressed its "grave concern" and
directly requested France "to refrain from such tests." 6 This United
Nations effort had no effect upon France. Neither have the more than
twenty resolutions which have followed over the years, most of which
have been directed at testing generally, and not at France in particu-
lar.
There have been two trends in these resultions. First is a notable
increase in concern about the urgency of stopping all testing. Sec-
ondly there has been a growing emphasis on the health and environ-
mental dangers of the testing and far less on the military danger. As
early as 1960, the General Assembly warned against the "hazards of
radiation resulting from test explosions as well as their adverse conse-
quences to the prospects of world peace." 7 A decade later, reflecting
the ecology movement, the General Assembly declared "with special
concern that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere is a source of growing pollution."9
Beyond this, the discussion in the General Assembly has now
returned to the focal point where it began-opposition, almost exclu-
sively, to French testing. One of the primary forums of debate has
been the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. In 1971,
several Pacific nations used the Committee to call upon France to
cease atmospheric testing "in view, inter alia, of the possibility of
serious harm to the marine environment and to marine life." 99 The
next year these countries complained that the tests were a health
hazard without any compensating benefit to the victims. 09 Again
they called upon France to halt the testing. France responded that
nuclear tests had never been conducted under such strict controls
with regard to the prevention and monitoring of side effects and
claimed that there had been no appreciable pollution resulting from
them.'9 ' Further, France pointed out that it had regularly submitted
95. G.A. Res. 1379, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
Adopted 51-16 with 15 abstentions.
96. Id.
97. G.A. Res. 1648, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962).
98. G.A. Res. 2828, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
99. 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 246, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/SC.III/L.4 & Add 1
(1970).
100. 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 65 (1972).
101. Id. at 66.
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reports to the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation which, in the absence of any comment on them, has im-
plicitly confirmed their harmlessness. Finally, France claims that the
assertions of environmental damage have all been made with no em-
pirical evidence. 10 2 The only nation coming to France's defense in the
debates was China, who claimed that the prohibition of nuclear test-
ing would be precisely advantageous to the consolidation of the mo-
nopoly of the United States and Soviet Union over nuclear weap-
ons. 1
0 3
The debates within the United Nations resulted in a 1971 resolu-
tion which called for a halt to all atmospheric testing by August 5,
1973.10 The 1972 resolution, reaffirming this deadline, singled out the
French testing, thus capping a series of resolutions of which the origi-
nal had been directed against France. It did so by "[e]xpressing
serious concern that testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere has
continued in some parts of the world, including the Pacific area, in
disregard of that [Test Ban] Treaty and of world opinion.'
0 5
Nevertheless, it remained clear that France had no intention of
complying with this overwhelming global sentiment. In response, the
Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand issued strong declara-
tions that France "must bear full responsibility" for the decision to
continue testing. 10 Even stronger language was used by the foreign
ministers of the "downwind" countries of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru.0 7 Throughout the first part of 1973, an exchange
of diplomatic notes took place between France and Australia which
were unsuccessful in modifying the French position.
USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
It was as a final resort that Australia and New Zealand brought
their dispute with France to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in early May 1973.108 Their reluctance to do so earlier resulted from
two major factors. First there were serious jurisdictional problems
which posed certain difficulties. France has strongly argued that the
Court lacks jurisdiction and made it clear that it would not recognize
the Court's jurisdiction. Secondly, aside from the force of public opin-
ion and a sense of international responsibility, the only concrete
means of forcing compliance with an ICJ order or decision is through
102, Id.
103, Id.
104, G.A. Res. 2828, supra note 98 at 33.
105. G.A. Res. 2934, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 17-19, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
106. U.N. Doc. A/8741, at 2 (1972).
107. U.N. Doc. A/8740, at 2 (1972).
108. Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at 749.
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an action of the U.N. Security Council. 0 9 As a permanent member,
France can veto any Security Council action.
Nevertheless, these governments, believing that they had ex-
hausted all other possible avenues asked the World Court to deter-
mine if the French testing was a violation of international law and,
pending its decision, to issue an interim order under Article 41 of the
Statutes of the Court"'0 prohibiting the conduct of any further nuclear
testing. That the governments of Australia and New Zealand took the
petition with the utmost seriousness is demonstrated by their
appointment of the Chief Judge of the Australian Supreme Court as
ad hoc judge in the ICJ proceedings.
The Court's response to the petition indicates two important
lessons concerning its potential use as a forum for conflict resolution.
First, the Court can act relatively quickly, and with flexibility, when
the urgency of a situation so warrants. Secondly, the efficacy of the
Court's decision depends upon the true desire of each party to allow
the Court to resolve the dispute.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The initial petitions were filed on May 9, 1973." Public hearings
were held from May 21-25. An order for interim measures of protec-
tion pending a decision on the merits was issued on June 22. The
operative part of the order read:
"The governments of Australia [New Zealand] and France should each
of them ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate
or extend the dispute ... and, in particular, the French Government
should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-active fall-out on
Australian [New Zealand] territory. ..- 2
The stickiest issue in the Court's 8-6 decision was that of juris-
diction. The question centered on what degree of certainty about its
own jurisdiction, if any, is necessary before the Court may issue a
binding order of interim protection. The majority held that evidence
which appears, prima facie, to constitute a basis on which "the juris-
diction of the Court might be found" [emphasis supplied] is suffi-
cient to justify interim measures of protection. The philosophy is that
when there is a possibility that the Court will hear the case, and there
is danger of immediate and irreparable injury to one of the parties,
it is both prudent and proper to order measures to avoid the injury.
This conclusion was also endorsed by at least one dissenting judge
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
110. "The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstan-
ces so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party."




who, however, found no such prima facie evidence of jurisdiction., 3
The majority's decision on this issue seems to have a sound basis
in legal authority.' The question is not novel; it has been raised on
several occasions before the World Court."5 In 1951, the ICJ was first
confronted with a request for interim measures of protection in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case."' The United Kingdom had
brought an action against Iran after nationalization of the Iranian oil
industry. Ultimately, Iran won when the Court announced that it did
not have jurisdiction. Before that decision, however, the Court had
issued an order calling for strong interim injunctive measures. In
issuing that order the Court ruled that when "it cannot be accepted
a priori that a claim . . . falls completely outside the scope of inter-
national jurisdiction," then measures of interim protection can be
issued without in any way determining the ultimate issue of compe-
tence to deal with the merits."7 When Iran failed to comply with the
preliminary order, Britain raised the matter in the U.N. Security
Council, requesting enforcement. The request became moot, how-
ever, when the Court announced shortly thereafter that it did not
have jurisdiction, causing the interim measures to collapse."'
When a request for interim measures of protection was raised in
1957 in the Interhandel Case,"9 the Court neatly avoided the issue of
jurisdiction by declaring that the good faith of the respondent
(United States) was sufficient protection. The question of jurisdiction
on the merits was ultimately avoided as well.29
The next cases raising the issue were the recent Icelandic Fisher-
ies Jurisdiction Cases. 2' This dispute evolved from British and West
German opposition to the establishment by Iceland of a 50 mile fish-
ing zone in 1972. Again a question of jurisdiction was involved, and
again prior to deciding upon that question, the Court entered an order
of interim measures of protection. Despite the rather clear compe-
tence of the ICJ based upon an exchange of notes in 1961 authorizing
it, Iceland simply refused to submit to the Court's jurisdiction. As a
113. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Petren in Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at
765.
114. E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTOVERSIES 165, 186 (1933); S. ROSENNE, I THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL Cour 424 (1965).
115. For their early use by the Permanent Court of International Justice, see
DUMBALD, supra note 114, at 147-54.
116. [1952] I.C.J. 93.
117. P.J. LIACOURAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 61 (1962).
118. ROSENNE, supra note 114, at 156-59.
119. [1957] I.C.J. 105.
120. LL couRAS, supra note 117, at 209-10.
121. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 743 (1973).
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result, the interim measures were highly unsuccessful. 22 A settlement
was finally agreed upon in late 1973 outside the forum of the World
Court and only after a potentially dangerous military standoff be-
tween the two countries.
23
Against this unhappy background, it is not surprising that the
attempt to impose interim injunctive measures in the nuclear testing
controversy was not successful. From the outset, France argued that
it was not subject to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter since it fell
into the scope of an express limitation to the 1966 French acceptance
of compulsory jurisdiction, specifically excluding "disputes concern-
ing activities connected with national defense.' ' 24 The petitioners
relied on Article 33 of the General Act of 1928 for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes to which France was a signatory.,?
That article called for compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court of International Justice for certain disputes. On the possibility
that the 1928 Act had not been superseded by the 1966 declaration
or, in the alternative, the possibility that nuclear weapons testing
may not be included in the concept of "national defense," the major-
ity found that a prima facie case had been made that the Court might
have jurisdiction. 2 6 These fragile possibilities were enough to justify
issuing the Order, but not enough to convince France to accept the
Court's decision and act accordingly. Just one month after the Order
was issued France began its new test series.
The next step in the case is scheduled to be a decision on whether
the Court has competence to entertain the dispute. In light of the
French attitude toward the initial Court action, it would be easy to
label further proceedings as wasteful and fruitless. It may well be,
however, that despite the French intransigence, the use of the World
Court may still prove useful in changing their current policy.
IMPACT OF THE COURT OPINION UPON FRANCE
In evaluating these international maneuvers, it must be noted
that France is by no means solidly united on the issue of nuclear
testing. Widespread opposition to the current series of tests is evi-
dent; sentiment is especially strong among the influential French
clergy. 127
It appears that the attitude of the French elite on the issue is
122. In the year after the measures were ordered, the nets of 68 British trawlers
were cut, live shots fired by Icelandic gunboats, and 13 collisions occured between
Icelandic and English ships. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1973, at 3, col. 5.
123. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 8, col. 4.
124. I.C.J. YEARBOOK 1972-73, at 60.
125. Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at 750.
126. Id. at 751.
127. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
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sharply divided. In 1966, an in-depth series of interviews with a large
number of the French elite indicated considerable opposition to
maintenance of a nuclear "force de frappe." When asked if they
considered a national deterrent to be a prerequisite to a nation's
independence, over half said they did not.'2 When asked if they con-
sidered an independent deterrent necessary for a nation's prestige in
the world, only 29 percent responded that they did.' 29 Finally, by a
slim margin, the elite felt that the development of a nuclear capabil-
ity was not worth the cost.' 30 While these results may be slightly
outdated, there is little reason to believe that French attitudes have
hardened in the years since.
It is, then, upon French attitudes and politics that the ICJ ac-
tion, and the international response to it, may have the most influ-
ence. Global reactions have put the French on the defensive. Follow-
ing the Court order, the French Ambassador to the United States felt
compelled to reply in length to a New York Times editorial on the
subject. Setting the stage for a justification of the violation of the
Court order which was obviously to follow in a few days, Ambassador
Kosciusko-Morizet wrote that the other parties were "the first to set
themselves in contradiction with the court's request" through mea-
sures such as boycotts of French products and transportation, and the
cutting off of mail and telephone communication between the two
countries."'
From this kind of reaction, it is clear that the French are sensi-
tive to world public opinion. Their defiance of the Court order has
aroused a number of official diplomatic protests,'32 severe criticism
from legal scholars'" and scathing denunciation in various media.'1
4
This barrage of negative reaction is bound to have some influence on
French attitudes.
There is, among some scholars, a healthy trend to look beyond
the obvious frailties of the international adjudicatory system to a
more subtle, but highly important, role of international law in formu-
lating national policy. This role simply can be to "operate as a re-
straint by raising the political cost which a country pays for engaging
in certain conduct."' ' The Acting Legal Adviser to the U.S. Depart-
128. K. DEUTSCH, ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN UNITY: ELIrE ATrITUDES AND THEIR
BACKGROUND IN FRANCE AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 130 (1966).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1973, at 40, col. 4.
132. 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 749n. (1973).
133. Nanda, French A Tests Stir Storms of Protests, Rocky Mountain News, Nov.
25, 1973, Global News Section, at 1, col. 1.
134. See French Filth, supra note 71.
135. R. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS 174 (1969).
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ment of State recently noted that "the absence of a comprehensive
and dispositive system of adjudication does not necessarily lead to
international anarchy. States comply with law among other reasons
because it is politic to do So.'
'
136
It remains to be seen how much France will be influenced by
world opinion. A good deal depends upon the reaction of the French
people and the resolve of the government. Thus even though a contin-
ued deliberation of the issue in the World Court might be fruitless in
producing concrete compliance with any orders to discontinue test-
ing, its influence on world public opinion may be an important factor
in any French decision to discontinue testing. There is clearly some-
thing more sacrosanct about a World Court opinion than a General
Assembly resolution. Perhaps, the traditional independence of the
courts in many municipal systems, and the strong popular respect the
judiciary receives among the public, makes an ICJ decision have even
greater potential impact upon public opinion than upon the
development of concrete international law.
There is little room for compromise on this particular issue. "Ul-
timately the only alternatives are the continuance or the cessation of
the French nuclear tests in the Pacific."'' 7 Given this situation, the
various possible diplomatic procedures which have been suggested",
can provide little direct benefit since each are designed to facilitate
compromise. More attention has been focused upon the testing since
Australia and New Zealand went to the ICJ than any time previously.
A continued pursuit of this course of action may prove to be the best
one in the immediate future.
William K. Ris, Jr.
136. Brower, International Law as an Instrument of National Policy, 3 DENVER J.
INT'L L. & POLIcY 285 (1973).
137. Dissenting opinion of Judge Forster, Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 1, at 758.
138. See for example Note, supra note 11.
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PORTUGESE AFRICA: A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED
NATIONS INVOLVEMENT
"Let him who will portray me, but let him not malign me; for patience
is very often lost when insults are heaped upon it."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A necessary prerequisite to any examination of Portuguese pol-
icy, in particular one concerning the Overseas Provinces, is an admis-
sion that Americans, in general, have yet to attain a realistic under-
standing of Iberian civilization. Traditionally, discussions of Portugal
labored under the shadow of what has recently been recognized as the
"Black Legend" (Leyenda Negra). Professor Philip Wayne Powell
observes that the fundamental premise of the "Black Legend" is that
Iberian people are "uniquely cruel, bigoted, tyrannical, obscurantist,
lazy, fanatical, greedy, and treacherous."2 Further, the illusion of.a
true Portuguese union with Spain under Philip II from 1580 to 1640,
often led to the mistaken equation of Portuguese explorative achieve-
ments with the unfortunate adventures of Spain in the New World.
3
Such misunderstanding predisposed many to uncritically accept alle-
gations of Portuguese injustice whenever presented in a colonial con-
text. John Tate Lanning writes that "the English language historian
who deals with (Iberian) civilization and culture has to think as much
of how he is going to grapple with the bias of his public as he does of
finding what the case is."' Hopefully, present scholarship should pro-
vide an adequate caveat against continuation of past histrionics.
H. LEGAL STATUS OF PORTUGUESE AFRICA UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE
U.N. CHARTER
Under its present constitution, approved by popular vote in Met-
ropolitan Portugal and Overseas Provinces in 1933, Portugal is a uni-
tary republic consisting of the following territories: (1) in Europe: the
Metropole of Portugal, the Archipelagoes of Madeira and the Azores;
(2) in Africa: Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Ca-
binda, Angola, S. Joao Baptista de Ajuda, S. Tome and Principe; (3)
in Asia: Goa (Istado da India) and Macau; and (4) in Oceania:
Timor.5 The Republic of Portugal, under this constitutional composi-
1. M. CERVANTES, DON QUIxoT, pt. II, ch. 59.
2. P. W. POWELL, TREE OF HATE: PROPAGANDA AND PREJUDICE AFFECTING UNITED
STATES RELATIONS WITH THE HISPANIC WORLD 11, 3, 169 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
POWELLI.
3. J. VERzITJ, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORlCAL PERSPECTIVE 134 (1969).
4. POWELL, supra note 2, at 131.
5. For English text of Portuguese Constitution of April 11, 1933, as amended to
1959, see A. PEASLEE, 3 CoNsTrrrrIONS OF NATIONS 725 (1968).
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tion, was admitted to the United Nations on December 14, 1955.' The
seizure of Goa and S. Joao Baptista de Ajuda, by India and Senegal
respectively, during the 1960's is not recognized by Portugal. Both are
considered under military occupation by foreign powers and Goa re-
tains its representation in the Portugese National Assembly.
7
Member States of the United Nations, responsible for adminis-
tration of areas designated as non-self-governing territories, are obli-
gated to transmit information concerning social and economic condi-
tions of such territories to the Secretary General pursuant to Chapter
XI of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly in 1956, the Secretary
General requested of Portugal "whether there are any territories re-
ferred to in Article 73 of the Charter for the administration of which
it has responsibility."8 Portugal replied that it "does not administer
territories which fall under the category indicated by Article 73."9
During 1957, the Fourth Committee (dealing with colonial and trus-
teeship matters) considered transmission of information pursuant to
Chapter XI by new members. Discussion focused upon whether the
General Assembly could assume responsibility for an objective exam-
ination of the obligation of any new member (Portugal in particular)
to submit information under Chapter XI." A Fourth Committee reso-
lution to create an ad hoc committee to study the application of the
provisions of Chapter XI in regard to new members was defeated by
the General Assembly." Such action by the Fourth Committee was
not customary. Since 1948, when eight member nations transmitted
information in regard to 74 territories, designation of territories as
non-self-governing was understood to be the exclusive right of the
administering country.'" The suggestion that this right should now
pass to the General Assembly was unprecedented. The Representa-
tive of Portugal explained that his country was a unitary state under
a unitary constitution with the Metropole and Overseas Provinces
under the identical organs of sovereignty and the same status under
international law.'" When Portugal was admitted to the United Na-
6. 1958 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONs 27.
7. OVERSEAS COMPANIES OF PORTUGAL, FACT SHEET ON PORTUGAL: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANCES 3 (1972). (Material available from the American representative of Overseas
Companies of Portugal, Downs & Roosevelt, Inc., Washington, D.C.)
8. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/331/Add.1,2 (1956).
9. Id.
10. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/345 (1957).
11. U.N. Doc. A/3531/Add.1 (1957).
12. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/347 (1957).
13. Some members of the Fourth Committee alleged that Portugal had tradition-
ally used the term "colonies" in regard to its overseas territories and only changed the
designation to "Overseas Provinces" in 1951. The first references to "Overseas Prov-
inces" in official Portuguese documents were in 1576 and 1633. The term was employed
in the Constitutions of 1820, 1832, 1842, the overseas legislation of 1867 and the Consti-
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tions, the Portuguese Constitution was known to its members and
there could be no misunderstanding as to the political structure or
territorial composition of Portugal. It was beyond the competence of
the General Assembly to question the constitutional structure or ter-
ritorial extension of any member state once it had been admitted to
the United Nations. The Portuguese government was and would con-
tinue to furnish extensive information to specialized agencies of the
United Nations, however to do so under Chapter XI would be in
abrogation of its own national constitution. 4
Although future debate would involve Portugal's failure to pro-
vide information on its Overseas Provinces, the substantial issue did
not concern quantums of information. From its admission, Portugal
submitted reports on its Overseas Provinces to the Economic and
Social Council, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, the World Health Organization and the
United Nations Library.' The real issue confronting the General As-
sembly by the Fourth Committee proposal was whether the Assembly
could disregard the constitutional structure of a member nation and
determine that nation's territorial composition. The Portuguese Con-
stitution did not recognize the existence of territories within the na-
tion with different legal status. Portugal maintained that the inter-
pretation and application of a member nation's constitution was the
exclusive right of the respective country. General Assembly interfer-
ence constituted a "flagrant violation" of Article 2(1) (sovereign
equality of all members) and Article 2(7) (U.N. intervention in mat-
ters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states
precluded). 1 The Fourth Committee resubmitted the resolution ex-
plaining it was necessary to interpret Chapter XI in relation to: (1)
the scope of the constitutional limitation clause in Chapter XI; (2)
whether Chapter XI included territories incorporated as part of the
metropolitan country; and (3) whether the General Assembly could
itself define territories as non-self-governing. The General Assembly
again rejected the draft resolution, failing to obtain a required two-
tutions of 1911 and 1933. Although the term "colony" was used for a short period in
modern texts, this did not change the status of the provinces under Portuguese law.
An early seventeenth century ruling of the Portuguese Royal Council reads in part that
"Goa and the other lands overseas with whose Governments this Council is concerned
are not distinct nor separate from this realm ... and thus he who is born and lives in
Goa or in Brazil or in Angola is just as much a Portuguese as he who lives and is born
in Lisbon."
14. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/347 (1957). See also PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTRY, PoRTu-
GAL REPLIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS 3-4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PORTUGAL REPLIES].
15. F. NOGUEIRA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PORTUGAL: A STUDY OF ANTI-
COLONIALISM 84 (1963) [hereinafter cited as NOGUEIRA].
16. Id. at 78-79.
1974
136 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
thirds majority vote.'7
The composition of the General Assembly in 1960, altered by the
admission of eighteen newly independent states, gave a clear majority
on the Portuguese question to the developing nations. Early in the
session the Special Committee of Six, maintaining the Charter "was
a living document and the obligations under Chapter XI must be
viewed in the light of the changing spirit of the times," submitted
principles to guide members in determining whether there existed an
obligation on their part to transmit information concerning non-self-
governing territories under Chapter XI.' s These principles were: (1)
there exists a prima facia obligation to transmit information on terri-
tories geographically separate and ethnically or culturally distinct
from the administering state; (2) full self-government can only be
attained by independence, free association or integration; and (3)
constitutional limitations enumerated in Chapter XI concerned only
the quantum of information to be provided.'9 The General Assembly
accepted the principles submitted by the Special Committee of Six,
and in its companion resolution, unilaterally designated the Overseas
Provinces of Portugal to be non-self-governing territories.2 Portugal
was now obligated to transmit information on those areas without
further delay.2 '
During the debate which surrounded adoption of Resolutions
1541(XV) and 1542(XV), Portugal maintained such action by the
General Assembly was not authorized by the Charter, was ultra vires
and that members of the General Assembly were applying a political
interpretation to the Charter. Portugal insisted that only a legal in-
terpretation of Chapter XI by the International Court of Justice or
an amendment of the Charter would ensure a successful resolution of
the problem.2 2 Portugal laid great stress upon the wording of the first
draft of the Report of the Committee of Six, wherein the Committee,
after having noted the difficulties involved in finding a satisfactory
definition of the concept of "territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government" and that anyway, it "was
not essential to arrive at a definition," said it "approached the prob-
lem from a practical point of view, bearing in mind the political
17. U.N. Doc. A/3733 (1957).
18. U.N. Doc. A/4526 (1960). The committee consisted of representatives from
India, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
19. Id.
20. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960).
21. G.A. Res, 1542, 15 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960). The territories so
designated were Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, S. Tome and Principe, S. Joao Bap-
tista de Ajuda, Goa, Macau and the Cape Verde Archipelago. Conspicuously absent
were the Archipelagoes of Madeira and the Azores.
22. NOGUEIRA, supra note 15, at 351.
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realities of the world situation." ' Portugal also found the selection
by the General Assembly of racial and cultural factors as criteria for
determination of non-self-governing territories a contradiction of
basic principles of the United Nations. That political separation
should necessarily arise because of racial and cultural differences was
viewed by Portugal as a stimulant to racial and cultural hostilities.
2
1
Portugal would not accept geographical separation, cultural and ra-
cial difference as sufficient to constitute a colonial situation. Instead,
Portugal claimed the General Assembly must consider each situation
on the basis of such factors as economic exploitation, disparity or
conflict of economic interests, deprivation of political, educational or
social rights and finally the imposition of a religion or culture upon a
people considered inferior.
25
A compromise between the colonial and anti-colonial powers,
Chapter XI consists of ambiguities and omissions. 21 The proposed
definitions for the principles of self-government, just treatment of
peoples, and free political institutions enumerated in Chapter XI
reflect the ideological diversity of the international community. In
attempting to define and implement, to some degree, these basic
human rights in non-self-governing territories, the General Assembly
asserted more power than a strict interpretation of Chapter XI would
authorize.2 From a legal point of view, Chapter XI does not enable
the General Assembly to determine whether a territory has attained
"self-government, ' 2 nor does it authorize the Assembly to specify
which territories are, in fact, non-self-governing. 29 Interpretations of
the Charter by the General Assembly, however, "cannot always be
defended from a legal point of view. ' 30 Although some authors suggest
the methods employed by the General Assembly to implement Chap-
ter XI "exceeds the requirements of the Chapter itself,"'3' they main-
tain that the Charter cannot be considered "a rigid, unchangeable"
legal document lacking "flexibility and adaptability.
' 3 2
23. U.N. Doc. A/AC.100/L.1 (1960).
24. NOGUEIRA, supra note 15, at 86.
25. Id. at 90.
26. Kunz, Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in Action, 48 AM. J. INT'L
L. 103, 104 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Kunz].
27. Engel, The Changing Charter of the United Nations, Y.B. OF WORLD AFFAIRS
80, 81 (1953).
28. Kunz, supra note 26, at 108-109.
29. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONs 556 (1950).
30. Kunz, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 504, 506
(1952).
31. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 448-462 (3rd ed. 1969).
32. L. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONs 68 (1959).
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The occupation of Goa and its dependencies by the Indian Union
in 1961, not only temporarily upset the moral framework of debate
within the General Assembly in regard to the Portuguese Overseas
Provinces, but confirmed many of Portugal's fears concerning the
motives of its critics. Since Goa was among eight Portuguese territo-
ries designated as non-self-governing by Resolution 1542(XV), Portu-
gal maintained that states, like India, which voted for the resolution
were legally bound to decide the future of Goa only by terms of
Resolutions 1514(XV) and 1541(XV). After analyzing the justifica-
tions submitted by India for its action, Quincy Wright concluded that
"no interpretation of the Charter provides a legal justification" for
the occupation. 3' When the action by India was tolerated in the Gen-
eral Assembly, Portugal perceived a double standard by which it was
condemned for not respecting principles of self-determination while
other nations politically aligned with the majority were not. Portugal
concluded that "in the United Nations, self-determination is not re-
garded as a principle of political ethics but as a banner of political
action designed to achieve certain pre-selected objectives which have
nothing to do with real self-determination.' '4 In regard to the imple-
mentation of self-determination within the United Nations, S. Prak-
ash Sinha writes:
once the basic decision for political reorganization or redistribution of
power has been made, the principle of self-determination is invoked to
attain the result in a desirable fashion. The principle is thus one of
political expediency which states may or may not use.'
Any moral persuasion which past or future United Nations resolu-
tions may have achieved with Portugal was lost after the action by
India and subsequent inaction by the General Assembly. 6 By 1963,
Dr. Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister of Portugal, wrote that "from
the study of this whole problem there is one inescapable conclusion
to be drawn, namely that discussion is impossible.
' 3
III. INSURGENT ACTIvrrIES AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE
A. Angola: 1961
Resolutions 1514 (XV), 1541 (XV) and 1542 (XV) were approved
by the General Assembly during December 1960. Within a month,
minor disturbances occurred around Luanda and on March 15, 1961,
simultaneous attacks against settlements along the Congolese border
33. Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 617, 630 (1962).
34. PORTUGAL REPLIES, supra note 14, at 10; see also W. KULSKI, INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 513-514 (1968).
35. Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe?, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 260, 271
(1973).
36. PORTUGAL REPLIES, supra note 14, at 10.
37. NOcUETRA, supra note 15, at 120.
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in northwestern Angola were initiated by rebel forces.A" Interpreted by
many of Portugal's adversaries as a spontaneous revolt, the rebellion
was in reality a series of activities performed in accordance with a
prearranged strategy and organization." During the first week of viol-
ence hundreds of Africans of European descent and more than 6,000
black Africans were massacred by the insurgents.' One authority
observed that it was "the biggest slaughter of Europeans which has
taken place in Africa in this century,"" and another that it made "the
Congo look like a tempest in a teapot."' 2
At the outset of the attack, there were approximately 7,000 mili-
tary and policy personnel in Angola, of which 5,000 were black and
2,000 of European descent.' For the most part, these units retreated
to the large cities to undertake defensive measures until the strength
of the insurgents could be determined and reinforcements arrived
from Metropolitan Portugal." By 1962, the insurgents had been con-
tained within the densely forested areas of northwestern Angola,
where guerilla activity continues today. Immediately following the
introduction of Metropolitan troops in Angola, allegations of Portu-
guese represssion gained widespread attention. Atrocities were com-
mitted by the Portuguese, most by European settlers who had re-
cently witnessed a similar fate befall their friends and neighbors."
The majority of such acts were committed prior to entrance of Euro-
pean military units." With regard to the Portuguese army's attempt
to control this bestiality, an official British commission undertaking
on-the-spot investigations, was encouraged "by the sense of duty
38. D. WHEELER & R. PELIssIER, ANGOLA 180 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WHEELER
& PELISSIER1.
39. Id. at 177.
40. PORTUGUESE AFRICA: A HANDBOOK 407 (D. ABSHIRE & M. SAMMUELS ed. 1969)
1hereinafter cited as ABSHmE & SAMMUELS].
41. Waring, The Case for Portugal, ANGOLA: A SYMPOSIUM 31 (London Institute
of* Race Relations ed. 1962).
42. Clairmonte, Angola: Unfinished Duel, 53 YALE REV. 1 (1963); see also Waring,
Angola-Terrorists on the Run, NAT'L REV., Sept. 11, 1962, at 189.
43. OVERSEAS COMPANIES OF PORTUGAL, PORTUGAL 1961-1971: A DECADE OF
PROGRESS 35 (1972). The size and nature of the Portuguese armed forces in Angola
during early 1961 suggest that government authorities did not foresee the coming
violence. However, other evidence indicates that the Portuguese did expect some trou-
ble. During 1959, Angola imported 156 tons of munitions; in 1960, 953 tons; in 1961,
424 tons and in 1962, 145 tons. WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 173.
44. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 407-408.
45. The insurgents hold several small areas in the Zaire, Uige and Cuanza Norte
districts of northwestern Angola and guerrilla infiltration continues in the Moxico
district of eastern Angola; see WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 201.
46. H. Kay, A Catholic View, ANGOLA: A SYMPOSIUM 67, 89 (London Institute of
Race Relations ed. 1962).
47. Id.
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among the senior officials and military commanders" it witnessed.49
B. United Nations Action
During 1961, the Security Council considered the "threat posed
to international peace and security" by these developments, 9 disre-
garding Portugal's assertion that such attention by the Security
Council was a contravention of Article 2(7) of the Charter and moti-
vated by a desire to internationalize problems of Portuguese domestic
public order for political advantage. 50 A Security Council draft resolu-
tion to investigate and report on the violence in Angola was de-
feated.5' In the General Assembly, a similar resolution, sponsored by
36 African and Asian countries, 52 to create a subcommittee to investi-
gate the "conflict and deterioration of human rights" in Angola and
call on Portugal to institute reforms within its African territories was
approved. 53 Eight months later the U.N. Subcommittee on the Situa-
tion in Angola transmitted its report to the General Assembly. The
Subcommittee found: (1) the Portuguese policy of assimilation not
accompanied by preparation of the indigenous population for citizen-
ship; (2) indications of forced labor; (3) evidence of inadequate edu-
cational facilities; (4) political organizations advocating self-
determination or independence were considered subversive and sup-
pressed;54 (5) the impossibility of discussion or negotiation with Por-
48. Id. The commission was composed of military personnel from the British
embassy in Lisbon and the consul general for Angola.
49. U.N. Doc. S/4738 (1961).
50. U.N. Doc. S/4760 (1961).
51. U.N. Doc. S/4769 (1961).
52. The sponsors were Afhganistan, Burma, Cameroun, Central African Republic,
Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federa-
tion of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan,
Lebannon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Upper
Volta. 1960 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 140.
53. G.A. Res. 1603, 16 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/L.345/Add.1-5 (1961).
54. See R. GIBSON, AF~icAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS: CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES
AGAINST MINORITY RULE (1972). The political parties basically concerned were: Movi-
mento Popular de Libertacao de Angola -(M.P.L.A.); Uniao National Para A Indepen-
dencia Total de Angola (U.N.I.T.A.); Governo Revolucionario de Angola-Frente Na-
cional de Libertacao de Angola (G.R.A.E.-F.N.L.A.); Uniao dos Populacoes de An-
gola (U.P.A.); Partido Democratico Angolamo (P.D.A.). Several observations should be
made concerning this situation: (1) by 1965, 31 of the 36 independent African nations
maintained a one-party system of government; see L. GANN & P. DUIGNAN, BURDEN OF
EMPIRE 393 (1967); (2) the parliamentary system of the Overseas Provinces is not
significantly different in this respect than that of the Metropole, making political
liberalization in the Overseas Provinces prior to that in Europe unrealistic; see
Wheeler, The Thaw in Portugal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 769-781 (1970); (3) government
acceptance of such political organizations during the 1950's would, in all probability,
have greatly increased the amount of covert foreign interference; see generally M.
COPELAND, THE GAME OF NATIONS (1969); and P. LESSING, AFRICA'S RED HARVEST (1962).
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tuguese authorities "forced" nationalistic movements into clandes-
tine activity and "direct action."5 5 In response to the report, the
General Assembly affirmed the right of the Angolan people to self-
determination and independence, deprecated Portuguese repression
and violence against the people of Angola and the denial of their basic
human rights and freedoms, and requested Portugal desist from re-
pression, and undertake without delay extensive social, economic and
political reforms to enable the transfer of power to the Angolan peo-
ple. •" The debate on Angola continued in the General Assembly
through 1962 and was brought to a conclusion as a separate and
distinct problem when the General Assembly condemned "the mass
extermination of the indigenous population of Angola and other se-
vere repressive measures being used by the Portuguese colonial au-
thorities" and noted "that in the territory of Angola, as in other
Portuguese colonies, the indigenous population is denied all funda-
mental rights and freedoms, that racial discrimination is in fact
widely practiced and that the economic life of Angola is to a large
extent based on forced labor."
5 7
C. Border Incidents
Following the violence in Angola, various African nations at-
tempted to escalate the situation in Angola to an international crisis
through allegations of aggression by Portuguese military units against
neighboring countries. In 1961, Senegal charged in the Security
Council that Portuguese army units entered a Senegalese village and
motorized columns accompanied by jet fighters penetrated other
Senegalese territory.50 Portugal denied the allegation and explained
that a routine reconnaissance patrol had become lost for a short time
in Senegalese territory and the overflight of two jet aircraft, due to
technical problems in navigation, had lasted no longer than 30 sec-
onds. 59 In 1963, Senegal informed the Security Council that Portu-
guese military aircraft bombed a Senegalese village, but was uncer-
tain as to the amount of damage and date of attack.60 Portugal denied
the charge and requested the Security Council establish a neutral
commission to investigate in loco the Senegalese complaint.6 In-
stead, the Security Council deplored "any incursion by Portuguese
forces into Senegalese territory as well as [this] incident.""2 In 1965,
55. U.N. Doc. S/4993/Corr.1 (1962); U.N. Doc. A/4978/Corr.1 (1962).
56. G.A. Res. 1742, 16 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/L.384/Rev.1 (1962).
57. G.A. Res. 1819, 17 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. AIL.415/Add.1 (1962).
58. U.N. Doc. S/5039 (1961).
59. U.N. Doc. S/5055 (1961).
60. U.N. Doc. S/5279 (1963); U.N. Doc. S/5283 (1963).
61. U.N. Doc. S/5281 (1963); U.N. Doc. S/5284 (1963).
62. U.N. Doc. S/5293 (1963).
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Senegal continued allegations of Portuguese military incursions into
Senegalese territory. 3 Portugal again denied the charges and re-
quested the United Nations investigate such allegations to reduce the
increasing tension between the two nations." The Security Council
unanimously deplored "any incursion by Portuguese military forces
into Senegalese territory," and requested Portugal "take all effective
and necessary action to prevent any violation of Senegal's sovereignty
and territorial integrity."65
In 1966, the Democratic Republic of the Congo charged Portugal
with allowing Angola to be employed as a military base for mercenary
operations against the Congolese government. While denying the
allegation, Portugal informed the Council that official Congolese in-
formation organs were instigating violence against the Portuguese
community in the Congo-the Portuguese embassy in Kinshasa had
been set afire, embassy officials attacked and seriously injured. Fur-
ther, Portugal indicated it would welcome an official United Nations
investigation of alleged mercenary bases in Angola, if the Congo
would allow similar inspections of known anti-Portuguese bases in
Congolese territory. 7 The Security Council urged Portugal "not to
allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for
interfering in the domestic affairs" of the Congo.66 In 1967, Guinea,
Senegal and Zambia complained of military incursions by Portuguese
army units. 9 The Congo repeated charges that Portugal was provid-
ing and encouraging mercenary bases in Angola.76 Portugal denied the
allegations, stating that the Congo, since 1960, had openly promoted
armed aggression against Angola from within the Congo.7 The Secu-
rity Council condemned Portugal for its failure to prevent mercenar-
ies from using Angola as a base of operations.
72
D. Mozambique
In 1973, new charges of Portuguese atrocities in Mozambique by
63. U.N. Doc. S/6177 (1965); U.N. Doc. S/6196 (1965) and U.N. Doc. S/6338
(1965).
64. U.N. Doc. S/6192/Corr.1 (1965); U.N. Doc. S/6240 (1965).
65. S.C. Res. 204, 20 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/6366/Rev.1 (1965).
66. U.N. Doc. S/7503 (1966). The charges followed the dismissal of Tshombe and
coup d' etat by Mobutu in the fall of 1965.
67. U.N. Doc. S/7506 (1966). See also Marcum, Three Revolutions, AFRICA REPORT
8, 10, 12 (Nov., 1967); and ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 411.
68. S.C. Res. 266, 21 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/7539 (1966).
69. Respectively, U.N. Doc, S/8193 (1967); U.N. Doc. S/8080 (1967); U.N. Doc.
S/8151 (1967) and U.N. Doc. 7664 (1967).
70. U.N. Doc. S/8218 (1967).
71. U.N. Doc. S/8238 (1967).
72. S.C. Res. 241, 22 UN. SCOR (adopted without vote), see 1967 YEARBOOK OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 127.
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the Roman Catholic missionary order, the Missionaries of Africa
(White Fathers), reopened the controversy concerning Portuguese
military policy.7 3 Allegations of widespread massacres were detailed
in a 400-page document released by the "White Fathers" in expla-
nation of that order's withdrawal from Mozambique in May, 1971.11
The document, referring to incidents in 1971 and 1972, followed
a charge by a British Roman Catholic priest, the Rev. Adrian
Hastings, that approximately 400 civilians were massacred at
Wiliamo.15 The charges were officially denied by Lisbon and by
General Kaulza de Arriaga, Portuguese military commander in
Mozambique." The village, allegedly destroyed by Portuguese troops
after concentration of the population in fortified villages, was visited
by a team of European journalists where a "careful search of the ruins
revealed no sign of a massacre."77 The existing evidence is less than
conclusive, and complicity by many "White Fathers" with guerrilla
terrorists diminishes the impartiality of their testimony., It would
appear that massacre and atrocity are no more part of Portuguese
military policy in 1972, than in 1962.79 To the contrary, evidence
suggests a large portion of the black population consider Portuguese
authorities "too soft" on terrorists.80 More reliable information de-
picts a realistic situation wherein isolated, unauthorized incidents of
summary execution and torture of suspected terrorists have been
committed by units of the Grupo Esspeciale Paraquedistas (special
counter-terrorist paratroop group) composed mainly of black Afri-
cans and ex-guerrillas. '
Although the present failure of the "liberation movements"
within the three African terroritories enjoys many explanations, the
primary reason is that the Portuguese government retains the neu-
trality, if not the open support, of a majority of the black African
73. New York Times, July 14, 1973, at 9, col. 5.
74. Id. at col. 6.
75. Id. at col. 5.
76. Id.
77. Conspicuously absent were spent cartridges, bullet holes in trees or building
frames and signs of recent burials; see Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1973, at 4, col.
4; New York Times, Aug. 11, 1973, at 10, col. 2.
78. INTELLIGENCE DIGEST 8 (Aug., 1973).
79. See generally A. VENTER, PORTUGAL'S WAR IN GUINEA-BISSAU (1973); A.
VENTER, PORTUGAL'S GUERRILLA WAR (1973); A. VENTER, THE TERROR FIGHTERS (1970);
Dodson, Dynamics of Insurgency in Mozambique, AFRICA REPORT 52-55 (Nov. 1967);
Marcum, Three Revolutions, AFRICA REPORT 8-22 (Nov. 1967); and Zartman, Guinea:
The Quiet War Goes On, AFRICA REPORT 67-72 (Nov. 1967).
80. Supra note 78, at 8.
81. Compare e.g. Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1973, at 3, col. 5, with DER
SPIEGEL, Aug. 13, 1973, at 64-73.
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population. s2 The employment by Portugal of brutal repression
against the civilian population such as massacres, wide scale use of
napalm, defoliates or bombing would rapidly evaporate existing
black African support. The fact that approximately 50 percent of the
Portuguese defense forces in the territories consist of non-Europeans
further reduces the possibility that the government is utilizing civil-
ian directed methods of warfare. 83
E. Portuguese Guinea
The insurgent activity within the three African Overseas Prov-
inces which has proved most difficult for the Portuguese is the war
in Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau).'" The revolutionary African
Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands
(P.A.I.G.C.) claims to have "liberated" two-thirds of the territory
and several authorities suggest that they are actually in control of
one-half of the area. s5 Portugal maintains that "there are no 'liber-
ated areas' under the control of the P.A.I.G.C.," 86 but admits there
are some "frontier areas" rendered "unsafe by terrorists infiltrating
clandestinely from the neighboring countries giving them sanc-
tuary." 7
In 1972, the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization estab-
lished a Special Mission, composed of representatives of Equador,
Sweden and Tunisia, to visit the "liberated areas" of Portuguese
Guinea. "' Entering Portuguese Guinea without the permission of Por-
tuguese authorities and with a military contingent of the P.A.I.G.C.
on April 2, 1972, the Mission reportedly observed reconstruction pro-
grams, and social, economic, educational and other conditions in the
"liberated areas."" Upon the Mission's return to New York, the phys-
82. ABSHIRE & SAMUELS, supra note 40, at 429; and WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra
note 38, at 221. Tribal animosity has in some regions increased greatly due to the
fighting. For example, in Angola that of the Ovimbundu towards the Bakongo and
Mbundu who massacred them in 1961; see WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 230.
Also see generally address by Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, The Only
Road Open to Us is to Defend Our Overseas Provinces, broadcast on Portuguese televi-
sion, Jan. 15, 1973 (available from Portuguese Embassy); Wheeler, The Thaw in Portu-
gal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 769-781 (1970); and Howe, Portugal at War: Hawks, Doves and
Owls, AFRICA REPORT 16-21 (Nov. 1969).
83. The 50 percent figure includes regular Metropole troops, militia, para-military
groups and police; see Address by Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Rui Patricio,
conveniently found in 99 CONG. REc. S4948 (1971).
84. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1973, at 15, col. 1; see generally A. VENTER,
PORTUGAL'S WAR IN GUINEA-BISSAU (1973).
85. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1973, at 15, col. 1.
86. PORTUGUESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MISSION INVISIBLE 31 (1972).
87. Id. at 46.




ical evidence offered by the photographer who accompanied the Mis-
sion did not indicate any place identifiable as Portuguese Guinea, nor
anything more than photographs of Mission representatives meeting
with African natives in jungle areas.90 In response to the Mission's
report, the Special Committee on Decolonization approved a resolu-
tion condemning Portugal. The Committee found that the P.A.I.G.C.
is the "only authentic representative of the territory" which, in its
opinion, "some States are prepared to recognize."'" Portugal con-
tested the findings of the Special Mission and invited the Secretary
General,"2 the President of the General Assembly,9 3 and the Security
Council 4 to designate a mission to visit Portuguese Guinea to deter-
mine the existence of "liberated areas. 9 5 The invitations were either
rejected or ignored.99
In September 1973, a Popular National Assembly, under the
sponsorship of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and
the Cape Verde Islands, proclaimed the independence of the "liber-
ated areas" of Portuguese Guinea. 7 Since then, approximately 70
African, Asian and communist nations have recognized the new terri-
tory. Currently, there is discussion in the General Assembly and the
Special Committee on Decolonization on whether to seat representa-
tives of the "liberated areas" on United Nations agencies and its
admission to the United Nations. However, since admission will
depend upon the recommendation of the Security Council, it does not
appear likely that the "liberated" territory will be admitted in the
foreseeable future.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom,
has stated that the "independent areas" of Portuguese Guinea do not
at this time possess the necessary attributes of a state to enable
recognition by the United States.9 Since "recognition [of] a country
90. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L.768 (1972).
91. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/400 (1972).
92. May 8, 1972.
93. October 2, 24, 1972; October 11, 1973.
94. October 11, 1973.
95. Statement by Portuguese Representative, Antonio Patricio, before the United
Nations General Assembly, Oct. 22, 1973.
96. Id.
97. The Proclamation of the State of Guinea-Bissau by the People's National
Assembly on Sept. 24, 1973 may be found in U.N. Doc. A/9196, Annex I, at 1 (1973).
The Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau may be found in U.N. Doc. A/9196,
Annex II, at 1 (1973).
98. Statement by Portuguese Representative, Antonio Patricio, before the United
Nations General Assembly, Oct. 22, 1973.
99. Address by David D. Newsom, African Studies Association Annual Meeting,
Nov. 2, 1973. "The State as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and
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still in the throes of warfare against the parent state . . . constitutes
participation in the conflict [and] makes the cause of independence
a common one between the aspirant for it and the outside State,''""
the United States will not seriously consider recognition until the
insurgent movement in Portuguese Guinea clearly demonstrates that
it exercises control upon a recognizably substantial part of the terri-
tory and population of Portuguese Guinea. However, on October 22,
1973, the General Assembly welcomed the accession to independence
of the "liberated areas" by the creation of the Republic of Guinea-
Bissau and condemned Portugal for perpetuating its "illegal" occu-
pation of and aggression against the Republic of Guinea-Bissau."°0
IV. THE BLACK LEGEND REVISITED
Since 1960, various nations in the General Assembly have at-
tempted to combine the problems of Angola and Mozambique with
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia by charges against Portugal of
racism, forced labor, inhumane labor conditions and the exportation
of black workers to South Africa. The creation by the General Assem-
bly of such a "Southern African Problem," requiring a uniform ap-
proach by that organization, can only result in unfortunate conse-
quences for the people of Portuguese Africa. The situation in Angola
and Mozambique is essentially different from that in South Africa
and Southern Rhodesia.
A. Racism
The Portuguese territories do not experience legislation such as
the Land Apportionment Act of Southern Rhodesia nor the "Jim
Crow" laws formerly found in the United States.'0 There is no de jure
discrimination in employment, education or housing, and there is a
corresponding lack of de facto discrimination.1' 3 In areas where admi-
ration for South African and Rhodesian society at times emerges,
primarily due to their greater economic and technological advance-
ment, antiracist propaganda is freely transmitted by government
d) capacity to enter into relations with other States." Convention on Rights and Duties
of States, Montevideo, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881.
100. C. HYDE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 153 (1947).
101. G.A. Res. 3061, 28 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/L.702. The following Member
States voted "no" on the resolution: Brazil,*Greece, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the United States. The following Member States abstained on
the resolution: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Den-
mark, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany (Fed. Rep.), Guate-
mala, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.
102. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 212.
103. Kennan, Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa, 49 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 218, 231
(1971) [hereinafter cited as KENNAN].
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agencies through official information organs. 104 Miscengenation is not
only accepted by a large majority of Portuguese, but is actively en-
couraged as an important aspect of official government policy."'1 Ar-
nold Toynbee writes:
You will see there people with Goanese and African blood in their veins.
It is evident that they feel themselves to be Portuguese and are felt to be
Portuguese by their European-blooded fellow citizens . . . the freedom
of the . . . Portuguese speaking peoples from race feeling is an unques-
tionable fact.'"
An increasing and significant portion of the population in the Over-
seas Provinces is of African-European descent (mesticos).107
The various insurgent movements in Portuguese Africa contin-
ually assert racism in the administration of the Provinces, and such
allegations find widespread acceptance in Afro-Asian and liberal
Western communities. However, the disparity between the great ma-
jority of black Africans and the more prosperous Europeans, Asians
and mesticos results from a corresponding disparity in educational
opportunity."5 In the territories, education, not race, is the avenue to
prosperity and the greatest governmental reforms have occurred in
the field of education. " " George F. Kennan writes:
it is difficult . . . to believe that a triumph of the present insurgent
pressures would produce any more rapid progress in educational oppor-
tunities and living standards for the African. In both these respects the
Portuguese territories are already well ahead of most of the black-ruled
countries in Africa.""
The Portuguese policy, in relation to aboriginal populations
within its territories, has been criticized as a concealed form of racism
despite similar practices by other nations and recognition by the
International Labor Organization of such methods to protect aborigi-
nal peoples. " ' Government dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of
104. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 213.
105. Id. at 202-203.
106. Toynbee, A War of Races? No., New York Times, Aug. 7, 1960, at 56, col. 1;
see also Kay, The Portuguese Way in Africa, FORTUNE 112-115, 139-142 (Jan. 1964).
107. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 1.
108. KENNAN, supra note 103, at 231. Mesticos are the indigenous population of
the island provinces off the African continent which were uninhabited when reached
by the Portuguese.
109. Id. at 232. R. Pelissier terms the educational reforms in Angola "a scholastic
explosion." In 1961, there were 105,701 Angolans in primary schools, 4,501 in technical
secondary schools and 7,486 in academic secondary schools. In 1967, the figures were
267,768; 15,371 and 16,700 respectively with 702 pursuing theological studies and 607
attending university in Angola; see WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 237.
110. KENNAN, supra note 103, at 232; see also WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note
38, at 237; and Sammuels, The 'New Look' in Angolan Education, AFRICA REPORT 63-
66 (Nov. 1967).
111. A. EDWARDS, THE OVlMBUNDU UNDER Two SOVEREIGNTIES 136 (1962).
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official assimilation methods led to repeal of the Native Statute in
1961. Under present legislation, any African may, without fee or test,
retain a traditional life style under special protection of law or adopt
full legal rights and obligations of Portuguese citizenship."2
B. Labor Conditions
In 1961, Ghana filed charges with the International Labor Organ-
ization against Portugal claiming that forced labor existed in Angola
and Mozambique in conditions worse than slavery and that over
100,000 Mozambicans were forceably exported to South African
mines. Acting upon the complaint, the I.L.O. established a commis-
sion to examine labor conditions in Portuguese Africa. The commis-
sion notified Ghana its complaint was unsupported by evidence."'
Yet in 1966, the General Assembly condemned, "as a crime against
humanity," Portugal's policy of exportation of workers to South Af-
rica.'" During 1970, Pierre Juvigny, the I.L.O. special representative
on labor conditions in Portuguese Africa, made personal investiga-
tions of Angola and Mozambique, similar to the original I.L.O. exam-
ination in 1962. He reiterated the nonexistence of forced labor and
forced exportation of workers to South Africa, The report concluded:
the Portuguese authorities appear to be fully aware of the need to develop
further the series of policies which they have been pursuing in recent
times . . . [theyl have repeatedly referred to I.L.O. standards as rein-
forcing the legal basis of their decisions. " '
Definitive reform of the labor system in Portuguese Africa began
in 1960 with the creation of minimum wages, labor inspections, revo-
cation of criminal penalties for breach of work contracts and ratifica-
tion of the I.L.O. Convention on Child Labor and Abolition of Forced
Labor."6 During 1961, the prohibition of labor recruitment by govern-
ment officials, equal pay irrespective of race or sex and freedom of
choice of work was extended to all rural and unskilled urban workers
through the Code of Rural Labor. The Code also provides for free
housing, food and transportation for rural workers; compulsory acci-
dent and illness insurance; collective bargaining; eight hour work day
and 48 hour work week; and precludes labor for children under 14
years of age (16 years in some occupations) and six hour work day for
112. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 166-167; see generally A. WILENSKY,
TRENDS IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS LEGISLATION FOR AFRICA (F. Holliday transl. 1971).
113. ILO, OFFICIAL BULL., XLV, No. 2, Supp. II at 231-234 (April 1962). The
commission, composed of high court justices from Senegal, Switzerland and Uruguay
reviewed documented evidence and made on-the-spot investigations traveling 9,000
kilometers through Angola and Mozambique by an unannounced itinerary.
114. G.A. Res. 2184, 21 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6554 (1966).
115. U.N. Doc. E/L.1403 (1970).
116. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 168-169.
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children under 18 years of age. Penalties for violations are exten-
sive."'
The emigration of native African labor to factories and mines in
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia constitutes a special problem
for Mozambique. Migration from the Lourenco Marques area has
continued for over 100 years. The reason is simply economic. Wages
in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are significantly higher than
in Mozambique."" Immediate prohibition of labor emigration would
cause severe economic hardship for a significant percentage of the
black African population of Southern Mozambique. Recognized as a
serious problem by Portugal, the situation is being alleviated by im-
proved working opportunities and conditions, which have reduced the
number of emigrants to 250,000 per year (of which approximately
100,000 are estimated to be illegal). Strong criminal sanctions exist
to prohibit illegal labor emigration."19
V. THE UNITED NATIONS BOYCOTT
In 1965, the General Assembly proposed what was considered the
final solution to Portuguese involvement in Africa. The Assembly
adopted a Fourth Committee resolution whereby it: (1) constituted
the Portuguese presence in Africa a "threat to international peace
and security;" (2) recognized the legitimacy of the black nationalist
"struggle" and "appealed" to all nations to cooperate with the Or-
ganization of African Unity to supply moral and material support; (3)
condemned exportation of workers to South Africa; (4) urged all
member states to sever or refrain from establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with Portugal; (5) urged the closure of sea ports to all Portu-
guese vessels and those in the service of Portugal; and (6) urged
member states to prohibit their ships from entering ports in Portugal
and its "colonial territories," and to boycott all trade with Portugal.
20
The General Assembly boycott of Portuguese trade, vessels and
sea ports was, from the outset, unrealistic and a predictable failure.
The Portuguese Overseas Provinces constitute international, geostra-
tegic centers too important for many Western nations to boycott
under contemporary circumstances. The Azores and Madeira islands,
lying on the intercontinental air route, provide sites for a United
States naval air station, outer space tracking facility and strategi-
cally important NATO projects. Cape Verde is a geostrategic point
117. Id. For English text see Rural Labour Code for Portuguese Overseas Prov-
inces, 86 INT'L LAB. REv. 285-293 (1962).
118. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 173-174.
119. Id.
120. G.A. Res. 2107, 20 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6209 (1965). African nations
gave serious consideration to economic sanctions against Portugal in early 1962. D.
WATT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1962 492-493 (1970).
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for air and shipping routes between Europe, Africa and South and
North America. The Portuguese territories in Southern Africa pro-
vide an important transportation infrastructure for its neighbors and
the international community. The railways and ports of Angola and
Mozambique afford virtually the only access to the copper resources
of central Africa and the landlocked nations of Zaire and Zambia., ',
Approximately half of the United States importation of maganese
ore, cobalt, uranium ore, natural gems, industrial diamonds and one-
third of its chromite, platinum group metals and coffee come from
nations dependant upon the transportation network in Angola and
Mozambique.'2 Portugal's fellow NATO members and a significant
proportion of African nations were, understandably, unwilling to ef-
fect such a boycott.1
23
The economic boycott having failed, the General Assembly con-
tinued procedures designed to deny Portugal access to United Na-
tions agencies and other international organizations. 4 In 1964, Afri-
can delegates walked out of the International Conference of Public
Education and the U.N. Trade and Development Conference in Ge-
neva. Later that year, Portugal was expelled from the U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa, and the executive committee of UNESCO
barred Portugal from the International Conference of Public Educa-
tion and the International Conference on Illiteracy. 125 During 1965,
the General Assembly recommended that the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary
Fund refuse Portugal financial, economic or technical assistance. 2 6 In
1966, the World Health Assembly suspended Portugal from partici-
pation in the Regional Committee for Africa.
127
VI. CONCLUSION
Societies exist in time more than in space. At any given moment a state
is but a collection of individuals . . . But it achieves identity through the
consciousness of a common history. This is the only 'experience' nations
have . . . History is the memory of states.'8
The history of Portugal traces an involvement in Africa which
dates from before the discovery of America.129 From that time, Portu-
121. See generally Hance, Three Economies, AFRICA REPORT 23-30 (Nov. 1967).
122. OVERSEAS COMPANIES OF PORTUGAL, PORTUGAL: INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (1971).
123. The General Assembly vote was 66 to 26 with 15 abstentions.
124. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 383.
125. Id.
126. G.A. Res. 2107, 20 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6209 (1965).
127. WHO Press Release, WP/31, May 27, 1966, at 4.
128. H. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED 331 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
KISSINGER].




gal consolidated its national identity as a multi-racial, multi-
cultural, transcontinental sovereignty. The debate in the United Na-
tions concerning the international status and destiny of the Portu-
guese Overseas Provinces spans nearly two decades. Within five years
from its admission to the United Nations, Portugal witnessed the
dismemberment of that identity by passage of Resolution 1542 (XV)
in the General Assembly. An act which, to obtain the acquiescence
of Portugal, would have required the "amputation of [its] national
memory.""" If, during this time, Portugal is to be judged recalcitrant,
its critics are equally guilty of gross distortion and rejection of a
fundamental tenet of legitimate international settlement, namely
that "diplomacy depends on persuasion and not imposition." '' Aside
from whatever influence the internationalization of Portugal's policy
may have had in the implementation of reforms in the Overseas
Provinces, the primary achievement of United Nations action re-
mains the collective legitimation of the insurgent movements and the
anti-Portuguese foreign policy of its member nations.
Carl A. Anderson
130. The phrase is Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn's. THE NOBEL LECTURE ON LITERA-
TURE 21 (T. Whitney transl. 1972).




A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Compiled and edited by M. Cheriff Bassiouni and Ved P. Nanda
(Charles C. Thomas, publisher)
1973
Volume I, 751 pages, $26.50
Volume II, 426 pages, $19.50
In spite of the doubts as to its existence expressed by Georg
Schwarzenberger in his classic essay,' "international criminal law"
has now secured a substantial measure of acceptance and recognition
as an independent discipline, incorporating elements of both interna-
tional and criminal law, while introducing factors and considerations
not found in either. Moreover, as these timely two volumes so well
illustrate, it is a multicultural discipline, drawing on the legal atti-
tudes and cultural mores of a great variety of civilizations in North
and Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia.
Still, the parameters remain somewhat unclear, or in the words
of the editors-Professors M. Cherif Bassiouni of the DePaul
University Law School and Ved. P. Nanda of the Denver University
Law School-"nebulous."2 A primary goal of the editors, which is in
large part fulfilled, is to remove this nebulosity.
These volumes are both an updating and an expansion of
Mueller and Wise's pioneering book on the same subject.' Together,
the Bassiouni and Nanda volumes constitute an immense work of
1,177 pages and 47 contributors from 22 different countries. Most, if
not all, of the subjects introduced by Mueller and Wise are more
comprehensively covered in these volumes, as are a variety of subjects
of current significance not found in Mueller and Wise.
4
This breath of coverage may cause some purists to question
whether all the areas treated properly fall within the international
criminal law category. Some might argue, for example, that it is not
a function of a United Nations peace-keeping force, at least as these
forces have developed in practice, to enforce international criminal
law, but rather to act as a buffer between belligerents in order to
allow them to resolve their differences through procedures for peace-
1. Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CUmENT
LEGAL PRoaLEMS 263 (1950).
2. Preface, Vol. I, at xi.
3. G. MUELLER & E. WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (1965).
4. For example, the problem of international narcotics control and the enforce-
ment machinery of international criminal law.
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ful settlement. The argument to the contrary is that, theoretically at
least, UN forces may be employed under Chapter VII of the Charter
to enforce the peace against an aggressor state, which, under the
Nuremberg principles, would be committing a crime against peace. ")
But we need not linger long over such semantic squabbling. There is
much in these volumes to interest and enlighten the international
lawyer, the criminal lawyer and the international criminal lawyer
alike. Indeed, the very breadth of the coverage poses problems for
the reviewer, because it is difficult, no impossible, to do justice in the
context of a brief review to the work of all the forty-seven authors
whose essays appear in these volumes. Rather, one must limit oneself
to a description in broad outline of the areas covered and attempt to
set forth an admittedly personal view of some, but by no means all,
of the highlights. Failure to mention a particular author's work
should therefore in no way be viewed as an adverse reflection on its
quality.
The first volume, in the words of the editors, "deals essentially
with the penal aspects of international law,"' and begins with an
exploration of the doctrinal and theoretical bases of international
criminal law. In an introductory essay,7 Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Pro-
fessor of Law, New York University, and Douglas Beshavov, Assistant
Corporation Counsel, City of New York, trace the development of
international criminal law, specifically, the "process that has taken
place for several hundred years and has resulted in the creation of
international criminal jurisdiction over piracy offenses, war crimes
and crimes against humanity, genocide, and a host of lesser interna-
tional offenses provided for by treaty and convention."' In addition,
they argue that "the emergence of intenational standards of human
rights, on both world and regional levels, and of general or special
application, has added to the growing body of international conduct
norms which, because they require enforcement, qualify as substan-
tive I.C.L."9 They conclude that, in spite of this considerable body
of substantive international criminal law, enforcement techniques
are so underdeveloped as to give rise to a "crisis," and reluctantly
"acknowledge that for the foreseeable future, reliance will have to be
placed on the traditionally less criminal and much more civil and
urban, though also more subtle, appeal to the sense of injustice of all
mankind, the pride of nations, and the competition for prestige and
honor.""'
5. In this connection it should be noted that the Nuremberg Trials found only
individuals and not the state of Germany guilty of the crime against peace.
6. Preface, Vol. II, at ix.
7. Vol. I, at 5.
8. Vol. I, at 7.
9. Id.
10. Vol. I, at 22.
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Fritz Munch, Professor of International Law, University of Bonn,
contends in an essay on "State Responsibility in International Crimi-
nal Law"" that, under the lex lata, only individuals, and not states,
may be held criminally responsible and subject to criminal penalties
for international crimes. He suggests that state responsibility for in-
ternational crimes in a sense analogous to municipal penal law would
be possible as a jurisprudential matter but would require a funda-
mental change in the negative attitudes presently prevailing in the
world community. His conclusion thus, in effect, confirms that ex-
pressed twenty-five years earlier by Schwarzenberger.2 On the other
hand, in a note following the Munch essay, the editors point out that
the International Law Commission, in its study of state responsibil-
ity, purposely does not draw a distinction between a tort and a crime
on the assumption that "a wrongful act subjects a state to responsi-
bility under international law regardless of the focus or label attached
to reparations."'"
After the expositions on doctrine and theory, the focus turns to
specific aspects of international criminal law under the following
broad headings: (1) crimes against peace, i.e., aggression, indirect
aggression and national and collective self-defense; (2) the regulation
of armed conflict; (3) common crimes against mankind, i.e., air and
sea piracy and other forms of terrorism, slavery, genocide, racial dis-
crimination and the international narcotics trade; (4) the prosecution
of international crime and the creation of an international criminal
court; and (5) the enforcement machinery of international criminal
law, i.e., police cooperation with respect to international crimes and
the possible role of an international criminal police and of United
Nations peacekeeping forces as a world police force. With respect to
aggression, editor Bassiouni contributes a helpful history of efforts by
the world community to define this elusive and emotionally laden
concept and an equally useful summary of proposals on defining ag-
gression before the United Nations as of June 1971." He notes that
these efforts have been "marked with few successes," but suggests
that they have at a minimum helped to clarify the issues and have
thereby made a significant contribution to the maintenance of mini-
mal world order.
It is generally agreed that the use of force in self-defense does not
constitute aggression, but the world community has been no more
successful in reaching agreement on a precise definition of self-
defense than it has on a definition of aggression. Yoram Dinstein,
11. Vol. I, at 143.
12. Schwarzenberger, supra note 1.
13. Vol. I, at 154.
14. Vol. I, at 159.
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Professor of International Law, University of Tel Aviv, contributes a
well thought out essay 5 which surveys various views on the content
of the self-defense concept and perceptively analyses the components
of the problem. Parenthetically, it may be noted that Dinstein's
paper is refreshingly free of Middle East polemics. His only oblique
reference to the Middle East is his disparaging comments on what he
sees as the failure of the United Nations Security Council to perform
its function under the Charter of evaluating the conduct of a state
which purports to justify its use of force on the ground of self-
defense. 6
As to the regulation of armed conflict, editor Nanda briefly
sketches some of "the enormity and complexity of imposing effective
legal limits on the military uses of the Oceans."' 7 He is of the opinion
that the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor and in the Seabed ThereoP8 "suffers from several
imperfections and inadequacies," but is also "future-oriented, pro-
viding a desirable first step for further negotiation of other multilat-
eral agreements toward the peaceful uses of the seabed."'' 9 The peace-
ful use of the seabed has been one of the many issues under considera-
tion in the preliminary meetings of the law of the sea conference.
Some commentators, however, believe that it is an issue which has
been shamefully neglected. 20 Professor Nanda's observations would
seem most apposite to this concern.
The next part of the first volume, which deals with common
crimes against mankind, contains discussions on subjects of substan-
tial current relevance, namely air and sea piracy, treason, slavery,
genocide, racial discrimination and international narcotics; all are
interesting reading. In particular, it may surprise some readers to
learn that, as noted in an essay by the editors,2 ' in spite of substantial
national and international efforts towards the suppression of slavery,
a 1971 Report of the Rapporteur of Britain's Anti-Slavery Society
alleges that debt bondage, serfdom, chattel slavery, servile forms of
marriage and the sale of children still constitute "a recognizable ele-
ment in patterns of society" in thirty-eight countries. Also, not gener-
15. Vol. I, at 273.
16. Vol. I, at 286. Cf. Murphy, The Trend Towards Anarchy in the United
Nations, 54 A.B.A.J. 267 (1968).
17. Vol. I, at 343, 350.
18. T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
19. Vol. I, at 350.
20. See, e.g., Auburn, The International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 173,
189 (1971).
21. Vol. I, at 504.
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ally well known, even to most international lawyers, are the legal and
other problems arising out of efforts to combat traffic in narcotics.
Editor Bassiouni, in an essay on "The International Narcotics Con-
trol System,"22 admirably fills this gap in our knowledge.
The last part of the first volume deals generally with enforce-
ment procedures in international criminal law. Several papers dis-
cuss and evaluate the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, as well as the
principles of international law and policy derived from the trials and
developed by the United Nations and other international institu-
tions. Judge J.V. Dautricourt, Professor of Law, University of Lou-
vain, a leading proponent of an international criminal court, ably
presents arguments in favor of the creation of such an institution.
23
Recently, under the auspices of the Foundation for the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, two unofficial conferences held
at Windspread, Racine, Wisconsin and at Bellagio, Italy drafted a
convention on international crimes and a statute for an international
criminal court . 2 Since the 1953 United Nations Draft Statute, 2 how-
ever, the establishment of an international criminal court has not
been pursued at the official level .
2
Also, in the enforcement area, Jean Nepote, Secretary General
of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), consid-
ers the role an international police force might play in the context of
an international criminal court and discusses the operations of Inter-
pol and other forms of international police cooperation with respect
to international crimes.2 7 Finally, S.K. Agrawela, Professor of Inter-
national Law, University of Poona, describes the functions of United
Nations peacekeeping forces, and suggests that the world community
should consider establishing a permanent United Nations force,
whose function would be limited to peacekeeping, as opposed to en-
22. Vol. I, at 533.
23. Vol. I, at 636.
24. The drafts have been published with the assistance of the Johnson Foundation
under the title: "The Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1st and 2nd
International Criminal Law Conference" (1973). Copies may be obtained from the
Johnson Foundation, Racine, Wisconsin 53401.
25. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the 1953 Com-
mittee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, U.N. Doc.
A/2645 (1954).
26. By way of editorial comment in the July 1973 issue of the AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, Professor Leo Gross has called for a resumption of early United
Nations efforts to draft a comprehensive convention on all forms of terrorism and to
establish an international criminal court. Gross, International Terrorism and Interna-
tional Criminal Jurisdiction, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 508 (1973). For a caveat regarding this
suggestion, see Murphy, Letter to the Editor-in-Chief, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. - (April
1974).
27. Vol. I, at 676.
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forcement actions, in order to improve the chances of obtaining a
strong consensus in support of such an institution."
In the second volume, which deals with questions of jurisdiction
over and international cooperation with respect to international
crimes, the emphasis shifts, in the words of the editors, to "the inter-
national aspects of municipal criminal law and those international
law aspects which affect it.""9 S.Z. Feller, Dean and Professor of
Criminal Law, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in a lengthy
essay,30 analyses the various situations in which states have exercised,
or may exercise, jurisdiction over offenses with a foreign element, and
suggests that a primary goal of international cooperation is to assure
that the jurisdictional provisions of individual states municipal law
are expansive enough to encompass all offenders and avoid "loop-
holes being left through which offenders are able to escape criminal
responsibility." 3' The filling of jurisdictional gaps is also a concern of
Steven Gorove, Professor of Law, University of Mississippi, who con-
tends that states must go beyond the jurisdictional provisions of the
Outer Space Treaty32 and engage in "further national and interna-
tional action involving domestic legislation and treaty law . . .to
avoid lawlessness and chaotic conditions.
33
Richard R. Baxter, Professor of Law, Harvard University, dis-
cusses problems of municipal and international law jurisdiction over
individuals charged with the commission of war crimes,' and Otto
Triffterer, Professor of Criminal Law, University of Bielefield, does
the same with respect to such jurisdiction over states. With respect
to the latter, Triffterer concludes that although criminal jurisdiction
over states is within the discipline of public international law, pun-
ishment of states is not yet provided for in substantive public interna-
tional law because of a lack of enforcing authority.
3
The third and fourth chapters of the second volume deal with
immunities and exceptions to international criminal jurisdiction,
namely, diplomatic immunity and status of forces arrangements,
36
and, in an essay by Istvan Szaszy, Emeritus Professor of Interna-
tional Law, University of Budapest, with "Conflict-of-Laws Rules in
International Criminal Law and Municipal Criminal Law in Western
28. Vol. I, at 694.
29. Preface, Vol. II, at ix.
30. Vol. II, at 5.
31. Vol. II, at 45.
32. T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
33. Vol. II, at 48, 57.
34. Vol. II, at 65.
35. Vol. II, at 86.
36. Vol. II, at 97-134.
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and Socialist Countries. ' ' 7 The latter chapter is especially valuable
for the comparative law dimension it brings to a subject of concern
to both domestic and international lawyers.
The second volume also contains several essays on judicial assis-
tance and cooperation in penal matters which should prove informa-
tive to the international lawyer, as well as to his domestic counter-
part." A case study of such cooperation among countries of common
geographical, political and social backgrounds is provided by Bart B.
DeSchutter, Professor of International Law, University of Brussels, in
his essay on the Benelux experience.3
Finally, the last part of the second volume covers extradition and
asylum.4 0 As is characteristic of much of the second volume, this part
contains an innovative comparative law dimension in editor Bas-
siouni's article on United States extradition law and practice,4 and
in a survey by Albert Metzger, former Chief Legal Adviser to the
Government, Freetown, Sierra Leone, of West African extradition
cases.42 Both authors are critical of their countries' practices, albeit
for different reasons, and suggest a more internationally oriented
approach to the problem.
Perhaps it would be appropriate in conclusion to reflect for a
moment on an issue touched upon briefly at the beginning of this
review, namely, the existence or lack thereof of an "international
criminal law." In view of the often expressed conclusion that states
qua states are not subject to international criminal responsibility
under the present status of the law, and in light of the large number
of topics covered in these volumes which do not involve relations
between or among states, the phrase "international criminal law"
does seem to suffer from a certain measure of imprecision. In this
connection, the concept "transnational law," one of Philip C. Jes-
sup's many major contributions to international jurisprudence,
comes to mind. Judge Jessup defined transnational law "to include
all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national
frontiers. Both public and private international law are included as
are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard catego-
ries." Subjects often cited as an example of transnational law are
the immigration and nationality laws which are rarely a matter of
international law, but which clearly regulate "actions or events that
37. Vol. II, at 135.
38. Vol. II, at 171-305.
39. Vol. II, at 249.
40. Vol. II, at 309-416.
41. Vol. II, at 347.
42. Vol. II, at 375.
43. P. JESSUP, STORRS LECTURES, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
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transcend national frontiers." Similarly, municipal law rules con-
cerning offenses with a foreign element seldom have international law
as their source but regulate events transcending national frontiers.
A possible alternative approach to this area, then, might be to
entitle it "transnational criminal law" and to regard it as a branch
of "transnational law." Under this approach the many subjects in-
cluded in these volumes would surely be regarded as transcending
national borders, national cultures and, indeed, the parochial bound-
aries of academic disciplines.
In any event, we are indebted to editors Bassiouni and Nanda
for their judicious selection of essays for, and their careful editing of,
this multifaceted work. One may easily agree with the editors that
"even if there is doubt about international criminal law, there is no
doubt about international criminality."" Many of the writings ap-
pearing in these volumes help to deepen our understanding of the
nature of international or transnational criminality and advance pro-
vocative proposals for its prevention and suppression.
John F. Murphy*
44. Preface, Vol. I, at xii.
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
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